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Abstract 
 
Strategic Flexibility has been widely cited as a critical success factor and capability for 
navigating today’s complex and dynamic business landscape. Despite this recognition, 
there remain considerable challenges in the conceptual understanding and 
implementation of this strategic principle. Strategic flexibility has also been linked to 
strategic decision making as the extent to which new and alternative options in strategic 
decision making are generated and considered. This relationship plays a key role in 
effective firm response and when combined with a strategically designed leadership 
pipeline it can result in a valuable source of competitive advantage. Yet we know very 
little about the interplay between particular environments and the factors that influence 
executives’ strategic frames as little empirical research has been conducted in this area. 
 
Therefore, this study extends knowledge of these relationships by investigating the 
strategic frames of senior executives, the contexts and the factors that influence their 
capability for cognitive strategic flexibility. The study explores strategic thinking and 
decision-making at the individual and organizational levels. Thus, it falls under the 
Individual and Organizational Minds research stream with significant influence by the 
two cognitive branches of Information Processing Perspective and Ideological 
Perspectives. A qualitative and inductive case study method was employed with the use 
of the Kelley Repertory Grid Interview technique. Consistent with the interpretivist 
philosophy, this qualitative research focuses on the perceptions and experiences of the 
participants in the work context. 
 
The study revealed multiple factors inhibiting the cognitive strategic flexibility of the 
individual executives. It also develops new conceptual connections between the Strategic 
Flexibility and Ambidexterity research streams that show promise for enabling strategic 
thinking in practice. The inductive creation of the new iSCOPE Framework from this 
research provides a useful tool that integrates academic theories and facilitates the 
development of intervention solutions that are concrete, mutually reinforcing and 
systematic.  
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1.0 Introduction  
 
A firm’s success or failure in the global marketplace is increasingly dependent on its 
strategic leaders and their ability to make sense of and respond to the environments in 
which they operate. Strategic Flexibility has been widely cited as a critical success factor 
and capability for navigating today’s complex business landscape (Hitt and Keats et al. 
1998, and Sanchez 1997, Buyterndijk 2010). Despite this recognition, there remain 
considerable challenges in the conceptual understanding and implementation of this 
strategic principle. Further, although this capability is linked to the cognitive ability of a 
firm’ individual executives, limited research has been done at this level (Sanchez 1997, 
Reger and Palmer 1996, Nadkarni and Narayanan 2004). Recent research further stresses 
the increasing cognitive demands that flexibility brings to business leaders including 
paradoxical tensions of delivering on today and foreseeing the future needs of the firm 
(Heifitz and Grashow et al. 2009, Teece 2014).  However, we know even less about how 
this flexibility is achieved in practice (Birkinshaw 2015). To gain a better understanding 
of how executives cope with these cognitive demands, consideration of the interplay 
between firm-level context and individual factors is necessary (Raisch and Birkinshaw et 
al. 2009). Therefore, this research design aimed at the investigation of the strategic 
frames of senior executives, the factors, and contexts that influence their potential for 
strategic flexibility. As this study explores strategic thinking and decision-making at the 
individual and organizational levels, it falls primarily under the “Individual and 
Organizational minds” research stream (Schwenk 1995). Within this stream, two 
cognitive perspectives concurrently underlie this research. The first is the “Information 
Processing Perspective” which provides theoretical foundations for individual and 
organizational level strategic thinking (Sharfman and Dean 1997), The second is the 
”Ideological Perspective” which covers the implications of “socially constructed belief 
systems” both at the organizational and industry level (Sharfman and Dean 1997). This 
Case Study uses qualitative methodologies and a “general inductive approach” of data 
analysis to investigate the potential for strategic flexibility and ambidexterity in one large 
multinational corporation (Thomas 2006). The findings and resulting induced iSCOPE 
framework are utilized to design and implement wide-scale change in the case company. 
15 
 
1.1 The Research Problem, Questions, And Structure 
The need for flexibility or organizational adaptation to fit one’s environment is not new 
and is a theme that has long been of interest both in the strategic literature and to 
practitioners themselves (Philip Selznick 1957). However in the age of globalization, 
intensifying competition, with growing complexity and uncertainty of markets, achieving 
this fit is increasingly difficult. Thus, it is not surprising that there has been a mounting 
emphasis in the strategic literature and popular media regarding this challenge of 
operating in fast-changing and uncertain business environments. The commonly proposed 
response is to reduce risk by increased flexibility at the firm, market, business unit and 
individual cognitive level. The widespread recognition of this need has contributed to 
“flexibility’s emergence as a new imperative” (De Toni and Tonchia 2005).  In fact, 
during the early stages of this research when the global financial crisis was in full force, 
Strategic Flexibility was being promoted as a means to combat or exploit it (Sull 2009). 
Yet there have also been those that have noted from empirical evidence that “rigidity in 
market strategies and actions is more the rule than the exception in organizations” 
(Matthyssens and Pauwels et al. 2005). Much of this research has been linked to 
cognitive inertia at the individual and organizational level (Reger and Palmer 1996, Sull 
2005). Also, the related research stream of Ambidexterity suggests that this rigidity may 
be connected to both individuals and firms struggling with the ability to resolve the 
cognitive tensions fast changing environments demand of them (Gibson and Birkinshaw 
2004, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). 
 
Undoubtedly many of today’s multinational corporations operate in markets that may at 
any one point in time demand a broad spectrum of responses from them. They do need to 
be adaptive, flexible and in many cases possess the capability for strategic flexibility. In 
supporting this viewpoint, Hitt and Keats et al. (1998) go as far as stating that “Success in 
the 21st-century organization will depend first on strategic flexibility” and that it “will 
require new types of organizations and leaders.”  How then, do multinationals create this 
capability? At the business unit or organizational level, it involves creating flexible 
resources, tactics and processes (Sanchez 1997). At the individual leader level, the key 
component is the cognitive flexibility of the strategic frames of the executives themselves 
16 
 
(Sanchez 1997, Shimizu and Hitt 2004). This dependency on leader’s cognitive abilities 
may be one reason behind Hsieh and Yik’s (2005) suggestion that in strategy one 
approach “is to weigh a corporation’s strategic options against its ability to launch new 
businesses, new approaches, and other forms of breakthrough performance – in other 
words its leadership”. The expectations of a leader’s strategic thinking competency are 
increasingly being linked to the leader’s ability to be adaptive (Heifetz and Grashow et al. 
2009). The adaptive capability relates to both the individual’s leadership style and 
cognitive strategic flexibility. The adaptive leader is expected to support the adaptation of 
the firm by fostering an environment of innovativeness. This task is accomplished 
through behavioral practices and the creation of supportive management mechanisms that 
enable the innovativeness of their employees. At the same time, the adaptive leaders 
should be flexible in their strategic thinking and decision making so as to balance 
exploiting today’s capabilities while anticipating and generating options for future 
capabilities (Sanchez 1997, Lewis 2000). This latter dimension is fundamental to both 
strategic flexibility and the ambidextrous leader (Buytendijk 2010, Smith and Tushman 
2005). Yet, what are the factors that support the creation and blossoming of an adaptive 
leadership culture? What type of strategic frames make leaders more or less adaptive? 
Are there factors or contexts that promote the potential for cognitive strategic flexibility 
of executive leaders? If so how does one go about enabling these in practice?  
 
1.1.1 Theoretical Perspective And Research Process  
 
Qualitative research and, in particular, Case Studies are especially well suited for gaining 
in-depth and rich data sources for an understanding of the phenomenon in context 
(Eisenhardt 1989a, Yin 1994, Creswell 2009). Given the exploratory nature of the 
research objectives and questions, a general inductive approach was used in the 
development of data collection and its analysis (Thomas 2006). (For a comprehensive 
coverage of the Qualitative research approach applied, please see chapter three section 
3.2 Research Methodology). To enhance the effectiveness and validity of the approach, 
the researcher was in the field or center of the context that allowed for multiple data 
collection methods and sources (Creswell 2009). This use of combining data collection 
17 
 
methods follows best practice in case study research (Eisenhardt 1989a, Creswell 2009, 
Yin 1994). This general inductive approach and range of methods provided a broader and 
deeper perspective on the context and the individuals. Ultimately, this greatly facilitated 
interpretation of the findings and addressing the research questions. 
 
The primary theoretical perspective used in this research was interpretivist/social 
constructivist. As such, Kelley’s Personal Construct Theory is utilized as the researcher 
believes that each individual constructs their own reality that is unique despite shared 
meaning developed in social or culture contexts (Kelly 1955). This perspective fits well 
with the nature of the research problem and purpose of the study being focused on the 
investigation and interpretation of the subjective meaning that executives construct from 
their work environment experiences. As noted above, the research drew principally on 
qualitative research methodology and, in particular, the qualitative case study as a method 
of inquiry. This mode of inquiry meant that the use of methods such as open-ended 
questioning, Kelly Repertory Grid interviews and other techniques that elicit participant’s 
perspectives was employed.   
 
The research also utilizes a general inductive approach for analyzing data for the purpose 
of discovering patterns, themes and a framework for better understanding of the 
phenomenon (Thomas 2006, Creswell 2009). Eisenhardt in her contribution to case 
method theory recommends that the specification “of some initial constructs will help 
shape the research design and measure some constructs and related elements more 
accurately” (Eisenhardt 1989a). Likewise, although the nature of qualitative case study is 
primarily inductive, by work familiarity the researcher deduced some initial consideration 
of themes. This deduction was reinforced by the conducting of one exploratory focus 
group pilot study at the global headquarters of the company during March of 2009.  
However, the inductive nature of the qualitative case method with its iterative process of 
data collection and analysis did necessitate going back to participants and other data 
points several times in the subsequent phases of the research to ensure “respondent 
validation” (Bryman 1988). 
18 
 
Nevertheless, the overall inductive nature of the research approach has been emphasized 
in the data collection methods chosen and in the open-ended quality of the research 
questions. Given the research problems identified, the research objectives intended to 
investigate the strategic frames of senior executives, the factors, and contexts that 
influence their potential for strategic flexibility. The objectives are in two groupings, each 
with one central theme objective and two supporting objectives:  
 
How do different environments influence the strategic frames of senior executives? 
What factors inhibit executive’s strategic frames and the potential for strategic 
flexibility? 
What factors enable executive’s strategic frames and the potential for strategic 
flexibility? 
 
How do executives cope with diverse strategic decision-making environments? 
Which decision-making environments have a greater need for executive’s strategic 
flexibility? 
Which decision-making environments have a lesser need for executive’s strategic 
flexibility? 
 
1.1.2 Research Context And Phases 
 
1.1.2.1 Case Company Context And Link To Theory 
 
According to Birkinshaw (2015), “qualitative research requires good access to senior 
executives”. The researcher’s role (Head of Executive Development) inside the Case 
Company assisted the fulfillment of this requirement. At the time of the launch of this 
research, the Case Company was a recently formed telecommunications industry Joint 
Venture (JV) between two global corporations. The rationale behind the JV was to create 
scale and scope in a consolidating industry that was experiencing intensifying 
competition. During the first year of the JV, the firm had already made significant 
progress with the challenges of building its independent culture, values, and routines. 
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However, the senior management of the company expressed concern that its Strategic 
Leader level executives were not showing the “flexible mindset” needed to cope with the 
demands of the changing landscape (Case Company Internal Communications June 
2007).  In parallel, there had been discussion and official communications around the 
need for creating strategic flexibility as a response to the harsh competitive environment 
facing the organization (CEO communications Q2 2007). Additionally the use of the 
terms “flexibility”, “agility” and “strategic agility” were occurring with increasing 
frequency in internal communications on the corporate intranet and webcasts with little 
consistency in meaning.  
 
With the continued intensification of industry competition and increasing financial 
pressure on the case study firm, the concern over the Leadership Competencies and the 
strategic frames of the company’s Strategic Leader level executives intensified. In TRN 
Strategic Leaders are one of four levels of leadership and represent a small but high 
impact group of leaders. See Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: TRN’s Leadership Levels  
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Based on the researcher’s initial understanding of the theoretical themes underlying 
strategic flexibility, this research was launched as a preliminary step in assessing the 
validity of these concerns. The first consideration involved an exploration of what might 
be the appropriate strategic frames for this organization’s Strategic Leaders. The long-
term objective that emerged from the research was to influence the design of the firm’s 
Leadership Brand through the creation of a new TRN Leadership Framework. This 
intervention would support and develop the appropriate strategic frames for the 
organization’s Strategic Leaders (Intagliata and Ulrich et al. 2000). The creation of the 
new Leadership Framework was additionally intended to support TRN’s ambition to 
increase its competitiveness through a stronger leadership pipeline with enhanced 
strategic foresight at all leadership levels (Charan, Drotter and Noel 2001). During the 
inductive research process, the researcher experienced increased awareness of the need 
for a more extensive intervention with additional change mechanisms employed. The 
recognition that recent developments in the ambidexterity research stream had a useful 
application for enabling strategic flexibility was then utilized and leveraged in the 
intervention plan. The resulting application of the new connections amongst the strategic 
flexibility and ambidextrous streams helps move thinking forward in both fields and 
provides useful examples of how to execute these concepts in practice.  
 
An initial theoretical influence on this research was the work of Nadkarni and Narayanan 
(2004) linking strategic schemas to industry clock speed and firm performance. They 
suggest that complex schemas promote strategic flexibility and are suitable for firms in 
fast clock speed industries while the focus of schemas promote strategic stability and are 
suitable for firms in slow clock speed industries. While this work has not been done on 
the individual cognitive level, it does suggest that there is a preferred match of strategic 
cognitive frames to industry type. This research will argue and the data collected will 
evidence that the case study company (TRN) exists in an industry context that does not fit 
consistently in either of these categories but rather has dimensions of both. This condition 
leads to another question researchers have asked in these mixed dynamic contexts. 
Namely, whether senior executives can simultaneously manage businesses with different 
dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis 1986, Tushman and O’Reilly III 1996). Recently 
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this paradoxical thinking and the tensions between the need to exploit and explore have 
been of increased interest at the individual level in the ambidexterity research stream. 
While the term “ambidextrous manager” has started to emerge limited research has been 
done at this level of analysis (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, Mom and van den Bosch et 
al. 2009)  
 
The implication for TRN and any large multinational corporation who may have diverse 
market dimensions within one business is that it is mission critical to develop the right 
leadership competencies to match the corresponding business and market dimensions. 
This challenge of matching and allocating leaders is a daunting one that needs a proactive 
and informed talent management system (Hermann and Komm et al. 2011, Ulrich and 
Small et al. 2000). Attaining a deeper understanding of the factors that influence the 
cognitive demands on executives will greatly assist the consideration of the fit of 
strategic cognitive frames to specific contexts. This fit has significant repercussions for 
the development, recruitment and placement of executive talent within the firm. Snowden 
and Boone (2007) argue that executives need to “tailor their approach to fit the 
complexity of the circumstances they face.” However, research suggests that a variation 
of factors within different contexts influence their ability to do so successfully (Kiesler 
and Sproull 1982, Reger and Palmer 1996). In environments undergoing change, even 
recognizing the level of complexity is not an easy task. Therefore, the purpose of the case 
study research phases was to collect data and observe contexts that would most 
effectively facilitate understanding of the factors influencing those strategic leaders. 
Achieving this purpose necessitated research phases and methods that allowed the 
researcher to connect themes at a higher level and also descend to factors at the 
individual level. The overall intention was to follow the primary purpose of the inductive 
approach that is “to allow research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant, or 
significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed by structured 
methodologies” (Thomas 2006) 
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1.1.2.2 Research Phases 
 
The research process has been divided into three projects with specific methods and 
objectives for each. A brief overview of the projects is provided below.  See Figures 2 
and 3 for high-level timelines. 
 
Figure 2: High-Level Timeline Of The Three Research Phases. 
 
Figure 3: TRN Significant Events Timeline 
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1.1.2.2.1 Project One: Inducing Strategic Constructs And Elements In 
The Case Company Context 
 
As this research utilizes the Case Study method to investigate individuals, an in-depth 
consideration understanding of the Case Company context was essential (Raisch and 
Birkinshaw et al. 2009). This method was useful to and consistent with the research 
questions regarding factors and contexts influencing the individual and the organization. 
The intent of this phase of the study was to 1) discover the key contextual drivers and 2) 
induce potential, themes, constructs and elements that may be influencing executive 
strategic frames 3) enable and inform the design of the repertory grid interviews of 
Project Two. The research timeline and data collection methods are illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Project One Research Timeline And Data Collection Methods 
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1.1.2.2.2 Project Two: Repertory Grid Interviews And Elicitation Of 
Executive Constructs  
 
Based on the induced findings from Project One of the research a focused and in-depth 
interview tool was created using the Kelley Repertory Grid Interview technique. The 
intent was to 1) elicit Executive’s strategic constructs in their own words from within 
their own working environment 2) identify factors and contexts that were influencing the 
strategic decision-making frames of the executives. The direct but nonintrusive method 
employed via the repertory grid interviews resulted in both fine-grained and rich sources 
of data. These sources confirmed not only many of the preliminary constructs and factors 
but also revealed several new constructs and influences not anticipated or uncovered in 
Project One. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Project Two Research Timeline And Data Collection Methods 
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1.1.2.2.3 Project Three: Assessing The Need For Strategic Flexibility 
 
Phase three of this research analyzed both the extant strategic constructs and context of 
the case company through cross repertory grid content analysis, a strategic thinking 
survey, and a strategic thinking workshop. The objectives of these combined methods 
was fivefold: 
 
1) Gain further insight into the dynamics of the strategic context of TRN. 
2) Obtain a deeper understanding of the strategic constructs extant in the senior 
leaders of TRN and their implications. 
3) Provide additional reliability of the temporal relevance of the research findings. 
4) Ensure that a high level of methods triangulation and validity was achieved. 
5) Gain empirical evidence and insight to support the specific design of the TRN 
intervention. 
 
Figure 6:  Project Three  Research Timeline And Data Collection Methods 
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From the content analysis, an integrative framework was induced (iSCOPE Framework). 
Based on the outcomes and the combined findings from all three projects, the iSCOPE 
framework was used as an integrative tool to analyze and generate recommendations for 
the redesign of the Case Company’s Leadership Framework and supporting mechanisms. 
The findings and analysis from the framework made clear the need for the creation of a 
wider Cultural Transformation Project Office (CTPO) initiative, with particular 
consideration of the current and future need for cognitive strategic flexibility in TRN. 
Chapters six and seven deal specifically with the iSCOPE framework analysis and TRN 
intervention details. Chapter eight summarizes contributions to theory and practice and 
recommendations for future research. The Theoretical foundations underlying this thesis 
will be covered next in Chapter Two. 
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Strategic Flexibility 
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2.0 Theoretical Positioning: An Overview 
 
This research had a primary focus on factors that enable the potential for cognitive 
strategic flexibility at the individual level of senior leaders. However, this inductive 
exploration also necessitated consideration of organizational and environmental 
contextual factors that influence the Case Company’s strategic thinking and decision 
making. Therefore, relevant literature from the “Individual and Organizational minds” 
research stream was a primary source (Schwenk 1995). Within this stream, two 
theoretical perspectives have been central. Firstly, the “Information Processing 
Perspective” has provided theoretical foundations for individual and organizational level 
strategic thinking (Sharfman and Dean 1997).  Secondly, the “Ideological Perspective” 
has supported the understanding and investigation of implications of “socially 
constructed belief systems” both at the organizational and industry level (Sharfman and 
Dean 1997). The field of psychology and contributions such as Kelly’s (1955) Personal 
Construct Theory are also extremely significant given that much of strategic management 
theory in the cognitive perspective is based on the foundation of this work. Adaptation of 
the individual and the firm also has interlinking themes. These are strategic flexibility and 
ambidexterity. While the researcher has not found in the literature previously explicit and 
direct connections between these two streams this review will show that much of the 
content supports the overriding objective of adaptation. Further, the researcher will argue 
that there is a benefit in further integrating these two streams both at the individual and 
organizational levels.  The development of a synthesis between these two related streams 
would advance conceptual understanding and improve managerial practice. 
 
The concept of Strategic flexibility has experienced a growing interest in close 
correlation with the perception that environmental dynamics are increasing in their 
degree of uncertainty and speed of change. As Buytendijk (2010) emphasizes, “The more 
uncertain the future, the more valuable flexibility and adaptiveness are as core strategic 
competencies.” This need for adaptive responses has generated the overarching concept 
of flexibility as a strategic principle from which strategic flexibility has arisen as a unique 
component. The need and overall degree of flexibility required by firms are dependent on 
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many external environmental factors but can also be reliant on the extent of the proactive 
orientation of the firm (Evans 1991). Essentially this is about creating options “rather 
than strong commitments that cause trade-off dilemmas” (Buytendijk 2010). The 
evolution of the literature has two main related adaptive themes or dilemmas. The first is 
the firm’s need to find the correct balance between exploitation and exploration of its 
environment (March 1991). This dilemma has had a more recent proliferation of 
contributors in the literature under the ambidexterity heading (Lavie and Stettner et al. 
2010). Ambidexterity at the firm level is closely related to a company's flexibility. The 
"ambidextrous manager" or individual level ambidexterity also has close relations to 
cognitive strategic flexibility’s paradoxical thinking dimension (Lewis 2000). The second 
theme is the adaptive challenge of a firm or individual and the orientation it has towards 
deliberate or emerging strategic planning (Mintzberg 1990). Given the link between 
individual and organizational action, the literature related to leaders strategic frames and 
cognition are also a central concern. Additionally, the role of leadership has always held 
the expectation of sensing, sense-making, and setting strategic direction. This 
competence is at the basis of all adaptive firm responses (Sharfman and Dean 1997, 
Sanchez 1997, Bogner and Barr 2000). As such firms strategically invest significant time 
and resources in building leadership pipelines and competency models that fit their 
strategic context with the aim of enhancing their competitiveness (Ulrich and Smallwood 
et al. 2000). The challenge of delivering on this objective is complex and is impacted by 
factors at both the individual and organizational level. The significance of this challenge 
is exemplified  by Hsieh and Yik’s (2005) research conclusion that “Even the best 
strategy can fail if a corporation doesn’t have a cadre of leaders with the right capabilities 
at the right levels of the organization.”  
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2.1 The Foundation of Adaptation: Flexibility  
 
The range of definitions of flexibility as it has evolved in the literature is extensive and 
varies for at least three reasons. First, the concept has proven to be ambiguous due to its 
application across many diverse contexts, environments, industries, and functions (Aaker 
and Mascarenhas 1984, Evans 1991, Volberda 1996, Johnson and Lee et al. 2003, 
Nadkarni and Herrmann 2010). Secondly, it has been researched from several different 
disciplines including strategic management, economics, organizational theory, and 
marketing to name just a few. Thirdly, the concept can be applied at the level of the firm, 
business unit or the individual decision maker. As stated by De Toni and Tonchia (2005) 
“There is not in the literature, a definition of flexibility that is widely accepted.” This task 
is further exacerbated by competing scholars struggling to find holes in the literature. 
Therefore, even a review of definitions is a considerable task as can be evidenced by 
articles that refer to defining the term as a “search for the Holy Grail” (Golden and 
Powell 2000). . 
 
Within the discipline of strategic management, there have been numerous attempts to 
clarify and bring some structure to the concept. One of the central challenges to this task 
as suggested above is that flexibility has been from the beginning a fundamental strategic 
principle of strategy (De Toni and Tonchia 2005, Sanchez 1997). Ansoff (1965) in his 
earlier writings proposed that flexibility is a strategic option. It can be exercised in the 
focus dimension by “internal flexibility created by liquidity and external flexibility 
created by diversification that can be either defensive or aggressive”. As Aaker and 
Mascarenhas (1984) put it “A firm, as part of its strategic thinking, should consider 
whether it is necessary to increase flexibility and, if so, which approach is the most 
appropriate and effective.” Buytendijk (2010) takes the issue of this consideration much 
further. He goes as far as to question the traditional perspectives of strategy as making 
choices when he asks “Is making either-or choices what strategy is all about?”. While this 
question may appear to be radical, it is a valid point. The implication is that the flexibility 
perspective is a critical lens that can help modify leader’s strategic frames. As Buytendijk 
(2010) proposes it can assist in overcoming historic strategic dilemmas in the modern 
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business context such as inside out versus outside in or top down vs. bottom up. Thus, the 
“Flexibility Decision” or perspective involves considering the “likelihood and nature of 
the impact of environmental change upon the organization” (Aaker and Mascarenhas 
1984).  
 
Amongst the vast array of contributors to the concept and its use, the research of Aaker 
and Mascarenhas’ (1984) was one of the most comprehensive contributions to the 
literature at that point. It builds upon the classical studies of Ansoff and Cyert and 
importantly provides an extensive list of both objective and subjective means for 
measuring and auditing flexibility. Although one of the article’s aims is to clarify the 
concept of “Strategic Flexibility” it achieves much more in elaborating on how flexibility 
can be achieved and exercised as a strategic option in practice. This elaboration includes 
a pragmatic portfolio of concepts, capabilities and ways to use assets in flexible and 
dynamic means. The study suggests that strategic flexibility can be applied via 
diversification, reducing the commitment of resources to a specialized use or by investing 
in underused resources (Aaker and Mascarenhas 1984). On the definitional front, Aaker 
and Mascarenhas (1984) include the obligatory central aspect of flexibility as the ability 
of an organization to adapt.  
 
In addition to focus mentioned above, three additional major themes or patterns seem to 
be dominant in the literature. The first theme classifies the dimensions of flexibility using 
temporal criteria. Under this classification three categories are formulated: (1) 
Operational which refers to day to day or short term flexibility, (2) Tactical referring to 
more significant changes in product mix or design related to demand, and (3) Strategic 
referring to the creation and realization of “options for a firm’s future” (Johnson and Lee 
et al 2003). In simplified terms, Operational is short-run, Tactical is medium-term, and 
Strategic is longer-run (Carlsson 1998). The second theme relates to the range of options 
open to a firm in reacting to foreseen or unforeseen changes in the environment (De Toni 
and Tonchia 2005, Volberda 1996, Carlsson 1998). The third classification is by intent. 
This intent dimension refers to whether a firm’s capabilities are developed with the 
32 
 
intention of either offensive or defensive maneuvers (Evans 1991, Combe and Greenley 
2004, Aaker and Mascarenhas 1984, Golden and Powell 2000, Buytendijk 2010). 
 
There remain numerous categorizations of the term, but the central, and most cited aspect 
of the definition is a firm’s capability for change and adaptation. The literature on 
flexibility continues to accumulate beyond the definitional front especially in the 
operational areas of resource and production systems. There are now abundant and 
excellent examples that illustrate how flexibility can be achieved. Primarily, these 
examples individually make up a repertoire of approaches or means to support the 
strategic option of “strategic flexibility”. 
 
2.2 Being Strategic About Flexibility: The Strategic Flexibility 
Concept 
 
The term “Strategic Flexibility” was first coined in the 1950’s by Eccles [as cited in 
Evans] (Evans 1991). Despite the widely accepted competitive importance of achieving 
strategic flexibility and that according to Eppink (1978) it has been examined in the 
strategic literature since the late 1950s there are some researchers who argue that it is 
“still unclear, what is meant by the designation “strategic flexibility” and how this can be 
measured in real terms” (Roberts and Stockport 2009, De Toni and Tonchia 2005, Evans 
1991, Johnson and Lee et al 2003). Part of this confusion is its synonymous use with the 
concept of flexibility and its frequent categorization as a type of flexibility. This can be 
seen in Aaker and Mascarenhas' (1984) differentiation of the notion of strategic 
flexibility by adding the two dimensions of time (long term) and change of business 
scope (substantial). Another aspect of confusion is the abstract and inconsistent nature to 
which it is used in the literature with additional components added depending on the 
focus of the research. For example, Shimizu and Hitt (2004) add the dimension of 
reversing action when they define it “as an organization’s capability to identify major 
changes in the external environment, to quickly commit resources to new courses of 
action in response to change, and recognize and act promptly when it is time to halt or 
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reverse such commitments”. This dimension fits nicely into their comprehensive 
exploration of barriers to changing courses of action from an organizational and 
individual level. However, it emphasizes only the reactive aspect of the strategic 
flexibility capability and how to avoid the “vicious cycle of strategic rigidity” (Shimizu 
and Hitt 2004). While this is useful both for increasing flexibility and managing the 
balance of ambidexterity it relies more on problem recognition rather than proactively 
designing to take advantage of opportunities. This missed dimension is critical as it is 
related to both an individual and firm’s cognitive orientation. Further, as Combe and 
Greenley (2004) note “different capabilities for reactive and proactive” strategic 
flexibility are needed.  An example of the implications of this dimension can be seen in 
this case study. The evidence supports that the inward orientation of TRN led to a short-
term focus or “temporal myopia” to the detriment of a longer term and more proactive 
strategic thinking (Miller 2002). 
 
Sanchez (1997), as one of the most prolific writers on strategic flexibility, defines 
Strategic Flexibility “as the condition of having options (the what) that are created 
through (the how) the combined effects of an organization’s coordination flexibility and 
using flexible resources”. [bracketed text added]. This definition goes a long way in 
distinguishing between the means for developing flexible approaches from the generation 
of strategic options themselves. Johnson and Lee et al. (2003) make explicit two other 
critical aspects of intent and feasibility. The authors define it as “the firm’s intent and 
capabilities to generate firm-specific real options for the configuration and 
reconfigurations of appreciable superior customer value propositions”. 
 
Evans earlier work anticipates this definition by providing an integrative framework and 
resulting formulation that is one of the most cited in the literature (Evans 1991). It 
outlines the scope of strategic flexibility options available to the firm. He incorporates the 
temporal and emphasizes intentional dimensions as they would be executed in both 
defensive and offensive modes. The four broad categories are 1) leading change through 
pre-emptive forms of strategic flexibility 2) withstanding change through protective 
forms 3) seizing the initiative for change through exploitive forms and; 4) correcting past 
34 
 
mistakes through corrective forms (Evans 1991). These intentional dimensions provide a 
pragmatic framework for thinking about applying the “how” methods of strategic 
flexibility outlined in the earlier literature. By considering a firm’s internal and external 
context different strategic emphasis and resources could be placed across Evan’s 
dimensions. However, to enable this potential requires being in the perspective that 
strategic flexibility is a strategic principle first and foremost. It is only  then supported by 
the creation of flexible capabilities and resources that the strategic option becomes 
realized.” (Evans 1991).As the data collected in this research will show, TRN did not 
embrace this perspective in principle or practice. It struggled to have the strategic insight 
or strategic foresight to consider all but the minimum dimensions proposed by Evans 
framework.   
 
Flexibility has been cited by many as a capability. Teece and Pisano et al. (1997) and 
later Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) have contributed to that definitional front by 
relabelling flexibility as “dynamic capabilities”. The first labeling of the capability as 
“dynamic” originated with Teece and Pisano et al. (1997). They “refer to this ability to 
achieve new forms of competitive advantage as ‘dynamic capabilities”. Coming from the 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm this perspective relies heavily on Barney’s (1991) 
concept of competitive advantage. The authors also spend considerable focus on the need 
to redeploy “resource configurations” closely mirroring work done earlier by Aaker and 
Mascarenhas (1984), Sanchez (1993) and others. Being deeply fixed in the RBV 
perspective they do recognize the need to reduce “stickiness” but focus primarily on how 
“to match the requirements of a changing environment.” It may be this subtle perspective 
that underlies why they miss the concept of strategic flexibility as a principle and its more 
proactive aspects of shaping the future. As Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) admit, 
“dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details.” More importantly as Bogner and 
Barr (2000) stress the RBV can be unhelpful in its focus on the past. As they note, “ A 
resource-based view emphasizes the cumulative weight of previous decisions on future 
strategy” and these are less relevant in turbulent and fast-changing markets (Bogner and 
Barr 2000). Further, they point out that “the process of inferring competitor’s future 
moves by focusing on fixed assets, established channels of distribution, or any other 
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historical basis of competitive advantage is not likely to be helpful, and may be deluding”.  
If this implication is valid, then the Resource Based View is more likely to create rigidity 
than flexibility in mindset by reinforcing unhelpful “Construct Anchors” and cognitive 
inertia (Bogner and Barr 2000). 
 
To be fair to Teece and Pisano et al. (1997) this early attempt to define flexibility was 
intended to “facilitate theory development and intellectual dialogue” (Teece 2014). 
Teece’s evolution and defense of dynamic capabilities have not been easy but has been 
influential in academic journals. The most recent modifications of the dynamic 
capabilities concept bring it much closer in line with earlier strategic flexibility concepts 
espoused by Evans (1991), Sanchez (1993) and others. Dynamic capabilities now have 
three components comprising sensing, seizing and reconfiguring resources (Teece 2014). 
While Teece clearly sees dynamic capabilities as not being a strategy or a strategic 
principle he has associated it with the three fundamental processes of mobilizing 
resources, executing, and renewal that all businesses must achieve (Augier and Mie et al. 
2009, Teece 2014). These recent modifications and additions are significant as they are 
influencing the ambidexterity research stream. Birkinshaw’s (2015) research argues 
against Teece’s assertion that “it is possible to identify a generic set of dynamic 
capabilities that apply in all settings.” What Birkinshaw’s (2015) research has rightly 
identified is that dynamic capabilities are simply flexible tactics and that there are 
multiple modes of adaptation. More importantly, this ambidexterity’s research view 
opens useful connections between how ambidexterity and strategic flexibility might be 
enabled in practice. 
 
To avoid potential contradiction and inconsistency with the principle of strategic 
flexibility, this research utilizes the English language definition of capability “as the 
power to do something”. Therefore, the working definition of strategic flexibility for this 
case study was the firm’s intent and capabilities to generate firm-specific real options to 
exploit or respond to its environment. Firm-specific real options imply having the ability 
not only to create options conceptually but also to implement those via the type of 
resource and coordination flexibilities outlined by Sanchez (1997). This definition then 
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implies organizational change management skills as well as strategic thinking. The 
theoretical and practical implications of this contextual perceptive was taken into 
consideration when crafting the intervention proposal for TRN, and it resulted in a 
solution of wider scope than originally envisioned by the researcher. However, it is also 
important to note that that the definition implies the deliberate strategic decision to create 
the capability to exercise strategic flexibilities. Buytendijk (2010) expresses both the 
principle and mindset well when he states “What happens when, instead of thinking of 
strategy as making choices and commitments, we see it as creating a portfolio of options? 
Options do not limit our flexibility in the future; rather they create strategic flexibility.” 
Thus at the individual level or that of the decision makers it can be defined as “the extent 
to which new and alternative options in strategic decision making are generated and 
considered”. Critically, it is the individual form of strategic flexibility that is a 
prerequisite for the firm-level capability. It is, therefore, a key rationale for focusing this 
research on the Strategic Leaders of TRN (Sharfman and Dean 1997, Sanchez 1997 
Bogner and Barr 2000 ). 
 
2.3 Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Flexibility  
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
At the very foundation of the need for firms to think and react flexibly is contingency 
theory as applied to strategy. It suggests that the best way to organize depends on the 
nature of the environment (Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1985). In the strategic literature, 
two main underlying themes relate to contingency theory and the importance of 
flexibility. The first is the “deliberate versus emergent” planning debate most widely 
known for the rivalry between Ansoff and Mintzberg (Ansoff 1976, Mintzberg 1990, 
Ansoff 1991, Mintzberg 1996). The second is the balancing dilemma of “exploitation 
versus exploration” (March 1991, Tushman and O’Reilly III 1996, Levinthal and March 
1993, O’Reilly III and Tushman 2013). Both of these themes have their heritage in other 
disciplines. The tradeoff between seeking greater fit with the present environment versus 
investing in new or future opportunities/environments is documented from many 
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disciplines including biology, economics, learning and population ecology (Beinhocker 
1999, Ghemawat and Costa 1993, Hannon and Carroll et al. 2003, Ghemawat and 
Patricio 1998, Garvin 2000). The deliberate versus emerging theme also has equivalents 
with particular relevance to economic and political theory (Barry 1987, Martin 1970, 
Conway 1989). 
 
2.3.2 Planning Versus Learning: The Challenge Of Anticipating The 
Future 
 
The deliberate versus emergent dilemma is seen in many disciplines but often using 
different terminology. For example, the planning versus laisez-faire economics dialogue 
has a long history with political and moral implications that have shaped and continue to 
shape today’s world (Barry 1987, Conway 1987). In the area of strategic management 
Ansoff (1965) was one of the earlier and strongest proponents of long-range planning. 
Part of this motivation may have been his frustration with the state of strategy during his 
time. It may also have been influenced by the post second world war economic boom 
where the influence of military planning and production was salient and reinforced by the 
installment of many senior ranking military leaders in corporate leadership roles. Yet one 
cannot fairly classify Ansoff as a thinker who did not anticipate the need or importance 
for flexibility. As referenced above, many of his writings dealt with this need in the form 
of planning for internal and external flexibility. He also made considerable effort to 
position planning as an appropriate response to surprise and change in the environment 
(Ansoff 1976). 
 
The environmental upheaval caused by the macroeconomic events of the 1970s along 
with the increasing dynamics of globalization and international competition combined to 
highlight the weaknesses of the traditional long range planning school. As the studies of 
Rumelt (Rumelt and Schendel et al. 1995) would show it often failed to “lead to 
innovation, adaptation to change, or even survival”. This failure gave rise to a school of 
thought that argued that rather than following precise long range planning; firms were 
seen to learn through search and trial. Strategies were then, only recognized or labeled if 
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at all, after the fact. This “unintended strategy” point of view is represented by articles 
such as Lindblom’s (1959) “muddling through,” Quinn’s (1980) “logical 
incrementalism,” and Mintzberg and Water’s (1978) “emergent strategy”. As cited in 
Rumelt and Schendel et al. (1995).  
 
At the heart of the flexibility motivation is the need to adapt to changing environments. 
Therefore as Buytendijk (2010) states it, a strategy “must be flexible enough that it can be 
changed constantly and adapted to shifting internal, as well as external, conditions.” This 
is consistent with the considerable consensus in the literature that strategic flexibility and 
strategic agility are most relevant to fast changing and uncertain environments (Aaker 
and Mascarenhas 1984, Chakravarthy 1982, Evans 1991, Carlsson 1998, Eisenhardt and 
Brown 1998, Eisenhardt and Sull 2001, De Toni and Tonchia 2005, Doz and Kosonen 
2008). A central red thread that underlies these publications is expressed well by Sanchez 
(1997) when he states “What clearly emerges from the diverse studies of strategic 
flexibility is the basic finding that the traditional strategic management objective of 
choosing a single “best” plan of action is likely to be an unrealistic objective in an 
uncertain environment”. In practice, the situation is not as black and white as it may first 
appear. Firstly, the degree of uncertainty and speed of change in environments will vary 
from firm to firm along a spectrum which makes planning more or less dependable and 
effective depending on the context. As Courtney and Kirkland et al. (1997) have outlined 
in their work on strategic posture, it is important for firms to go beyond just recognizing 
that uncertainty exists. They also need to determine the level of residual uncertainty so as 
to plan their response accordingly. Secondly, Mintzberg (1990), and Sanchez (1997) have 
recognized that the deliberate and emergent learning should go hand in hand. This 
synthesis can be achieved by realizing “strategic flexibility jointly through longer-term 
planning for basic competence building and near-term, emergent forms of specific 
competence building” (Sanchez 1997). Alternatively, it can be accomplished by 
establishing broad outlines of actions while allowing deliberate details to emerge 
(Mintzberg 1990). This latter suggested balance is very much in line with the type of 
strategic communications seen in large multinational corporations (TRN Plan 2010). The 
implication for senior executives is the need to responsively fill in the details based on 
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their understanding of the broad outlines and their interpretation of the changing factors 
in their environments.  
 
This difficulty of having the ability to plan and be sensitive to shorter-term environmental 
change while maintaining a longer-term perspective is closely related to the concept of 
strategic foresight. This tension was highlighted at the organizational level by Stafford 
Beer (1985) when he put forward the idea that organizations generally focus on an 
“inside and now” orientation with the aim of achieving results and improvements in the 
near future. This temporal myopia tends to support the deliberate perspective as the focus 
is on the known variables (internal), and the relative planning horizon is closer and, 
therefore, easier to predict (Miller 2002). By comparison an orientation of focus on the 
“outside and then” would tend to support more of an emphasis on what is going on 
outside the firm with a longer term horizon (Beer 1985). This latter orientation enables a 
firm to improve existing operations but also to transform itself by “reshaping its purpose, 
niche or identity” based on the learning from taking a longer term orientation (Beer 1985). 
This perspective has also been emphasized in the more recent work of Doz and Kosonen 
(2010). Their research on strategic agility draws largely on the success stories of large 
multinational corporations such as Nokia, Cisco, IBM and others. They argue that 
strategic insight (the ability to perceive, analyze and make sense of complex strategic 
situations as they develop and be ready to take advantage of them) is the key to strategic 
agility (Doz and Kosonen 2010). While they also recognize the need for strategic 
foresight (the ability to anticipate key trends and changes and see further into the future 
than competitors, customers, suppliers, and partners) it is strategic insight that is harder to 
develop and the key characteristic needed to succeed in fast and complex changing 
industries (Doz and Kosonen 2008). The concept of strategic agility as espoused by Doz 
and Kosonen is not an exact fit to the flexibility and strategic flexibility concepts. 
However, it does draw upon very similar literature and has a strong fundamental overlap. 
More importantly, this work highlights one of the cognitive implications of the 
increasingly necessary balance between deliberate and emergent strategic planning. This 
discussion continues to have relevance in the strategic literature. As Goddard (2014) 
argues ‘winners’ are rarely chasing cost leadership. Rather they “see their journey as one 
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of continuous discovery, moving from a place of ‘best practice’ to one of ‘unique 
practice.' (Goddard 2014) This perspective of placing emphasis on new value creation is 
a central aspect of strategic flexibility as it involves anticipating and even creating the 
future.  Nevertheless the need to deliver value today is also critical. Achieving a suitable 
balance is context dependent. It also is at the core of the explore versus exploit 
dimensions to be covered next. 
 
2.3.3 Exploitation Versus Exploration: The Challenge Of Sustainability 
 
Underlying the motivation and need for exploration and renewal are various 
comprehensive studies that highlight the decreasing lifespan or inconsistent performance 
of large firms. For example, Keller and Price (2011) note that the "excellent" companies 
of  “In Search of Excellence” and “Built to Last” have not faired well. They cite that “by 
2006, 20% no longer existed, 46% were struggling, and only 33% remained high 
performers” (Keller and Price 2011). This type of data supports just how critical it is for 
firms to find the appropriate trade-off between investments in current opportunities 
versus exploring new ones. In the Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Edith Penrose 
viewed firm growth "as a process of search and exploration. Management teams seek out 
new opportunities in the environment and then use corporate resources to exploit them." 
(As cited in Beinhocker 2006). The much later work of Teece and Pisano et al. (1997) 
extended the resource based view calling these firms "high-flex". There is, however, an 
associated cost and risk in the nature of this balance. Exploiting present opportunities 
often involves configuring corporate resources in a manner that creates a greater fit to the 
current environment. Economies of scale, vertical integration, deeper knowledge of and 
closer relations with customers are just a few of the benefits to leverage. From the 
resource-based view of the firm Barney (1991) would argue that it is from just such 
contexts that "firms may develop unique, hard to copy skills that give them decided 
competitive advantage." March (1991) in his consideration of organizational learning and 
competitive advantage warns that "adaptive processes, by refining exploitation more 
rapidly than exploration, are likely to become more effective in the short run but self-
destructive in the long run." In a related article, Herriot and Levinthal et al. (1985) 
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conclude that "It is quite possible for competence in an inferior activity to become great 
enough to exclude superior activities with which an organization has little experience." 
This danger and the challenges of change and the resistance that comes with it are well 
documented in the strategic literature and business case studies. The unfortunate truth is 
that it is quite often the most competitive buggy-whip maker that is the last to become 
obsolete. As Leornard-Barton (1992), in her study of the core capabilities of twenty 
company cases found, "firms often fall into competency traps, as core competencies 
become core rigidities."  Goddard and Eccles (2013) describe this as "an organizational 
bias towards the loop of ‘control and alignment' largely focused on the here and now of 
‘doing more of what we already do'.” The clear repercussion is that such an over 
emphasis on this bias does not enable new competency development and will not lead to 
long-term sustainability. To offset this imbalance faster and more effective learning 
should be done by what they refer to as the loop of "learning and discovery" (Goddard 
and Eccles 2013). 
 
The ambidextrous viewpoint appears to have close links to the strategic flexibility 
stream’s view of building competencies and options. For example, Sanchez (1997) as a 
leading proponent of strategic flexibility emphasizes that "the process of managing to 
prepare for an uncertain future as fundamentally an effort to identify and achieve the right 
"strategic balance" in building new organizational competencies that create new strategic 
options and in leveraging current competencies through the exercising of existing 
strategic options." Therefore, these two perspectives both address what the literature 
highlights as one of the costs of exploiting a specific environment or skill set; the 
specialization that limits new options (Levinthal and March 1993). Sull's (2005) work on 
what he refers to as a firm's active inertia outlines this direct impact on flexibility in his 
following statement "While each decision defines your company's capabilities now, it 
also reduces its flexibility in the future". It is also suggested that the best time for 
anticipating the future and to explore is when  "an organization enjoys surplus talent and 
other resources, or when the market is relatively stable" (Hines and Bishop 2006). This 
recommendation to engage in strategic foresight in good times is consistent with the 
earlier pre-emptive advice of Christensen’s (1998) to face disruptive dynamics before 
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disruption appears. While this makes intuitive sense, there is also literature evidencing 
that firm success is linked to complacency (Hedberg and Jonsson's 1997, Sull 2005). The 
addition of the need to be planning for the future just as the present is most rewarding 
creates a paradoxical cognitive tension that underlies both ambidexterity and cognitive 
strategic flexibility. The literature reinforces this paradox by emphasizing both the cost of 
flexibility and the cost of not exploiting and creating competitive advantage (Barney 
1991, Harrigan 1980).Thus, this balance is difficult to achieve by following prescriptions 
alone.  
 
2.3.4 Exploitation And Exploration: The Aspiration For Ambidexterity 
 
The objective of finding the right balance between exploitation and exploration both at 
the organizational and individual level has been increasingly referred to in the literature 
as ambidexterity. The concept of ambidexterity was first used by Robert Duncan in 1976 
to describe managerial contradictions (as cited in Lavie and Stettner et al. 2010) but was 
popularized and further conceptualized by Tushman and O'Reilly (1996). The essence of 
the challenge of ambidexterity can be expressed in simplified terms as the tension 
between two different business models; "running the business versus changing the 
business." (Nieto-Rodriguez 2014). Ultimately the goal is to enable your explore 
capability to "figure out the future before your competitors do" while at the same time 
managing to separate the "past from the future" orientations and capabilities within the 
firm (Tushman and Euchner 2015). 
 
Although there are empirical studies supporting the positive benefits of achieving 
ambidexterity, there is considerable discussion regarding the best methodologies for 
doing so (He and Wong 2004, Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, Mom and van den Bosch et 
al. 2009). The early work in this area by Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) proposed that 
separating the activities into distinct units avoided the challenge of what is considered to 
be two largely different capabilities and mindsets. An early solution proposed was the 
structural "differentiation" approach. By making structural separation you centralize the 
complexity of the two contexts in either the CEO or just the firm leadership team 
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(Tushman and O'Reilly 1996, and Tushman 2015). Much of the early work on structural 
differentiation was reinforced by the prominence of the "silicon valley" high-tech hype 
and start-up logic of the 1980s and 1990s. In this environment, multiple benchmarking 
examples of new ventures supported the idea that decentralized; smaller and less 
bureaucratic structures were more suited to the explorative orientation (Christensen 1998, 
Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). However, more recently this perspective has been 
questioned. As pointed out by those closer to the practitioner realm "very few companies 
can afford to have independent structures to focus solely on exploration" (Nieto-
Rodriguez 2014). Further, as identified by Beer (1985) and supported by later academics 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Gilbert 2006, and Teece 2007) the ideal value capture from 
ambidexterity is when exploration and exploitation activities and insights are reunited. 
Despite the fact that structural separation could have viable benefits, firms that are under 
extreme cost pressure (as evidenced in the TRN context) may not have the slack to take 
advantage of this option. Therefore, there is support and varied suggested applications of 
the "integration" orientation despite the potential difficulties of mixing the two strategic 
frames. The primary challenge of integration is whether to do so through alternation, 
parallel, sequential or some combination of these activities. On the organizational level, 
this has also been debated.  One option is what has been called "sequential 
ambidexterity" where firms go through phases of focusing on one orientation and then the 
other (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). The implication is that firms adapt to their changing 
environments in the attempt to achieve an ideal state much like traditional contingency 
theory. However, this "static" view is not widely supported given ambidexterity as a 
capability is seen to involve continuous and intentional reconfiguration of resources 
(Lavie and Stettner et al. 2010). This latter description of ambidexterity resonates well 
with descriptions of the strategically flexible firm. Therefore, one might expect that the 
challenges of achieving ambidexterity or strategic flexibility to be similar. Further, there 
is likely overlap and potentially complementary mechanisms that enable both 
capabilities. 
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2.3.5 The Ambidextrous Leader: Dealing Strategically With Paradox, 
Change, And Uncertainty  
 
Recent research has increased the focus, scope and connection of ambidexterity at the 
individual level. Much like Sanchez's (1997) conclusion regarding the link between an 
organization's strategic flexibility and individual's strategic flexibility; studies show that 
ambidexterity is embedded in individual’s ability to exploit and explore. Additionally, 
that specific organizational mechanisms can enable it at both the individual and unit 
levels (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, Mom and van den Bosch et al. 2007, Jansen and 
Tempelaar et al. 2009).  One approach is to find mechanisms that enable individuals to 
focus on one or the other dimensions by creating discrete subdivisions, teams or roles. 
However as Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) have established there is also "contextual" 
ambidexterity that allows both dimensions of alignment and adaptability to 
"simultaneously permeate an entire business unit." This concept has been further 
developed in Birkinshaw’s (2015) recent research where it is referred to as “behavioral 
integration”. Importantly, this works best when "the context is dynamic and flexible 
enough to allow individuals to use their own judgment as to how they divide their time 
between alignment-oriented and adaptation-oriented activities," (Gibson and Birkinshaw 
2004). This autonomy of decision making has also been cited in the strategic 
management literature as an enabler of firm performance as well as providing for “richer 
sense-making and cognitive processes at the personal level” (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1994, 
Raisch and Birkinshaw et al. 2009 ). However, as Mom and van den Bosch et al. (2009) 
have recognized research regarding ambidexterity "at the individual level of analysis is 
very scarce." Previously Tushman and other researchers have focused primarily on team 
dynamics or contexts that enable ambidexterity to function at a unit or organizational 
level. However, the recognition of the concept of contextual ambidexterity and that it 
"manifests itself in the specific actions of individuals throughout the organization" has 
led to increased research focus on individuals (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). This new 
focus includes how "paradoxical thinking" impacts individuals beyond the CEO and 
executive board levels (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, Lewis 2000).  The work of Smith 
and Tushman (2005) is an example of how looking at the cognitive impact of 
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ambidexterity connects with the demands put on individual's to generate strategic 
options. When faced with paradoxical frames, the authors suggest that leaders need to 
manage the two cognitive processes of differentiating and integrating (Smith and 
Tushman 2005). While cognitive differentiating refers to "recognizing and articulating 
distinctions", integrating involves shifting levels of analysis to identify potential 
linkages." As outlined by Smith and Tushman (2005) the benefit of cognitive 
differentiation is that it "allows team members to avoid cognitive commitments to the 
past even as they support the new". This cognitive ability not only ties into what a firm 
needs to do for ambidexterity, but it also relates closely to the concept of Strategic Agility 
and the dimensions of strategic foresight and insight. In other words, managing the short-
term horizon involves cognitive differentiation to (make sense of complex situations as 
they develop). Managing the longer term horizon involves cognitive integration skills of 
shifting time horizons (anticipating key trends and changes) and looking for synergies, 
opportunities, and value capture from existing competencies (Doz and Kosonen 2008). 
Lewis (2000) describes these factors as creating paradoxical tensions and directly notes 
the examples of expectations on managers to both “increase efficiency and foster 
creativity.”  Lewis also references Kelly’s (1955) personal construct theory, stating that 
“most actors accentuate contradictions by interpreting data through simple, bipolar 
concepts, constructing logical, internally consistent sets of abstractions that separate 
opposites” (Lewis 2000). Although these schema “enable actors to make sense of 
complex realities they are biasing and, once entrenched, become highly resistant to 
change” (Lewis 2000). Thus much like the cognitive biases formed in the information 
processing stream of the strategic decision-making research, the paradoxical tensions 
from ambidexterity potentially cause similar cognitive challenges. 
 
The aspiration for ambidexterity has many implications for the firm. On the most 
fundamental level, it involves recognition of the need for adaptation and flexibility. This 
recognition has direct implications for firm and individual level development of strategic 
thinking and feasible options. Nieto-Rodriguez (2014) emphasizes this proactive process 
when he states that "exploitation encompasses knowledge creation and analysis of future 
opportunities." At the organizational level, it impacts a firm's choices regarding structure, 
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processes, and systems (Mom and van den Bosch et al. 2009). It also has repercussions 
for softer dimensions such as culture, leadership styles and competencies (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw 2004, Tushman and Euchner 2015). Thus, it can involve a significant level of 
change at multiple levels of an organization. Buytendijk (2010) comments on its 
difficulty level by observing that it is a "strategic stretch" and one that involves a 
synthesis of a dilemma. Nieto-Rodriguez (2014) adds additional potential constraints 
when he suggests that for many firms "the structural separation focused on by much 
academic research is unrealistic." While this latter view may be overstating the challenge 
it is likely accurate for firms with limited slack and intense or hostile competition as 
supported by the findings of the TRN case. Therefore, the promise is in the potential of 
achieving forms of contextual ambidexterity consistent with the requirements of enabling 
the potential for cognitive strategic flexibility. To do so requires leaders who have the 
potential for cognitive strategic flexibility. As pointed out in the ambidexterity literature 
achieving this potential also involves creating the mechanisms, process, systems, culture 
and leaderships style to enable it. In the TRN case, the intention of such a systematic 
approach would be to modify the strategic frames of its leaders and mitigate the danger of 
the short-term inward orientation that threatens sustainability. As Goddard and Eccles 
(2013) note "Time devoted to strategies of cost efficiency is simply time stolen from the 
much more important, difficult and wealth-creative activity of innovation, differentiation, 
and entrepreneurship."  
 
In summary, much of a firm’s choice of which ambidextrous dimension to emphasize 
will depend on the industry and market context. Equally important in such choices is the 
ability of the strategic leaders to interpret the meaning of the signals in that environment 
and context. As Trispas and Gavetti's (2000) in-depth study of the Polaroid story 
suggests, it is not always core rigidities described by Leornard-Barton (1992) or a lack of 
searching capabilities that cause an organization to fail. Rather these authors argue that 
Polaroid was able to be aware of and develop the capabilities of digital imaging with 
sufficient lead time. The issue was the cognitive barriers of senior executives. The 
Polaroid senior executives were trapped in the mental models (old business models) or a 
dominant logic that inhibited their ability to understand the potential of the new 
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landscape (Trispas and Gavetti's 2000). In other words, the way in which executives 
model a new landscape has a significant impact on their strategic prescriptions and thus 
their potential for strategic flexibility (Levinthal and March 1993, Walsh 1995). 
 
2.4 Strategic Leadership: Enabling The Potential For Strategic 
Flexibility And Ambidexterity 
 
According to Heifetz and Grashow et al. (2009) executives today need to foster 
adaptation. Closely echoing the paradoxical thinking of Lewis (2000) the authors note the 
dilemma of executing on today while adapting “what and how things get done in order to 
thrive in tomorrow’s world.” (Heifetz and Grashow et al. 2009). This leadership 
expectation is not new. However, it is a critically important function of leadership. 
Ghoshal and Bartlett’s (1994) research has highlighted these mechanisms and their 
importance to quality management and firm performance. In their words “Organizational 
context is created and renewed through tangible and concrete management actions. The 
context, in turn, influences the actions of all those within the company” (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett 1994).  Therefore, the firm’s ability to adapt and learn is dependent on the ability 
of its leaders to learn, adapt and create a supportive context for learning.  Much has been 
written at the individual and organizational level that builds on Lewin’s (1947) early 
work on how additions or changes to mental models require the processes of unfreezing, 
change and refreezing.  In today’s world of leadership, these processes are embedded in 
the emphasis on the need for reflection. As has been known for millennium, little learning 
comes from experience without reflection. Unfortunately, as Senge (1990) noted decades 
ago “most leaders do not reflect carefully on their actions.” Twenty-five years later the 
intensity of information via technology and the perceived increased pace of business has 
not enabled reflection or time for strategic thinking as a natural practice. In low slack 
contexts such as evidenced in the TRN case, there are even less supporting and more 
inhibiting factors.  
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Despite the challenges of learning and adaptation the importance and relevance of 
strategic flexibility and ambidexterity’s ultimate objective of sustainability has not 
declined. Senge’s (1990) observation that learning disabilities in an organization are fatal 
and result in most dying “before they reach the age of forty” still resonates. Senge notes a 
key link to ambidexterity and learning when he suggests that “Today’s problems come 
from yesterday’s solutions” (Senge 1990). This perspective underlies one dimension of 
why modern talent management strongly values learning agility. In building leadership 
pipelines Mitchinson and Morris (2014) explain that the focus is on “finding and 
developing individuals who are continually able to give up skills, perspectives, and ideas 
that are no longer relevant, and learn new ones that are.” Another element of why 
learning agility is valued is that it goes beyond assessing things that are relatively static 
such as intelligence. Instead, it emphasizes potential in the form of the ability to learn and 
grow quickly (Lombardo and Eichinger 2000). This view is behind the separation of 
performance and potential in identifying what is commonly referred to in practice as 
“high-potential” leaders. In practice, the learning agility concept has been extended in use 
by many firms (including the TRN case company) to incorporate additional learning 
agility categories including People Agility, Results Agility, Mental Agility and Change 
Agility (Lombardo and Eichinger 2000). Just as in the balance of focus in ambidexterity, 
firm’s talent management systems need to achieve a similar balance.  Specifically, firms 
need to retain and develop high performers (for exploitation) and high-potentials (for 
exploring). As in ambidexterity, there is the same real danger in overvaluing one 
leadership profile over the other. To assist in achieving the ideal alignment with a firm's 
strategy and context firms depend on competency frameworks and models. 
 
Leadership competency models are prevalent in large corporations as they “set clear 
expectations about the types of behaviors, capabilities, mindsets, and values that are 
important to those in leadership roles” (Conger and Ready 2004). Intagliata and Ulrich et 
al. (2000) argue that competencies can build competitive advantage through both 
distinctiveness and performance. The authors outline five reasons why competencies are 
important. 1) They guide direction 2) They are measurable 3) Competencies can be 
learned 4) They can distinguish and differentiate the organization 5) They can help 
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integrate management practices (Intagliata and Ulrich et al. 2000). Therefore, leadership 
competencies can be the foundation for competitive advantage and a core consideration 
in supporting strategic options. Hsieh and Yik 2005 support this view and suggest that 
leadership is a key factor in crafting a suitable strategy. They go as far as proposing that it 
could be the starting point of strategy via assessment of the leadership pool, “the types of 
leaders and their mix of capabilities” (Hsieh and Yik 2005). This rationale supports this 
research’s proposal for intervening in TRN’s competency model and leadership 
framework. By defining new TRN success profiles and the “unique combination of 
competencies that describe the skill set of the ideal person for a specific level or role” 
there is an increased potential for enabling cognitive strategic flexibility in the case 
company (Orr and Sneltjes et al. 2010). 
 
2.5 Creating Strategic Leaders 
 
An initial catalyst for this research was the question of whether TRN’s Strategic Leader 
level executives had the required strategic flexibility to meets the demands of the 
company’s context. In addition to the internal Leadership Competency Framework, 
literature provides prescriptions and expectations for Strategic Leaders. An example that 
mirrors the Information Processing perspective is provided by Schoemaker and Krupp et 
al. (2013). The authors suggest that the “Adaptive strategic leaders” needs six essential 
skills: Anticipate, Challenge, Interpret, Decide, Align, and Learn. Snowden and Boone 
(2007) are more helpful in their prescription by going beyond the ‘what’ is needed to the 
‘how’. The authors not only highlight the need to match strategic thinking to contexts, but 
they also provide an excellent framework to assist leaders in defining the range of 
contexts faced and appropriate approaches for each. These approaches also imply the 
need to adjust one's leadership style, so that it matches the context. Alternatively some 
researchers suggest that “Rather than expecting present managers to learn new mental 
models, firms can recruit new executives and schemas that are appropriate for the 
changed environment” (Reger and Palmer 1996). Shimizu and Hitt (2004) propose 
limiting the tenure of top executives, hiring new outside directors and rotating managers 
50 
 
in key positions. While these prescriptions can assist in the partial renewal of a leadership 
pipeline, they have consequences. Recruitment at senior levels is highly expensive in 
process costs and salary package liabilities. In many cases, there is a short-term (and 
sometimes permanent) performance drop through loss of knowledge, relationships and fit 
for the role (Watkins 2003). Even the proposition of job rotation incurs negative 
performance costs in the short-term both on the position vacated, and the position 
occupied (Cheese and Thomas et al. 2008). For larger multinational corporations 
replacing or moving significant portions of the executive population is not feasible. 
Further, it avoids the issue of the incumbent population. It, therefore, becomes imperative 
to address the learning and strategic needs of the organization as a whole in a systematic 
and comprehensive approach. In the TRN case, the limited slack outlined in this research 
makes the direct approach even more appropriate than buying off the shelf solutions. The 
challenge of creating learning and change in strategic leaders in any firm is 
overwhelmingly difficult. As Peter Senge suggests there are three levels to be achieved: 
1) practices: what you do 2) principles: guiding ideas and insights 3) essences: the state 
of being with high levels of mastery (Senge 1990). This leveling captures the challenge 
TRN faces in moving from single-loop learning (change in behavior) to double loop 
learning. The latter involves “a restructuring of the individual’s mental models” and is 
essential to enable the potential for cognitive strategic flexibility (Barr and Stimpert et al. 
1992). 
 
2.6 Theoretical Foundations For Researching And Enabling 
The Potential For Cognitive Strategic Flexibility  
 
2.6.1 Introduction 
 
As was previously indicated, this research has a central connection to the “Individual and 
Organizational minds” research stream. Further, the “Information Processing 
Perspective” and the ”Ideological Perspective” has provided theoretical foundations for 
exploring the individual and organizational level strategic thinking of the TRN case 
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company. The impact of the discipline of psychology on these cognitive perspectives 
within strategic management has a long history with extensive influence. This influence 
is particularly relevant in the area of strategic thinking and strategic decision making. An 
indication of this influence has more recently been through high-profile works of 
cognitive psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory. Or through 
Gary Klein’s work on intuition. Both have had popularized formats intended for 
consumption by the general public. However, other influences have remained in the 
academic literature but have had even more profound influences on our understanding of 
the theoretical frameworks underlying individual cognition as it applies to strategic 
management and decision making. The work of George Kelley is one example that is 
central to this research. Therefore, his perspective and the impact of social cognition will 
be considered next. The section will conclude with a review of the linkages between the 
three main theoretical approaches of social cognition to strategic flexibility and its 
importance to the TRN case research. 
 
2.6.2 The Influence Of George Kelley And Personal Construct Theory 
 
As mentioned, George Kelley and, in particular, his Personal Construct Theory is 
especially significant to the cognitive perspective in strategic management. He is often 
recognized as one of the first cognitive theorists and has thus greatly influenced many of 
the writers and researchers both in strategic management but also in social psychology. In 
addition, his theories are also of importance due to the interpretivist philosophical base 
this research has taken as well as to the methodologies that were employed. This 
perspective is behind the choice to explore strategic flexibility at the cognitive level in 
their own words and consider the implications based on the individual and shared 
meaning they perceive. Reger and Palmer (1996) in their work on cognitive maps note 
that this work on the psychology of personal constructs has had a high impact in this 
research stream. They also highlight the appropriateness and innovativeness of their use 
of Kelley’s Repertory Grid Interview technique for this area of research (Reger and 
Palmer 1996). These author’s and more recent increases of the repertory grid interview 
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technique in this stream provide confidence in its fit for the task. Further, it extends 
contribution to practice in its application to a new dimension of studying cognition.  
 
Personal Construct Theory has several implications for the study of human cognition, or 
more specifically the study of executive’s strategic frames. According to Personal 
Construct Theory, the world does not create the meaning of perceptions for individuals 
and, therefore, they have the freedom to choose meaning from that perceived world. This 
freedom allows one to apply alternative meanings (alternative constructivism) to what 
one perceives in the past, present or future contexts (Kelley 1955). However, as has been 
outlined in the social cognition literature and in-depth in the Information Processing 
Perspective this also has implications for what is noticed, interpreted and incorporated 
into one’s constructs. The promise of this freedom for executive’s strategic frames is that 
one is not bound by one’s past cognitive frameworks and can, therefore, put new or 
adapted frames on their experiences. However, as subsequent research such as Reger and 
Palmer’s (1996) study suggests, this may not happen quickly but may be accelerated in 
turbulent environments where consensus is not reinforced. 
 
Part of this model’s perspective is the idea of “man the scientist” and the trial and error 
process of building constructs and trying them out much like hypotheses (Kelley 
1955).Therefore, this model promotes the idea of experimental action under uncertainty 
as prescribed in the strategic literature. This experimentation is suggested at the 
individual level where it is needed in unknown strategic contexts and where learning is 
needed via action (Snowden and Boone 2007, Shimizu and Hitt 2004, Buytendijk 2010). 
It also has relevance in the organizational minds perspective in the research outlined 
earlier in the deliberate vs. emergent planning dimensions. The inference strongly 
suggests that constructs and belief systems can be revised and are open to revision. If 
man is indeed this rationale, then there is hope for the ability of executives to break 
through their old cognitive frames and for them to adjust to the new realities of their 
environment. However much like an executive uses existing mental models or strategic 
maps to channel information and anticipate environmental changes, Personal Construct 
Theory suggests that a “person’s processes are psychologically channelized by the way in 
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which he anticipates events” (Fundamental Postulate) (Kelley 1955). In other words, our 
constructs strongly influence what we pay attention to and how we anticipate the future. 
Further, despite the apparent freedom of individuals to choose meaning they are 
nevertheless influenced by the constructs they build and the groups of constructs which 
can, in fact, be a strategic schema or strategic frames. One’s constructs then indicate how 
one is likely to interpret the world and thus how we are likely to act and take action. This 
realm of possibilities can be summarized in Kelley’s statement that “Man can enslave 
himself with his own ideas and then win his freedom by reconstruing his life” (Kelley 
1955).    
 
This ability to reconstruct one’s reality is closely linked to the idea of one’s ability to win 
freedom from past constructs or cognitive maps. The testing out of our theories and 
adjusting them based on environmental feedback would hopefully lead to new learning 
and revised or replaced obsolete constructs with new more realistic hypotheses or 
strategic options regarding our environment. As applied in learning theory, this principle 
suggests that when our mental models are no longer congruent or cannot explain what is 
occurring in the environment then new learning must take place before adaptation occurs 
(Lewin 1947, Garvin 2000). The repercussion of the subjective nature of perception and 
interpretation is that we would expect to have huge variation and variety of worldviews 
that suggest incredible diversity in meaning. However, many factors come to play to 
support the development of communal and socially shared constructs. On the one hand, 
there are positive effects of this phenomenon. For example, as pointed out by the research 
by Bogner and Barr (2000) on sense-making in hypercompetitive environments 
“Individuals social interactions create shared belief systems. Which in turn make action 
possible by building common frameworks”. From the organizational minds perspective, 
this can create hierarchies of frameworks at the firm-level or industry level (Prahalad and 
Bettis 1986, Bogner and Barr 2000). As these examples suggest, the underlying 
perspectives from Kelley have influenced the field of Social Psychology and in turn 
strategic management. The Repertory Grid Interview technique developed by Kelley is 
also based on the principle of Personal Construct Theory. Its creation was meant for use 
in psychotherapy as a means to help reveal or uncover constructs in a less invasive 
54 
 
manner. It has been used effectively in many contexts and as Reger and Palmer (1996) 
have noted it is ideal functionally and philosophically for use in exploring strategic 
frames such as those of the Case Company Executives.   
 
2.6.3 Sense-Making And The Cognitive Perspective In Strategic 
Management 
 
Executive’s sensitivity to their environment is strongly linked to the cognitive perspective 
in strategic management. Schwenk (1995) defines this perspective as “the way executives 
conceptualize strategic problems, the way they develop their own rules and guidelines, 
the personal and organizational characteristics that influence the process, and the ways 
these rules influence their own decision-making”. Similarly, Kiesler and Sproull (1982) 
reinforce this definition with an emphasis on how this applies to the strong role that 
senior executives play in adaptation. They state that “a crucial component of managerial 
behavior in rapidly changing environments is problem sensing, the cognitive processes of 
noticing and constructing meaning about environmental change so that organizations can 
take action.” 
 
A central cognitive challenge for all humans whether they are individuals dealing with 
daily life or executives coping with their environments is the overwhelming amount of 
information in those environments. As Simon (1955) puts it “Since managers are 
boundedly rational, they must rely on simplified representations of the world in order to 
process information”. These simplifications and the process of simplifying information 
have individually unique aspects that hold significant implications for the way in which 
executives think strategically and make decisions (Trispas and Gavetti 2000). As Sargut 
and McGrath (2011) point out “Most executives believe they can take in and make sense 
of more information than research suggests they actually can. As a result, they often act 
prematurely, making major decisions without fully comprehending the likely 
consequences for the system”. The possible heuristics and cognitive biases that can 
influence a strategic decision maker are continuously being identified, categorized and 
added to (Roxburgh 2003, Lovallo and Sibony 2006, Kahneman and Lovallo et al. 2011, 
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Heathand Lovallo et al. 2013). These processes, perspectives and biases combine to 
influence what are frequently referred to as a leader’s strategic frame or schema. How 
these schemas are developed and influenced will be discussed next. 
 
2.6.3.1 Schemas, Strategic Frames, and Related Concepts 
 
Although the cognitive perspective in strategic management is a broad area of research, 
its foundations are even broader given the strong influence of fields such as behavioral 
economics and psychology. Due to the influence and diversity of schools of psychology, 
the number of terms and various related concepts is exhaustive and often overlapping. 
This situation is exasperated by the fact that many of the concepts of cognition are 
abstract and difficult to verify empirically. The result is that in the area of strategic 
management alone, Walsh (1995) has compiled a list of close to one hundred terms 
related to the cognitive realm. Many of these are used interchangeably and include 
relevant terms such as strategic schema, dominant logic, cognitive maps, world views, 
strategic frames, belief structures and knowledge structures to name but a few. Walsh 
(1995), himself defines a knowledge structure or schema construct as “a mental template 
that individuals impose on an information environment to give it form or meaning. From 
the social cognition perspective of psychology, Fiske and Taylor (1991) define schema as 
“a set of interrelated, largely unquestioned assumptions that highlights certain 
characteristics of new stimuli and establishes the grounds for categorizing them as similar 
to or different from those encountered before”.  Neuroscience and emerging perspectives 
such as NeuroLeadership are helping to confirm and categorize some of these 
abstractions and terminology (Rock and Schwartz 2006, Rock 2008). Still this work is in 
its infancy and has to date largely done more to confirm existing confirmed psychological 
theory than provide extensive new insights. Therefore, as discussed, the field of 
psychology and, in particular, the theories of social cognition continue to have huge 
influence in providing a theoretical foundation for many of the phenomenon observed 
and researched in the field of management.   
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2.6.3.2 The Influence Of Social Cognition On Management And 
Strategic Flexibility 
 
Kiesler and Sproull’s (1982) article explores the implications of social cognition 
processes on problem-sensing behavior and is one of the most cited in the literature 
within the cognitive perspective of strategic management. It provides an excellent review 
of the three main theoretical approaches to social cognition (Social Perception, 
Information Processing, and Social Motivation). All three of these approaches commonly 
hold the assumptions noted above by Simon that individuals have limited capacity to deal 
with information.  Specifically, that the ability “to notice and interpret information varies 
with learning and innate capabilities, with social pressures and with the technical limits of 
information search” (Kiesler and Sproull 1982). Another central shared assumption that is 
largely researched in the strategy literature is in regards to cognitive processes being 
made up of perceiving, encoding, storing, retrieving, and inferring. Each of these 
components is considered to be lying “along a continuum of requirements for attention, 
effort, and higher order mental activity” (Kiesler and Sproull 1982, Reger and Palmer 
1996). This continuum’s range is from automatic to effortful processes. Where 
“automatic processes are relatively unaffected by environmental or organismic conditions, 
while effortful processes are greatly influenced by such conditions as personal intention, 
learning and social influence” (Kiesler and Sproull 1982). An example of this assumption 
being applied in the strategic literature is Reger and Palmer’s (1996) study of cognitive 
inertia in executives experiencing an industry with increasing uncertainty or dynamism. 
They question the “sharp dichotomy” between automatic and controlled cognitive 
processes that both cognitive and social psychology originally saw in this spectrum. 
Rather, they cite several examples of controlled aspects of automatic processing and 
automaticity in judgment tasks previously thought to be controlled. The widely accepted 
conclusion is that there is likely a “continuum of processing modes, each mode exerting a 
greater or lesser effect on action depending on which is primarily engaged” (Reger and 
Palmer 1996). Automatic processes can act much like our stereotyping of individuals. 
Similarly “executive decision makers categorize key environmental factors in automatic 
stereotype ways” (Reger and Palmer 1996). While both cognitive modes are slow to 
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modify “cognitive inertia is stronger in automatic modes”. Further, as Weick’s (1990) 
study of the Tenerife air disaster suggests, it may be even more prevalent in crisis 
situations where expert intuition plays a strong role (Klein 2003). By contrast, Reger and 
Palmer’s (1996) research finds that both automatic and controlled modes had a greater 
accuracy of interpretation in stable environments. It is during a turbulent change that 
“strategic mistakes” can occur. Namely, the study revealed that executives used 
automatic maps that represented obsolete industry boundaries even though the dynamics 
of the industry had changed. However, executives can modify their mental models, but 
this involves “deliberate processing of acknowledged information” (Reger and Palmer 
1996). The research also indicates that the modification is slow but can promote greater 
divergence of mental models and increased constructs across an industry in turbulent 
contexts. Examples such as these illustrate the importance of determining when and 
where executives need to be mindful and when and under what conditions judgment is 
automatic. These and other related types of cognitive dimensions undoubtedly have 
significant implications for strategic frames and how they may evolve and be modified. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that there has been a proliferation of models and proposed 
prescriptions to guard against these type of cognitive perception challenges (Miller and 
Ireland 2005, Lovallo and Sibony 2006, Snowden and Boone 2007, Kahneman and 
Lovallo et al. 2011, Heath and Lovallo et al. 2013). 
 
2.6.3.3 Social Perception Theories: Sensing Our Strategic Environment 
 
Social perception theories emphasize how people encode information and use it in 
explanations. Kelley and Weick are two major contributors in this area, and their work is 
central to this research. Although it is not possible to categorize either of their writings 
exclusively in any one of these three theoretical streams (Social Perception, Information 
Processing, and Social Motivation)  much of their work can be found under the social 
perception theory category (Weick 1979, Kelley 1955). The writings of Weick (1979 and 
1995) contribute to a central aspect of the cognitive perspective, that of sense making. 
According to Weick and Sutcliffe et al. (2005) sensemaking is “central because it is the 
primary site where meanings materialize that inform and constrain identity and action”. 
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Taking an interpretivist view Weick (1995) goes on to claim that “the environment is not 
an objective thing to be known, but rather the product of interpretation and action.” In 
other words, he claims that “the concept of sensemaking is valuable because it highlights 
the invention that precedes interpretation” (Weick 1995). Thus like Kelley’s “man as the 
scientist” both see man as an active selector and interpreter of data (Kelley 1955). 
 
This social perception perspective underlies much of the work done on strategic decision 
biases. The significance of this theoretical stream can be seen by the widely cited and 
famous studies of heuristics and biases by theorists such as Kahneman and Tversky 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). According to Kiesler and Sproull (1982) five main 
concepts dominate social perception theories: “1) Augmentation 2) Discounting principle 
3) Illusory correlation 4) Illusory causation 5) Automatic Scanning”. These concepts 
impact the application of many broader theories such as salience and attribution theory. 
The result has been the development of numerous studies and new categorizations of 
potential heuristics and biases in the management context (Miller 2002, Roxburgh 2003, 
Lovallo and Sibony 2006, Kahneman and Lovallo et al. Sibony 2011). Also, these 
conceptual categories are used in the other theoretical streams to highlight different 
aspects of social cognition. Cleary, the application of social perception theory has 
extended across a vast many disciplines and contexts including its considerable impact on 
strategic management research (Bukszar 1999). In the specific area of strategic cognitive 
flexibility, it is significant as it offers a greater understanding of how individuals perceive 
and attend to their environment. 
 
2.6.3.4 Information Processing Theories: Friend Or Foe In Strategic 
Thinking? 
 
Information Processing theories emphasize what comes after perception, the “encoding, 
representation, and organization of encoded material, memory and retrieval” (Kiesler and 
Sproull 1982). These phases involve the development and use of schemas and how 
expectations from those schemas affect judgment, memory and the use of new 
information (Galambos and Abelson et al. 1986). As Beinhocker (1999) indicates in his 
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review of adaptive strategies, our mental models “become less likely to perceive 
experiences as totally new and instead we try to relate them to previous ones, which we 
group into existing categories”. This attempt to find a fit with existing categories may 
inhibit our ability to recognize the link between changes in our environment and the need 
for strategic change as was the case for Polaroid and in the TRN case study. As Sharfman 
and Dean (1997) state, “cognitive structures or models may influence capabilities for 
strategic flexibility by limiting decision makers’ thinking and blinding them from 
innovative decision-making options”. Therefore, sensing and sense-making take effort as 
it is not enough to just passively absorb and categorize information. According to 
Johansen (2007), the skill of foresight also involves having “the discipline to hold at the 
perception stage just long enough, before moving to judgment”. Foresight then 
“encourages you to spend more time sensing, to develop skills in asking questions that 
matter and resisting answers that don’t” (Johansen 2007). While this practice will 
increase the likelihood of premature judgment based on our assumptions and existing 
categories, it is not easy to rethink strategic frames. Paradoxically, it is our mental models 
that also enable us to recognize repetitive patterns and relationships quickly. This 
recognition enhances our ability to cope successfully with the majority of our daily 
managerial tasks. It is also this pattern recognition that is one of the fundamental 
principles behind the use of the case method in business schools. Pattern recognition is 
also a key element of the intuition research done by Klein (2003) and has been espoused 
to be of benefit in specific decision-making contexts. Intuition is at its core “a set of 
insights and understandings that is not fully known to its owner” (Miller and Ireland 
2005). Therefore, it can be dangerous and one reason Klein (2003) suggests it is best in 
non-turbulent conditions where predictability and learning from feedback enables expert 
intuition to be developed. Klein refers to these contexts as “high-validity” but stresses 
that major strategic decisions do not meet this criterion fully. Therefore, executives 
should only listen to their intuitions as a starting point (Kahneman and Klein 2010). 
Problematically, Kahneman points out that there is a bias to select leaders who are risk 
takers and make decisions quickly (Kahneman and Klein 2010). In his words, this is 
because “We deeply want to be led by people who know what they’re doing and who 
don’t have to think about it too much.” (Kahneman and Klein 2010). This latter 
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leadership dilemma will be an additional motivation for shaping the TRN Leadership 
Framework to discount this bias. The intent is to dilute the impact of this bias by 
highlighting and reinforcing competencies, supporting mechanisms and culture that value 
perspective, strategic agility and managing vision and purpose. A final key aspect of 
information processing is that information from the environment “is not a selection 
process that is arbitrary” but rather “people attend to and encode salient material” 
(Kiesler and Sproull 1982, Galambos and Abelson et al. 1986). These factors make 
processing information in a non-biased way i) more challenging ii) more effortful to 
avoid iii) and as salience is connected to existing schema and strategic frames, more 
likely to reinforce existing information and beliefs. Given the needed effort involved to 
avoid these processing errors, it is not surprising that the evidence from this case study 
suggests the senior TRN executives fell prey to these dynamics. The pressure for short-
term results and lack of slack were two of many factors reinforcing this tendency. 
 
2.6.3.5 Social Motivation Theories: What’s In It For Me? 
 
Social Motivation theories regard how people enhance information based on their 
individual goals, motives and include emotional needs such as social approval. These 
theories see the function of cognitive processes as linking information with whatever 
particular goals are strongly held (Kiesler and Sproull 1982).  An example of research in 
the business field that utilizes this principle is Staw’s (1981) study of escalation of 
commitment. He suggests that the search for information may be narrowed so as to 
justify past decisions. Other circumstances under which goal motivation may affect the 
evaluation of stimuli, or the interpretation of information are more commonly found. 
Kiesler and Sproull (1982) refer to these as “aspiration-level triggers”. These are typical 
motivational and often incentivized goals such as market share, Profit and Loss targets 
and so forth. If the goals are not met then, problem-solving behavior begins. 
Understandably, the stakes at risk with these types of goals can influence both 
consciously and unconsciously the attention and interpretation of data. These factors are 
highly relevant to the TRN case study in the three general categories: 1) the incentive 
systems (both formal and informal) that drove personal interest and focus of cognitive 
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attention and effort 2) the negative leadership behaviors associated with decline as 
outlined by Kanter (2003) in her study of the psychology of turnarounds, and 3) the 
organizational mindset resulting from a survival mode context. These factors will be 
covered in more detail in the mainstream of this research. 
 
2.6.3.6 Summary of Social Cognition Influences 
 
In summary, social cognition theories heavily influence the study of mental models or 
strategic frames in strategic management. The multiple micro-social-cognition processes 
affect our strategic frames in at least three ways: 1) determining what information will 
receive attention 2) interpretation through the current map or frame may limit or slant 
recognition of the strategic significance of the data  3) our frames limit the number of 
alternative solutions we generate for issues identified (Barr and Stimpert et al. 1992, 
Mintzberg and Raisinghani et al. 1976). The significance and challenge of enabling the 
potential for cognitive strategic flexibility will be covered next. 
 
2.7 Strategic Flexibility: The Challenge And Importance Of 
Cognitive Strategic Flexibility 
 
Strategic flexibility is a capability and as has been pointed out by Sanchez  (1997), 
Combe and Greenley (2004), it is associated with new resource configurations required to 
deal with change. Sanchez (1993) illustrates this in describing the coordination flexibility 
as an essential component of the overall strategic flexibility capability. Individuals and 
the organization as a whole need to “identify new uses for resources, imagine new 
configurations of resource chains and deploy new resources effectively in a given 
resource chain”. The creation of these complex configurations often involves building 
imaginative relationships and solutions throughout the resources chain or value chain. In 
many large firms that cooperate and or have co-opitition with a large set of players, the 
creation and managing of what is often considered an eco-system is not only a means for 
flexibility but also an attempt to create competitive position, dependency, and control in 
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uncertain environments. The need to consider the big picture and think of the strategic 
implications of these complex relationships is essential and a central expectation of 
modern leadership (Hodgson and White 2003, Brousseau et al. 2006, Schoemaker and 
Krupp et al. 2013). In a single supply chain, there can be hundreds of players to consider 
and manage. For example, decisions involving choices of sourcing, co-development, 
brand sharing and others can have implications of lock in or lock out of competing 
ecosystems. The same can be said for the more traditional competitive repertoires of price, 
product line or service (Miller and Chen 1996). Success in this coordination flexibility is 
clearly dependent upon the engagement of the individual and organizational cognitive 
capabilities of the firm. This interdependency is hinted at when Sanchez (1997) observes 
that the “overall flexibility of an organization will be limited by the inherent limitations 
or inflexibilities of the least flexible resource in the chain.”  
 
This theme of dependency on individuals is a reinforced by Sharfman and Dean (1997) in 
their study of 57 strategic decisions in 25 companies. They suggest that “the core of all 
adaptation is a decision-making process” and that without flexible decision making it is 
unlikely the organization can be flexible enough to adapt (Sharfman and Dean 1997). 
Again it is implied that weak links of individual cognitive inertia are important and that 
decision making is critically important. One reason behind this criticality has been 
illustrated in the literature surrounding the concept of Strategic Flexibility. Namely, that 
the time frame for all strategic actions is being reduced (Sanchez 1997). As the numerous 
studies of Eisenhardt (2004) and many others have suggested, strategy is becoming more 
and more “temporal.” The environmental pressure and strategic necessity of recognizing, 
interpreting and responding quicker are placing new demands on executives (Hitt and 
Keats et al. 1998, Schoemaker and Krupp et al. 2013). These demands are not unfounded 
given that previous research has shown a link between fast strategic decision making and 
effective firm performance in the form of increased profitability (Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt 1998).  
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Strategic Flexibility is also reinforced when the speed of the strategic decision-making 
process is enhanced. This speed is accomplished by maintaining “simultaneous 
alternatives” which in turn lowers the psychological stake individuals have in any one 
alternative and enables them to shift between options (Staw 1981, Eisenhardt 1989b). 
Shimizu and Hitt (2004) have provided a similar approach in their study of reversing 
ineffective strategic decisions. They recommend that executives should look at projects 
as “a portfolio of options” as this tends to reduce the risk of commitment both cognitively 
and in resources. As noted earlier, the ability to cope with this tension or paradoxical 
thinking has also been recognized as an enabler of ambidexterity (Lewis 2000, Gibson 
and Birkinshaw 2004). Another identified source of increasing the speed of the strategic 
decision-making process has been the suggestion of using real-time information. This 
type of information may “speed issue identification, allowing executives to spot problems 
and opportunities sooner” (Dutton and Jackson 1998, Eisenhardt 1989).  
 
The research and practitioner literature have many prescriptions for improving the quality 
and speed of the problem-solving capability of individuals and organizations. These 
include increasing the speed with which managers receive information, increasing the 
range of information, providing more experiences from which to learn or simply having 
sophisticated planning and control systems that allow early recognition of deviations 
from plan. The implications in regards to individuals becoming the potential weakest link 
in the chain of resources are considerable and central to enabling the adaptation of the 
firm. As indicated above, this factor is one of the central reasons why firms spend 
significant resources on the recruitment, development, and tracking of their leadership 
pipeline (Charan and Drotter et al. 2001, Conger and Ready 2004, Herman and Komm et 
al. 2011).  
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The strategic literature in both the ambidexterity and strategic flexibility streams point to 
the critical role of leaders in enabling these key capabilities. However, they also highlight 
the fact that both internal and external contextual factors have a significant impact on the 
cognitive potential of leaders. The researcher has argued that there are close links 
between the ambidexterity and strategic flexibility literature. Further, that there are 
potential benefits in leveraging their complementary aspects to enable cognitive strategic 
flexibility and the adaptation capability of the firm. The implication is that a 
comprehensive approach is needed to achieve these objectives. The literature and the 
complexity of the task are considerable. The development of an integrative framework to 
guide thinking and the intervention planning in the TRN case study was developed to 
assist this task. The inductively developed iSCOPE framework has proven to be 
extremely helpful in building a customized approach while leveraging the conceptual 
synthesis of the ambidexterity and strategic flexibility literature to meet the needs of TRN. 
The TRN case company has explicitly acknowledged its ambition to create a distinctive 
leadership brand as one mechanism to support increased cognitive strategic flexibility 
and overall competitiveness. On the organizational level, the structural and contextual 
ambidexterity discussion will be addressed by utilizing the complimentary approach 
noted in the literature proposed above (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). The cognitive and 
contextual dimensions that influence “Individual and Organizational minds” is a central 
theme of this research and, therefore, we now turn to methodology and purpose of Project 
One. 
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3.0 Project One: Inducing Strategic Constructs And Elements 
In The Case Company Context 
 
3.1 Specific Purpose Of Project One  
 
Given this research is a Case Study focusing on the strategic frames of one global 
company’s Strategic Leader level executives, a deep understanding of the overall context 
in which these executives operate was a fundamental requirement. Raisch and 
Birkinshaw et al. (2009) recommend a similar approach for understanding ambidexterity. 
The authors cite numerous studies that “provide a strong indication that organizational 
factors have to be considered alongside personal characteristics when explaining 
individuals’ ambidexterity” (Raisch and Birkinshaw et al. 2009). This greater contextual 
understanding enables the researcher to better analyze the strategic perspectives of the 
research target group. Further, the gaining of insight to potential elements for and 
possible constructs from the Repertory Grid interviews for Project Two of the research 
enabled the researcher to build more successfully the grid creation process and carry out 
the open-ended section of the Repertory Grid interviews. It also allowed for a more 
grounded analysis of the results and their implications. Therefore, the intent of this phase 
of the research was to 1) discover the key contextual drivers 2) induce potential 
constructs and elements that may be influencing executive strategic frames 3) and enable 
and inform the design of the repertory grid interviews of Project Two. 
 
As has been noted, the researcher was an embedded participant in the organization and 
therefore already had significant experiential knowledge of the main events and other 
details at play since the time of the founding of the Joint Venture in 2007. However given 
the size, scope and complexity of the organization, one perspective on its own is quite 
limited. Thus, multiple data sources and methods were employed to bring about a richer 
and more diverse view of the organization and its context. Furthermore, as will be shown 
in the results section of this chapter, many executives from this JV spent considerable 
time in the pre-integration period and in the industry itself. Therefore, the history of the 
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Parent companies and precedent JV factors were taken into consideration. The overall 
structure of Project One is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Project One Research Timeline And Data Collection Methods 
 
3.2 Research Methodology  
 
3.2.1 Characteristics Of Qualitative Research  
 
Qualitative research methods of inquiry have struggled to achieve legitimacy and as 
pointed out by Creswell (2009), in earlier years research proposal writers needed to spend 
considerable time convincing stakeholders of its credibility. This issue of credibility is 
principally due to questions about the reliability and generalizability of the findings. It 
may also be related to the perceived subjective or central role of the researcher in the 
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process. Consistent with the interpretivist philosophy, qualitative research focuses on the 
perceptions and experiences of the participants with data that reflects this mode. This 
focus means that data is usually text and often in the words of the participants 
themselves.  In this case study the researcher does play a key and central role in carrying 
out the research, by being in the field for extended periods of time and collecting data 
directly (Sekaran 2003). However, of critical importance and one of the challenges of this 
methodology is the researcher’s ability to keep the focus “on learning the meaning that 
the participants hold about the problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers 
bring to the research or writers express in the literature” (Creswell 2009). 
 
Unlike quantitative research methods, fully formed theories or precise hypothesis are not 
established in advance. In contrast, the qualitative process is very much bottom up with 
themes or patterns emerging through analysis of the data. This inductive methodology 
has been used extensively as the strategy of inquiry for this qualitative case study. As 
Eisenhardt (1989a) describes in her theoretical contribution to this methodology 
“research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and 
no hypotheses to test”. In fact, even the research process is emergent and somewhat 
opportunistic. As Creswell (2009) explains, “the initial plan for research cannot be tightly 
prescribed, and all phases of the process may change or shift after the researcher enters 
the field and begins to collect data. For example, the questions may change the forms of 
data collection shift, and the individuals and sites visited modified”. Eisenhardt (1989a) 
calls this “controlled opportunism” and provides research examples where unscheduled 
events or unexpected access to individuals have made significant contributions to the 
study despite their not being in the original design. This phenomenon has occurred in this 
research design in several constructive instances due to the dynamism of the case study 
organization and the industry in which it operates. This freedom or flexibility to make 
adjustments during data collection is consistent with the reflective and bottom-up nature 
of the approach.  Qualitative research offers some freedom to make modifications during 
the data collection process to reflect themes or events that emerge. It is also consistent 
with the practice of seeking multiple sources of data that help in establishing validity and 
in recognizing themes across the data (Yin 1981). Again, this highlights the central and 
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interpretive role of the researcher in understanding the data and “reporting multiple 
perspectives, identifying the many factors involved in a situation, and generally sketching 
the larger picture that emerges” (Creswell 2009). As will be discussed below, despite this 
apparent subjectivity, there are multiple methods and procedures to support the validity 
and reliability of this method of research.  
 
3.2.2 The Qualitative Research Strategy: Case Study 
 
As noted above, the research strategy chosen for this inquiry is the case method. Case 
studies can have a range of focuses. They can be an in-depth investigation of a process, 
event, organization “or one or more individuals” (Creswell 2009). Cases focus on 
“understanding dynamics present within single settings” and in this instance, the single 
setting is a large multinational organization with a relatively diverse and geographically 
dispersed presence (Eisenhardt 1989). Since the aim of this research is to investigate the 
strategic frames of senior executives and the factors that influence their potential for 
cognitive strategic flexibility, the context is an essential part of the study that needs to be 
captured and analyzed. As Yin (1981) points out “As a research strategy, the 
distinguishing characteristic of the case study is that it attempts to examine:(a) a 
contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” In this study, strategic 
flexibility is the phenomenon in question, and the context of interest are the diverse 
factors that are influencing both the organization and the individuals representing that 
organization. As identified previously a central research focus is the ability of firms to 
match and enable executives with the appropriate strategic frames that will fit the 
demands of the varied business contexts facing the firm. Being in the field or center of 
the context and using multiple data collection methods and sources is one of the best 
strategies for investigating this research focus. A fundamental part of the research during 
Project Two involves drawing out and eliciting the ideas, constructs, perceptions of the 
executive participants in the setting and not in an experimental or laboratory 
environment. Themes and theory building cannot be successfully developed without the 
understanding and interpreting of the larger context that influences their daily challenges 
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Raisch and Birkinshaw et al. 2009, Thomas 2006). This reflexive analysis was largely 
enhanced by the researcher’s proximity to both the subject/s and the data sources in the 
organization and industry setting (Maxwell 1992). 
 
While the case method can employ both quantitative and qualitative methods, the 
qualitative approach was the principal methodology utilized in Project One. As 
Eisenhardt and Creswell, both note, the qualitative case method allows for flexible and 
opportunistic data collection where the questions or choices of data collection methods 
can change (Eisenhardt 1989a, Creswell 2009). Eisenhardt and her colleagues have often 
used this blended approach by employing questionnaires to supplement qualitative 
interviews and observations. Nevertheless, Yin (1981) reminds us that with “case study 
designs (all must cope with the essential problem that, because the context is part of the 
study, there will be too many “variables” for the number of observations to be made, thus 
making standard experimental and survey designs irrelevant)”. 
 
The inductive nature of the qualitative case method with its iterative process of data 
collection and analysis did necessitate going back to participants and other data points 
several times in the subsequent phases of the research to ensure “respondent validation” 
(Bryman 1988). The case method often allows relationships and familiarity that can 
facilitate the ease and effectiveness with which this can be done. On the other hand, it has 
been necessary for the researcher to maintain protocols to reinforce consistency and limit 
researcher bias. As noted above, Eisenhardt (1989a) in her recommendations for building 
theory from the case method suggests avoiding developing hypothesis and theories in 
advance. For the purpose of focusing efforts, she recommends that researchers “should 
formulate a research problem and possibly specify some potentially important variables 
with some reference to extant literature” while avoiding, at least at the beginning, 
thinking about detailed relationships between variables and theories. It must be stated that 
this has been a challenging balancing act but was assisted by organizing the research in 
sequential inductive projects. Still one cannot help being influenced during the process by 
the literature and existing theories. The very process of refining elements, constructs, and 
themes with a continuous comparison of data and literature implies looking for how the 
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data fits with or creates theory. In the attempt to look at each data source independently, 
one cannot help being influenced by knowledge and emerging conclusions already 
developing from other data sources. Strauss (1987) points out that this is not bias to be 
eliminated but rather crucial “experiential data” that contributes a significant source of 
hypothesis and validity checks. Also, constructivist grounded theory makes no claim to 
be objective and recognizes the interpretivist role of the researcher (Glaser and Strauss 
1967).   
 
3.3 Data Sources and Recording Methods  
 
Case studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, 
questionnaires and observations and this research has used all of these methods (Creswell 
2009, Eisenhardt 1989a). This range of methods provides a broader perspective on the 
context. The interpretation will provide clarity and focus for Project Two. Consistent with 
the Inductive Qualitative research approach to data collection and for gathering a 
comprehensive environmental perspective the following sources and methods have been 
used in Project One: 
 
- Exploratory Focus Group 
- Open-ended Questionnaire and observation of Company strategy training 
participants 
- Textual coding and analysis of Company archives and communications 
- Interviews (and textual coding) of two former Heads of Strategy and Business 
Development 
- Observation of a Strategic Leadership training 
- Researcher diary and reflective notes 
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While the specific purpose of each of these methods will be explained in their following 
correlated sections, the overarching objectives of these combined methods was threefold: 
 
1) Gain an understanding of the current and historical macro level trends, dynamics 
and factors operating in the company and the telecom industry 
2) Begin to identify specific factors, constructs and potential elements that are 
impacting the strategic frames of executives at the individual level 
3) Ensure that a significant degree of methods triangulation was achieved to increase 
the reliability and validity of the overall findings from the data  
 
3.3.1 Exploratory Focus Group 
 
Initial information about the firm’s strategic situation and strategic orientation were 
formed by the researcher during employment and from informal observation of five 
strategy training sessions for Strategic Leaders over the period of November 2007 to 
February 2009 (See Figure 7). The training involved approximately 120 executives 
including Executive Board members and the Head of Strategy and Planning. It was from 
this context that the research problem, possible questions, and related issues began to 
emerge and be formulated. As a means to dig deeper and explore whether there was a real 
foundation for further investigation one focus group was conducted at the global 
headquarters of the JV. 
 
The focus group was held in a relaxed setting during March of 2009 with 7 of 10 invited 
Strategic Leaders participating. Due to evolving working time conflicts and the overall 
demand on this level of leadership, 3 participants needed to decline participation. This 
purposively selected target group was chosen i) as it was the category of leadership senior 
management had expressed strategic mindset concerns for and ii) due to the close 
correlation between the leadership level and the significant percentage of “time 
applications and focus of effort” that this leadership level applies to strategy and vision as 
these tasks related directly to the strategic thinking topic of this thesis (Charan and 
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Drotter et al. 2001). This expectation is confirmed by the company’s Strategic Thinking, 
Leadership Competency description for this level: “Creates Company’s strategy and 
promotes the vision ensuring it evolves to meet global needs” (TRN Leadership 
Competencies). 
 
The participants were chosen with the intention of achieving as much gender, ethnic, age, 
functional, business unit and parent company heritage diversity as possible from a small 
group (Patton 1990). This diversity was aimed at for the purpose of revealing a full range 
of perspectives and avoiding a one-dimensional representation of the firm’s Strategic 
Leaders. A structured protocol was used to ensure that all participants were aware of the 
purpose, process and confidentiality of the discussion. The exact research agenda was not 
revealed to the participants so that preconceptions would be kept to a minimum. 
Consistent with this, the overall approach for the focus group discussions was to go from 
low to high moderator control. This approach was chosen to enable themes to emerge 
more freely while allowing for deeper exploration through focused discussion on 
concepts relate to strategic thinking of primary interest. To stimulate and guide the 
discussion, numerous visual cues were employed. These were primarily company logos 
from well-known global players. These were used to generate initial discussion and build 
a broader frame of reference. Companies selected included direct competitors, 
complementors and others from unrelated industries. Various exercises and constructs 
were used to allow individuals to do self-reflection and sharing of perspectives. The focus 
group was conducted over a two hour period and was tape-recorded and later transcribed. 
A series of discussions around the following themes emerged: Global Players and Speed 
of Change, Individual and Organizational Focus, Flexible Mindset, Market Dimensions, 
and Environmental Complexity. 
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3.3.2 Open-ended Questionnaire And Observation Of Company 
Strategy Training 
 
A portion of the researcher’s role in the Case Company involves the design and 
implementation of executive training. In April of 2010, the eighth of a continuing series 
of globally located independent four-day strategy training events for senior executives 
was held in Moscow, Russia. The participants were 24 Strategic Leaders representing all 
global regions and functions of the organization. The format of these strategy trainings 
included analysis and consideration of the strategic context of the company including 
macro-level issues, customer business models, and alignment, the competitive landscape 
and a deeper dive on a particular strategic issue of timely relevance. 
 
Although the researcher had played an essential role in the previous seven strategy 
workshops, no formal protocol for observation had been conducted. Given that the 
researcher was the primary orchestrator and facilitator of the sessions the role was direct 
and actively involved with the work environment. However, the formal line between 
observer and participant was not black and white. In some portions of the events the 
researcher was deeply involved in facilitating and directing the activities. Whereas in 
other sections of the event the researcher had the possibility (and even work role duty and 
participant expectation) to take notes and freely capture the insights, factors, and 
understanding from the participants’ perspective.   
 
For the Moscow event, the intention was to do a more comprehensive observation of the 
session given that many of the activities simulate strategic thinking environments and 
stimulate the need to think strategically from new and unusual strategic perspectives. The 
utilization of other stakeholders to support the facilitation of the session and thus reduce 
the researchers’ formal work duty would have allowed more systematic and wide 
observation. However, as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989a), qualitative case studies can 
enable opportunistic research but also require the need to adapt. The unforeseen volcanic 
activity that disrupted air travel across the globe and especially Northern Europe at that 
time deeply impacted the delivery of and resources available for the Moscow event. 
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Although the researcher was able to make observations and notes the level of the 
structure was significantly reduced as two support resources were not able to attend due 
to air travel cancelations. 
 
As a result, a post-event open-ended questionnaire was conducted with the participants. 
The questionnaire was intentionally implemented one month after the participants had re-
entered their formal work environment. The objective was to enhance reflection on their 
feelings, perceptions and thoughts regarding individual and group strategic thinking 
practices. The questions emphasized both the strategy related activities during the 
workshop while also asking for a comparison of the factors impacting their “real” work 
conditions. The questionnaires were collected digitally and coded. Although the 
identification of the participants was possible, procedures were used to do the individual 
analysis anonymously. Memos were recorded in the MAXQDA software system for each 
question’s answer, and a summary was made on conclusions from each questionnaire. 
Themes and concepts were then summarized both at the individual questionnaire level, 
across questionnaires by question category, and followed by summary observation from 
the entire data source. (Maxwell 2005).  
 
3.3.3 Textual Coding And Analysis Of Company Archives And 
Communications 
 
Given the role of the researcher and unrestricted access to documentation and 
communications of all formats, the need to be selective for the purpose of research focus 
was required. Initial plans were to explore a wider range of internally produced strategic 
support documents that are generated by the Corporate Business Intelligence units and 
various subscriptions available on the intranet and sharenet databases (competitor reports, 
customer reports, regional analysis, etc.) that are available to the Case Company’s 
Strategic Leaders. However during the iterative process of observing, discussing and 
reviewing interview material the lack of influence of this wider material became apparent. 
Firstly, the researcher discovered that an increasing amount of these materials are 
obtained from generic external sources and reflect consultant or analyst views rather than 
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views of the case company executives themselves. Part of this trend came from the 
overall reduction in resources within the strategy function and a corresponding decline in 
strategy sharing sessions that were intended for two-way intelligence sharing. Also, a 
familiar theme that emerged from the executive target group was “information overload” 
and relative lack of time. This can be evidenced by the following representative Moscow 
Survey response “This lack of time is also affecting the ability to follow the markets and 
the world around us, to generate any new ideas, and to read everything (or even part of) 
what is available for example in the TRN intranet or FYI e-mails” (Moscow Survey 
Respondent 3). Despite the limits of the executives and bounded rationality, these 
documents have had a considerable impact on the researcher, and this is something that 
cannot be removed from the analysis. The primary impact on the researcher was an 
increased understanding and insights into industry-level dynamics.  As will be discussed 
in the results sections of this thesis, this cut back on the breadth of intelligence gathering 
and upwards and downwards communication did influence the overall strategic thinking 
potential of TRN’s Strategic Leaders.  
 
The final choice of documents reviewed for coding and analysis are in five categories: 
 
- Quarterly Business Review sharing documents for internal communication 2007-
2011 
- Quarterly CEO Internal Communications 2007-2011 
- Selective corporate level strategy documents and communications 2007-2011 
- Transcripts and notes from interviews 
- Moscow Open-ended Questionnaire forms 
 
The period of the documents initiates with the legal start of the JV and ends with the 
closing of Project One. The first two sources above were chosen because they reflect and 
reveal the main activities that were being heavily communicated and emphasized at the 
top tiers of the organization and to the Strategic Leader target group. They also cover 
macro-level issues regarding industry dynamics and corporate priorities including 
strategy. The combination provides factual based data and interpretation of performance. 
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It also communicates the state of mind of the CEO/s given these messages came directly 
from them and contained priorities, general opinions, and personal perspectives. The 
documents also reveal information about the pulse of the organization. Critically the 
communications were shared first with senior executives and then cascaded through 
formal processes to the leadership teams down the organizational pipeline. Therefore, 
each strategic leader needed to familiarize themselves with the messages and use the 
available material packages to “own” the message by internalizing it and sharing it in 
their own individualized way. 
 
The formal corporate level strategy documents and messages have been chosen as they 
are central to the strategic frames of the senior executives and essential to their role 
expectations. 
 
After conducting search and analysis of several text-coding software options, the 
MAXQDA software system was chosen due to its high level of features that enabled 
depth and flexibility of analysis. It also provided the capability to code the widest range 
of document formats (Creswell 2009). MAXQDA was then used to code all 
communications including the transcripts from two former Heads of Strategy and 
Business Development. An open coding system was used combined with memoing. This 
software allowed for easy retrieval of code segments by code, document, document 
category and multiple other formats. It also allowed for easy revision of codes during the 
coding process. An example of the coding functionality is provided in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 Example Of Textual Coding Using MAXQDA Software 
 
3.3.4 Interviews With Two Former Heads Of Strategy And Business 
Development 
 
Two semi-structured interviews were conducted with former Heads of Strategy and 
Business Development during November of 2010. The interviews were done on the site 
of the interviewees new employment premises in private settings. Interviews were 1.5 
hours in duration. Both interviews were recorded and later transcribed. The researcher 
also took careful notes during the interviews. These purposefully selected interviewees 
were chosen on the basis of the strategic significance and impact of the former role of the 
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interviewees, their relatively removed objectivity, and the tenure of their employment in 
the telecom industry. 
 
The researcher had prepared sets of questions based on several themes that had emerged 
during observation and analysis of the other sources of data collection outlined earlier in 
this section as well as from informal discussions with TRN employees. These themes 
were primarily around: 
 
- the strategy process 
- history of the company’s strategy and context 
- the strategic focus of the company 
- the strategic focus of the senior executives 
- specific actions and stakeholders 
- conclusions, perspectives, and insights  
 
Nevertheless, the structure, format, and procedure of the interviews were kept very loose 
so as not to box in the interviewee and leverage any emerging perspectives that were 
elicited. Learning from the first interview did influence some content of the second 
interview, primarily on new topics unknown but revealed to the researcher during the first 
interview. This adjustment is consistent with the inductive nature of the data collection 
and research approach (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). Extensive memo taking was done in 
the MAXQDA software system during the transcribing process. The transcripts were then 
coded, and summary analysis of both interviews was done both individually and in 
combination. 
 
3.3.5 Observation Of Strategic Leadership Training  
 
 Although not originally planned for in the research design a very relevant opportunity 
emerged at a four-day Strategic Leader training during November 2010, in Surrey, U.K. 
Therefore the researcher successfully sought consent from the event participants to 
include this in the data collection. The event was primarily organized and implemented 
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by an external vendor for 28 globally representative senior corporate executives who had 
been chosen chiefly due to their being assessed as critical resources during the Executive 
Board Talent Watch. This outsourcing of event management allowed the researcher to 
focus completely on observation and note taking during the entire event. Although not 
designed to be a strategy workshop a significant number of the activities focused on the 
company strategy and the leadership/strategic role of the participants. This 
multidisciplinary approach is consistent with modern leadership development practice 
where corporate content is a primary starting point, and the artificial separation of 
Leadership and Strategy is removed. Also, one full day was dedicated to reflecting on the 
challenges they face and the messages they would like to communicate with the 
Executive Board. During the four days, the researcher was able to take notes and engage 
in informal conversations with all the participants. The notes, reflections, and memos 
were recorded anonymously and confidentially in the MAXQDA software system. 
 
3.3.6 Field Diary And The Role Of The Researcher 
 
The nature of the central role of the researcher in collecting and interpreting data in 
qualitative research usually requires a discussion and sharing of the researcher’s values, 
biases, personal background and other relevant factors that may come to play in the 
interpretations of the study (Creswell 2009). Since this particular case study would be 
categorized as “backyard” research involving the researcher’s organization some 
explanation of the connection to the research setting is also needed (Creswell 2009). One 
of the biggest factors that enabled this study was the researcher’s four and a half years of 
employment inside the organization at the time of completion of Project One. This 
experience provided significant prior knowledge of the setting regarding details on size, 
structure, history and culture. In addition to familiarity with many of the strategy 
documents, there was significant knowledge of where to look for and how to obtain data. 
This awareness allowed for access to information that external researchers would not 
have knowledge of and would be unlikely to uncover. The ability to spend extended 
periods of time in the field is an advantage but makes protocols and triangulation an even 
more important means to guard against too much individual bias (Yin 1994). On the 
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positive side, being embedded in the organization provided the researcher with the 
possibility to gain a holistic view of the big picture and be a “complete participant” or 
complete observer with less intrusiveness (Creswell 2009). It also exposed the researcher 
to real time and other types of information not usually gained by an external researcher. 
This experience proved to be valuable in providing a highly informed contextual 
perspective and understanding of the participant’s precise situation during the data 
collection phase. These were minor things like knowing about recent results or 
relationships at play in an individual’s context or much larger things such as a publicly 
unannounced reorganization that was on everyone’s mind, but that would not be revealed 
to an outsider. Access to real-time knowledge via intranet and impromptu conversations 
were also extremely valuable in gaining insights. A significant number of previously 
mentioned “opportunistic events” emerged and were valuable in adding strategic 
direction and additional perspective to the study. These included several 
workshops/interventions with various Global Leadership Teams, Business Unit 
Leadership Teams and the Strategy and Business Development Insight Planning scenario 
planning development workshop. 
 
On the other hand, the advanced knowledge and intimate relationship the researcher has 
with the firm and its employees have required that multiple forms of validity be used to 
guard against potential bias. Having been so involved with the organization, its success 
and failures meant that particular effort has been needed to step outside the role of 
employee and take on the role of the researcher. Protocols have been useful in this 
process, but there remains the view of the researcher’s role (Strategic Leadership), 
function (within Central Functions) and previous involvement in activities including 
strategy formation and sharing. One of the functional and relational dynamics that was 
managed is in regards to researcher’s role in Talent Management and Executive 
Development. The Researcher’s role carries with it associated or potentially perceived 
power dynamics. Several research techniques for ensuring anonymity and providing a 
sense of safety and neutrality in the data collection methods have been utilized to mitigate 
this possible factor.  Further, the target group is very much at a peer level or more senior 
to the researcher, so the overall perceived threat has likely been minimal.   
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The researcher’s work and educational background are routed in executive education. In 
these work roles before TRN, there had been considerable exposure to senior executives 
in many large corporations on a comparatively global basis. While this provided some 
comfort, skill and multicultural perspective in facilitating interactions with the executive 
population, it also implied the need to be wary of the danger of being too familiar with 
the target group. Extra reflection via the use of memoing and using sources of additional 
perspective (discussions with trusted external consultants and professors) were needed to 
guard against potentially being blind to certain observations and jumping to assumptions 
based on previous individual experiences. (Maxwell 2005, Creswell 2009) 
 
3.4. Data Analysis   
 
3.4.1 Data Analysis Approach: General Inductive Approach 
 
A general inductive approach to data analysis was used for Project One (Thomas 2006). 
For case studies, Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests that the overlapping of “data analysis with 
data collection not only gives the researcher a head start in analysis but, more 
importantly, allows researchers to take advantage of flexible data collection.” As 
mentioned above given that the researcher took on-going field notes, Eisenhardt’s 
prescription of making summary write-ups after each appropriate stage or phase of data 
collection was followed. This process facilitated one of the fundamental characteristics of 
qualitative research, the iterative data collection/analysis approach. According to Coffey 
and Atkinson (1996) an essential principle of qualitative research is that data analysis 
should be conducted simultaneously with data collection. This pairing allows you to 
“progressively focus your interviews and observations, and to decide how to test your 
emerging conclusions.” (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). This focus repeatedly occurred in 
choices regarding data sources, interview questions and target group refinement for 
Project Two. The challenge for the researcher has been to balance reflection on emerging 
themes without jumping to conclusions based on limited data, memorable experiences or 
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the opinions of very senior authority figures.  In other words, not to fall prey to many of 
the cognitive biases that were discussed in the social cognition section of Chapter Two in 
this thesis. In the case of textual coding, the initial Inductive Coding was heavily 
influenced by the preliminary literature review and the researcher’s existing experience 
with the Case Company. The insights gained from the 2009 focus group also influenced 
the choices for recognizing and tracking specific terms or category references. The main 
impact was the expectation and creation of specific categories of codes related to the 
environmental influences that might be at play, and that would impact strategic leader’s 
potential for strategic thinking and decision making. 
 
3.4.2 Strategies For Analysis 
 
As with strategies for validity, triangulation was also used in analysis techniques.  
According to Maxwell (2005) “Strategies for qualitative analysis fall into three main 
groups: categorizing strategies (such as coding and thematic analysis), connecting 
strategies (such as narrative analysis and individual case studies), and memos and 
displays (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). In the choice and process of analysis, all these 
methods have been used and combined. 
 
In categorizing analysis, Maxwell (2005) recommends that it is important to make 
distinctions between “organizational, substantive and theoretical categories.”  
Organizational categories are “broad subjects or issues” that the researcher establishes in 
advance of the data collection. In Project One, some examples are themes used to create 
discussion during the Exploratory Focus Group, questions chosen for the Questionnaire 
and some textual coding categories.  Although these are useful for sorting and conducting 
data collection, they are less helpful for “the actual work of making sense of what’s going 
on” (Maxwell 2005). As implied above the substantive and theoretical categories are 
more useful in providing a deeper understanding and making sense of what is going on. 
For both of these sub-categories, their significance is not usually known in advance. 
However given the researchers familiarity with the setting and the target group the 
importance of some categories and themes of analysis were anticipated.  
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“Substantive categories are primarily descriptive, in a broad sense that include a 
description of participants’ concepts and beliefs” without implying a theory on their own 
(Maxwell 2005). In Project One examples included anticipated construct categories 
induced by the researcher, themes brought out by the Open-ended Questionnaire that 
have been used in the Case Company context analysis and coding categories as well as 
categories created using “open coding” (Thomas 2006, Corbin and Strauss 2007). 
Theoretical categories are “derived either from prior theory or from an inductively 
developed theory” (Maxwell 2005).  In relation to Project One, examples of prior theory 
influencing categories and themes were theories from the areas of strategic management 
and organizational development. These were primarily used in the anticipated constructs 
as well as the Case Company Context components illustrated in Figure 9. For example, 
when considering preliminary constructs mainstream strategy theories such as Blue 
Ocean strategies, strategic posturing, and industry clock speed were used. These 
categories are covered in more detail in the literature review section of this thesis. 
Whereas inductive theory came in to play first in the reflection captured in memoing and 
then concurrently into the data categorizing. These “etic categories” (the researcher’s 
concepts) will be covered more fully in the discussion section of Project One. The “emic 
categories” (participants’ concepts) will be covered in greater depth in Project One, Two 
and Three. 
 
Connecting strategies “attempt to understand the data (usually, but not necessarily, an 
interview transcript or other textual material) in context, using various methods to 
identify the relationships among different elements in the text. Such strategies include 
some forms of case studies” (Patton 1990, Maxwell 2005). In Project one and throughout 
this Case Study connecting strategies are used as a primary analysis method to make 
linkages and produce insights to the big picture themes and ultimately back to their 
relative impact on the participants’ strategic frames.    
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3.4.2.1 Sampling 
 
As referenced above, the most common form of sampling in qualitative research 
(Purposeful sampling) has been used (Patton 1990). This focused sampling has been 
partially guided by the logic of the initial research questions as well as by information 
gained from the data collection and time in the field. This strategy has been chosen 
because it best meets the requirements for obtaining the type of information needed for 
the area of research.  
 
3.4.2.2 Coding 
 
As mentioned above, the MAXQDA text analysis software was used for storage, coding 
and analysis of all the primary forms of data collected including interview transcripts, 
survey responses, company archives and observation notes.  Although some enumeration 
of the words and codes was done it should be noted that in qualitative research “the goal 
of coding is not to produce counts of things but to “fracture” the data and rearrange it into 
categories between things in the same category and between categories. (Strauss 1987, 
Maxwell 2005). This method of analysis is consistent with the goal of inductively 
creating themes and grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
 
Although a small portion of the initial coding was influenced by existing theory the 
primary coding method employed was Inductive Coding, which involves the researcher 
directly examining the data and “developing the codes as they code the data” (Burka and 
Christensen 2007). This method also involved the creation of “codes that partially or 
completely overlap.” or co-occurring codes (Burka and Christensen 2007). 
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The process of analysis of the text documents was as follows: 
 
1) Selection through a purposeful sampling of the most relevant forms and 
sources followed by the uploading of all sources of data into MAXQDA. As 
MAXQDA has the capability to code multiple document formats (including 
PowerPoint) this allowed easy and integrated analysis. As mentioned above some 
refinement of choice was made through information gathered and learning in the 
field.  For example the target group for interviews was adjusted after learning who 
are the most strategically relevant leaders, the archived materials were focused 
based on increased knowledge of readership and use of the documents. 
 
2) Coding of the individual documents within each data category. The 
sequencing of coding these documents was dependent on the timing of data 
collection, the perspective on the context the data might provide and finally the 
scheduling and availability of access. As this coding was done concurrently with 
data collection throughout Project One, a significant portion of substantive 
categories were created during the process.  In practice, this meant revising and 
adding new code categories to the code table and re-coding earlier documents 
 
3) Summarizing the memos from each data category and reviewing for themes 
and insights. The MAXQDA software allowed for memoing in the documents 
with easy merging, summarizing and other comparative methods. This capability 
enabled the researcher to reflexively analyze individual documents and categories 
on an on-going basis throughout Project One. During the final summarizing of 
each document category the researcher made an intentional sequencing choice. 
The company archives were reviewed first as they represented the CEO’s or 
official corporate view. The remaining document categories were then reviewed 
as they were more representative of emic categories. This purposeful intention 
was to see if there was congruence and alignment in themes and perspectives 
across categories. 
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4) Reviewing the coding of each sub-category within data categories and 
making summary conclusions. For example the coding and memoing from the 
Business Quarterly Reviews were summarized and analyzed, then the CEO letters 
and so on. 
 
5) Overall conclusions from each data document category.  After insights and 
themes were considered from each document an overall summary analysis was 
made for each category. Therefore, summaries were made for the corporate 
archives, the interview transcripts, the questionnaire responses and for each 
document category. 
 
6) Macro evaluation of all sources for input to discussion and next steps for 
Project Two.  A final qualitative review of the overall coding outcomes using 
connecting analysis strategies was done to reflect on the larger themes and 
insights to what might really be going on inside the Case Company. These 
insights are discussed in the review of Contextual Factors, Preliminary Constructs 
and Discussion sections of Project One below. 
3.5 Validity And Rigor 
. 
This research used an embedded design as recommended by Yin (1981) and Tellis 
(1997). This meant the use of multiple levels of analysis and multiple scopes through a 
wide selection of data collection methods. The researcher has also employed “data 
triangulation” through the breadth of documents used for text analysis both in the 
corporate archives/communications and also in the wider range of data sources selected 
and then converted into text documents.  “Methods triangulation” has also been utilized 
via the breadth of analysis methods used. As mentioned above in the coding section, 
analysis of individual data sources in isolation has been done as this often leads “to 
insights not noticed when reviewing the extensive overall data that tends to compile in 
case studies (Stewart 2009). Connecting strategies to find themes across data sources has 
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also been employed. According to Yin (1981) and Eisenhardt (1989a) this corroboration 
of patterns or themes in more than one form of data means the findings are likely to be 
more valid. However, interpretation has been the primary method, going hand in hand 
with content analysis and reflexive memoing. This resulting triangulation provided for 
increased validity and substantiation of the findings. Additionally, Denzin (1970) states 
that this “strategy reduces that risk that your conclusions will reflect only the systematic 
biases or limitations of a specific method, and allows you to gain a better assessment of 
the validity and generality of the explanations that you develop”.  
 
3.5.1 Strategies For Validating Results 
 
Some of the methods for validating results have already been touched on in the analysis 
and coding procedures above such as triangulation. The use of checking data content and 
some of the researcher’s conclusions with the participants themselves was done to 
enhance validity. In regards to the content referring to the Company Contextual Factors 
below, several one on one discussions were held with internal senior executives as well 
as with external stakeholders close to the company to share the model and test its 
soundness. To ensure respondent validation the researcher has also gone back to the 
interviewees and a sub-set of the questionnaire participants to check for accuracy by 
allowing them to comment on aspects of the findings of Project One. Further accuracy 
and validity checking was done in Projects Two and Three. 
 
Yin (1981) points out an underlying logic of case validity is replication, treating cases as 
series of experiments with each one serving to confirm or disconfirm the conclusions. “In 
replication logic cases which confirm emergent relationships enhance confidence in the 
validity of the relationships. Cases which disconfirm are often an opportunity to extend 
the theory” (Eisenhardt 1989a). In the single case study situation, internal individual 
groups or individuals have been used in a similar fashion. However, as Creswell (2009) 
comments on the nature of qualitative research, “the intent is not to generalize findings to 
individuals, sites, or places outside of those under study”. Returning to the role of the 
researcher and the time spent in the field Creswell (2009) also mentions that the “in-depth 
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understanding” of the phenomenon under study and “the more experience that a 
researcher has with the participants in the actual setting the more accurate or valid will be 
the findings.” Given the researcher’s deeply embedded position in the Case Company, the 
depth and breadth of relevant relationships and the longitudinal nature of the data 
collection, there is a substantial basis for claiming such accuracy and validity. Finally, 
Eisenhardt (1989a) observes that tying “emergent theory to existing literature enhances 
the internal validity, generalizability, and theoretical level of the case findings.” These 
three objectives will be addressed in the Contextual Factors, Preliminary Constructs, and 
Discussion sections below as well as in Project Two and Three. 
 
3.6 Interpretation And Results  
 
The aim of this section is to present the outputs and results of Project One. This section is 
split into two parts. Firstly, the outcome of the analysis of data and observation regarding 
contextual factors that the case company employees perceive to be present will be 
covered. Secondly, during Project One the researcher induced strategic constructs that 
were potentially extant in the mindset of the case company executives. A preliminary 
review of these constructs will be conducted.  
 
3.6.1 Contextual Factors 
 
During the pilot focus group session in March 2009 a number of themes arose around the 
possible internal and external factors that seemed to be present in the case company. The 
data collection sources have largely supported the presence of these factors and brought 
to light further interrelated factors. These have been grouped under the following 
headings: 
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 Merger Business Case 
 Market and Industry Context 
 Macro Environment Context 
 Financial Health and Profitability 
 Internal Context 
o Cost Structure 
o Organizational Focus 
o Organizational Dynamics 
 
Each of these is considered in detail below. Figure 9 provides a visual representation of 
the findings. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Case Company Context 
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3.6.2 Corporate and Industry Historical Context 
 
As in all industries the history and evolution of the telecommunication infrastructure 
business has made a significant impact on the relationships between the players, the 
overall industry logic and the mindset of the current executives. Given the current harsh 
state of the industry it is easy to forget that during the early days of the global expansion 
of the 1990s the infrastructure business was extremely attractive. During that time in both 
the Joint Venture parent companies, the network divisions were the “stars” while the 
handset sides of the businesses were still struggling to become profitable. This factor had 
a long term impact on the corporate culture and the mindset of the individuals even 
extending to the years of the JV. In the words of one of the Heads of Strategy it “was like 
mining gold” there was “so much capacity that new devices went out practically as fast as 
you could produce them” (SBD Head 1 interview). 
 
This incredible growth and expansion meant there was enough market for all the network 
infrastructure providers and the emerging markets demand only extended the “land grab” 
(SBD Head 2 interview). It seems that even the players themselves did not fully 
understand the scope and implications of the expansion to come as evidenced by this 
sample reflection of a key strategic leader of the time “no one in their wildest dreams 
believed the market would grow five times in 3-4 years and then double again in two 
years” (SBD Head 2 interview). Although these experiences are seemingly far in the past 
the confidence of this success of being number one, consistently winning and finding 
ways to succeed has continued to influence the performance of senior executives in the 
case company (TRN Talent Watch files 2009). 
 
The growth or capacity-filling phase of the industry came to a sudden slowdown during 
the early 2000s when a number of factors combined to produce pressure on the network 
infrastructure providers. The overall collapse of the technology bubble of the time was 
closely followed and reinforced by the financial burden and overestimated market related 
to the “3G hype”. The enormously expensive licenses dropped 350 Billion from the 
potential operating expenditure capacity of the Communication Service Providers (CSPs). 
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This in turn meant a resulting squeeze on the network infrastructure providers along with 
pressure from the increasingly professional procurement of the CSPs (SBD Head 1 and 2 
interviews). This shock was something that most of the industry participants had never 
seen before and made a lasting impression. Given the large R&D expenditure needed in 
the infrastructure business and the declining revenues it was not long before 
consolidation became the trend and top of mind for industry executives. Despite this there 
were attempts by the leading infrastructure providers to change the industry dynamics in 
relation to the CSPs through forms of cooperation but in the end the intensity of 
competition amongst the providers did not allow it. (SBD Head Interview 2, Strategy 
discussions Moscow Vision 2015 workshop April 26-29 2010) 
 
Even with these significant setbacks the continued growth of demand in emerging 
markets combined with increasing mobile and internet penetration provided the basis for 
optimism in the future of the industry. This optimism in the industry potential is 
summarized in TRN’s own strategic documents as follows “We are involved in a 
technology that is the fastest growing in history, and touches literally everyone on the 
planet. We can see being a major part of a €350 billon market and the rewards that will 
bring” (Plan 2011 TRN Priorities). This communicated optimism was understandable 
based on the technological growth and the need to keep the employee population hopeful. 
However, this frame of mind likely contributed to TRN’s struggle to establish a sense of 
urgency amongst this same target group. This sense of complacency is not unusual in 
munificent markets (Hedberg and Jonsson 1997). The result, as will be evidenced by 
interviews in Project Two and Three is that it limited the awareness of the need to 
increase strategic variation and increased the faith in the use of “more of the same” 
tactics. (Central Senior Executive Interview and Asian Regional Customer Operations 
Head to CEO Chief of Staff to Region Head Interview) 
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3.6.3 Merger Business Case 
 
As noted above consolidation was and appears to remain as a central industry logic 
driving the strategic frames of many of the executives in this case study. Prior to the Case 
Company merger of 2007 two other major network infrastructure providers merged and 
one of the parents of the Case Company Merger had already tried an unsuccessful attempt 
to find an alternate merger partner.  
 
Although the Case Company is approaching its 8th year of existence at the time of this 
writing, the implications and impact of the original merger business case are still felt. 
According to the current CEO’s 2009 Quarter 3 Communication “Our company and our 
cost structure was designed for annual revenues of €15bn. Revenues for the past four 
quarters total just €13.3bn” (TRN 2009 Q3 Business Review Communications). While 
this overestimation of the potential revenues demonstrates the pressure on the financial 
health of the company other internal stakeholders who were part of the integration 
planning have cited numbers for the original estimate in the range of €16bn with plans to 
grow to €25bn (SBD Head 1 and 2 interviews).  
 
Yet from the beginning the need for “synergy capture” was transparent and open in the 
corporate communication and strategy headings of “Consolidate, Leverage, Transform” 
(Case Company Strategy Communications 2007). The then CEO remarked on the 
positive progress that had been made in this direction by year end 2008 “we also met our 
commitment to achieve substantially all of the €2 billion in annual synergies by the end 
of 2008” (TRN 2008 Q4 Business Review Communications). Further progress was made 
at that time around profitability and financial health “During the course of the year, we 
reduced costs, increased margins, improved operating cash flow, and delivered 
committed synergy savings” (CEO communications Q4 2008). However even though the 
CEO recognized that by Quarter 1 2009 the company had “exceeded our synergy targets” 
it would not prove to be enough to obtain net profitability (CEO communications Q1 
2009). 
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The on-going implications and reasons behind this context are multiple and will be 
discussed further below. Yet based on questionnaires and workshop observations some 
insights regarding the early failure can be gathered. According to one representative 
comment by a senior strategic leader there may have been significant issues in translation 
and cascading of the strategy from the start:  “In a way, strategy and targets were created 
by an impressive and enthusiastic team of leaders who had been through months of 
analyzing the whys and what’s of the merger (insights and foresights). Then they handed 
over the strategy and targets to the next level in the organization, expecting immediate 
understanding of the what’s and whys and nearly overnight adoption of the many changes, 
including the cultural changes. But the next level was less aware and less “owning” the 
strategy, and therefore more resistant – consciously or unconsciously – to the whys and 
what’s of the strategy – this might relate well to the execution weakness” (Moscow 
Survey Respondent 5). This issue of poor cascading and even upward capturing of 
communications is a strong theme that recurs throughout this study. It takes a different 
form during the turnaround phase and the findings from this research show similarity to 
recent studies of Nokia by Vuori and Huy (2015). The implication will be covered in 
more depth in Project Two and Three. 
 
Issues of buy-in and related execution are also supported by comments of the two 
sequential former Strategy and Business Development Heads of the time: “Execution has 
been more difficult than anticipated - has not enabled the company to move faster 
towards the targeted long term. (SBD Head 1 interview).  Certainly the size of the merger 
provided somewhat predictable but daunting challenges of integration around structure 
and people. However perhaps more problematic was the complexity of combining 
product portfolios in the context of uncertainty in the industry’s evolution: “The 
secondary implications of having to deal with both the technical and commercial 
complications had a lot to do with the less than optimal financial results and the non-
material realization of the business case.” (SBD Head 2 interview).  
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3.6.4 Macro Environment Context 
 
The Macro Environment Context is wide in scope and impacts both internal and external 
dimensions of the Case Company. Although there was a wide range of factors to consider 
under this heading the primary driver was the global financial crisis, its economic impact 
and related level of uncertainty both for institutions and individuals. The significance of 
this crisis in relation to other temporary down cycles or recessions can be seen through 
the Case Company’s inaugural CEO’s recognition in 2008 that “ We are now in the midst 
of a global economic crisis the likes of which has not been seen for a generation or more” 
(CEO communications Q4 2008).  By 2009 this same CEO may have been reflecting the 
overall macro sentiment when his comments moved from cautious statements of  
uncertainty such as “Exactly how long the economic crisis will last is not at all clear,”  to 
statements that might be interpreted as outright pessimism or harsh realism “ Two years 
of market decline, a brutal global economy, rising unemployment, and ongoing tight 
liquidity for our customers all point to tough times ahead.” (CEO communications Q1 
2009 and CEO communications Q2 2009). As will be discussed below the impact on the 
industry’s end-user consumer was increased price sensitivity and variable usage. When 
this was combined with the tightened liquidity for the CSPs the resulting reduction and/or 
delaying in capital expenditure had a domino effect all the way through the value chain.   
 
3.6.5 Market And Industry Context 
 
From the initial observations and data collection the description of the telecommunication 
infrastructure business would likely be categorized in the literature as “declining” or 
“hostile” (Harrigan and Porter 1983, Potter 1994). Competition is intense, demand is flat 
or declining due to saturation of the mature markets and yet it remains “an industry where 
scale is essential” (CEO communications Q1 2011). Where significant growth does occur 
it is primarily in the emerging markets. However the challenge in these markets is 
providing needed expansion with low margins in a GDP environment where cost pressure 
is even more sensitive. From the perspective of the Case Company, the overall 
profitability of the business then remained to be driven largely by the fate of the CSP 
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customers and the price pressure of the newer low-cost competitor entrants. 
 
In the emerging markets the CSPs had fast growing but low-income end users who 
tended to have high churn (consumers switching between CSPs). This pushed providers 
like the Case Company even harder because “the economics for those operators per 
subscriber is different so by default they have a need to get that capacity cheaper” (SBD 
Head1 interview). In the mature markets, saturation means that competition it primarily 
focused on the replacement market or up-selling one’s installed base. At the same time, 
smartphone devices and the correlating huge expansion in network traffic (video and 
similar download demand) means that enabling growing capacity at cheaper and cheaper 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) is passed on to the infrastructure providers. The 
perception of this dynamic is captured well in the 2011 strategy documents as follows: 
“remember that our customers are going through huge challenges themselves, with 
signaling issues in their networks, end-customers who are constantly churning, and 
changing technology and customer expectations” (Plan 2011 TRN Priorities).  
 
Then there is the Chinese effect that is more general in the marketplace” which is largely 
determined by China’s decision that the telecommunications sector is one of the five 
strategic sectors in which it will be a global player (SBD Head 2 interview). The 
“Chinese effect” had not been taken seriously during the early 2000s when the two 
competitors (Company H and Company Z) were both lower cost, and lower quality with 
primarily a domestic market focus. By 2008 the momentum could no longer be ignored 
and became worthy of special attention by the Case Company as evidenced by the 
comments of the CEO and resulting internal task forces to deal with the fact that “we face 
low-cost, credible competitors who are putting pressure on us far beyond their traditional 
strongholds” (CEO communications Q2 2008). At the time of the writing of Project One 
the leading Chinese competitor moved from 5th to challenging the Case Company for 2nd 
in industry market share and had extended the low cost pressure from the low margin to 
higher margin markets pressuring all competitors to respond much as the Japanese had 
done decades earlier with ‘loose bricks’ strategies (Hamel and Prahalad 1989). The 
combined market factors outlined here further reinforce some of the ambiguity related to 
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defining market types that was revealed in the Exploratory Focus Group. During that 
session, lack of clarity and cohesion of perspective was revealed regarding what defined a 
mature market. The group was divided between defining mature as dependent on TRN 
penetration, country GDP or the level of technological evolution. These internal 
observations were further substantiated in Projects Two and Three. Yet, even at the initial 
data collection phase of this thesis, there is evidence of the potential variation of strategic 
thinking demanded of TRN’s Strategic Leaders. 
 
3.6.6 Financial Health And Profitability 
 
From the inception of the Case Company, the “non-material realization” of revenue in the 
anticipated amount of in excess of €15 billion had put tremendous pressure on the 
balance sheet. Given the natural special circumstances and expenses in any merger the 
initial benchmark for success was operating profit. This focus in both CEO and Quarterly 
Review communications was positioned as the most reasonable given it reflected the 
controllable performance of the Company. In addition these mostly positive results 
helped to overcome the possible and real “crisis of customer confidence” in the viability 
of the organization. Surprisingly to the researcher, several TRN Strategic Leaders 
interacted with during this thesis were deceived or blinded by these communications in 
regards to the real profitability results and the lack of viability of the JV. This long term 
viability is particularly important in the telecommunications industry given the long term 
commitments involved with technology and its evolution (CEO communications Q1 
2010). Nonetheless in the face of “eight consecutive quarters of the company’s sales 
shrinking,” even massive and largely successful efforts to reduce costs on all dimensions; 
operating profit was small or negative (CEO communications Q3 2010). Even with the 
success of four sequential quarters of sales growth during the writing of Project One, the 
net profitability (includes taxes, interest and other charges) was negative. The 
implications of the inadequate profitability and its resulting vulnerable financial health of 
the organization had significant impact on the internal organization and the strategic 
frames of its leaders regarding what strategic options were feasible.  
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3.6.7 Internal Context 
 
3.6.7.1 Cost Structure Pressure 
 
As part of the initial merger “synergy targets,” a 9,000 employee reduction in global 
headcount was undertaken and completed during the first two years of the merger. The 
recognition that the originally planned “synergy capture” would not be enough to achieve 
net profitability meant continued focus and pressure on reducing costs in all forms. 
Therefore, the headcount reductions that were meant to be a one-time activity became a 
way of life for the organization. These were accompanied by a gradual but consistent 
effort to migrate employment from high to low-cost countries. Statements by the CEO as 
early as 2008 indicated that “We need to have more of our people based in these 
countries” (CEO communications Q2 2008). Although this philosophy is consistent with 
leveraging a globalization strategy, it brought about a lot of uncertainty and turnover at 
the individual level in the merger parents’ origin countries and in most of the European 
based operations. This had additional significance given that these locations are where 
the majority of the Strategic Leader population is based.  
 
At the same time much had been achieved in reducing product and operating costs via 
continuous effort and supporting communications to be “ Accelerating our cost savings”, 
“ Finding additional savings” and “ eliminating non-value added work and getting more 
efficient” (CEO communications Q2 2008). Despite this positive trend, the continuous 
cost pressure, reductions and migrations of employment contributed to i) limited slack ii) 
less of a risk taking mindset iii) less information sharing and conditions for innovation iv) 
and increased focus on internal operational efficiency. These combined findings 
contributed to the questioning of TRN’s overall health and sustainability. They are also 
fundamental issues to be addressed in the research’s intervention proposal. 
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3.6.7.2 Organizational Focus 
 
Given the pressure to achieve profitability from both a financial health and a customer 
credibility perspective, there is little wonder that the overall perspective was short-term. 
To quote one executive “Tomorrow’s 1 Euro seems to be valued higher than 50 Euros in 
half a year” (Moscow Survey Respondent 3) and based on other surveyed executive’s 
comments it appears that “forcing salespeople to review and report their figures weekly 
because the company is panicking that quarter targets may not be reached” was also a 
common experience (Moscow Survey Respondent 6). These results indicating a 
significant concentration on short term horizon results are consistent with those found in 
the exploratory focus group. This overall perspective and their potential consequences are 
captured in the following executive’s questionnaire response: “Pressure, and typically 
bad results, is pushing individuals to park strategic foresight for a while in order to focus 
more on strategic insight and short-term actions. I suppose a good company has the 
capability to mobilize extra resources into short-term actions in order to respond to 
temporary turbulent times, while not hampering strategic foresight and long-term 
actions” (Moscow Survey Respondent 1). To put this in the terminology found in the 
literature, the Case Company appeared to be highly focused on exploiting the current 
environment for more predictable and perhaps dependable short-term results at the 
relative expense of exploring new profit pools that have longer return horizons. This 
suggests that the ambidextrous organization (Tushman and O’Reilly III 1996) hinted at 
by Moscow Participant 1 was non-extant. It also evidences that the overall company 
context and mindset was not enabling strategic flexibility at the individual or 
organizational level. 
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3.6.7.3 Organizational Dynamics 
 
One of the first challenges with any large merger is the complexity of combining systems, 
physical and human resources in a way that creates synergy and shareholder value. The 
Case Company had to do so under significant pressure due to the Merger Business Case 
expectations mentioned above. During the first years of the merger many of the 
operational barriers of mixing corporate and national cultures were overcome. Yet 
extensive complexity remained to the extent that in 2010 a “Simplification Office” was 
established to confront the problem. Issues regarding fighting complexity and overall low 
Employment Engagement Survey scores had resulted in the creation of a “Scorecard” that 
tracked a number of financial and “reinvigoration” variables on a quarterly basis. This 
Scorecard was tied to incentive bonuses with the intention of increasing the Company’s 
engagement, innovativeness, cost structure and competitiveness. However, based on the 
survey and observation results of this research there was evidence of incongruity between 
intended outcomes and the organizational dynamics.  
 
The results suggest that the long-term drive for cost reductions and its accompanying lack 
of slack impacted the energy, creativity and motivation of the employees. Typical 
attitudes expressed by employees identified issues around not having enough time, 
resources or energy to take actions even when they may have the know-how as illustrated 
in the response of the following executive: “Also, it may be that as people are so heavily 
overloaded with work, any issues that might increase the work amount (without having 
equal decrease in the workload immediately after implementation) might be the reason 
why new ideas are not raised. I have to admit, there are issues in my mind which we 
could/should change, but I am not starting the actions myself simply as I don’t have the 
extra time for that” (Moscow Survey Respondent 7).  By contrast, the literature and Case 
Company executive responses assert that “Any factor that tends to create an environment 
where people are given targets and maximum freedom, trust, empowerment and support 
to meet the targets is contributing to the development of strategic options by these 
people”  (Moscow Survey Respondent 5). This employee’s statement echoes the research 
findings of Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) and Raisch and Birkinshaw et al. (2009) who 
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come to the same conclusion. Again, the data collected during Project One indicated 
otherwise. It suggests that this lack of time, overwork, and short-term focus supports the 
likelihood that “This (short term target pressure) is inhibiting strategy making because 
this is “boxing” people into telling them what tasks they are supposed to focus on." –
bracketed text added (Moscow Survey Respondent 9). The concern may have been 
further aggravated by an increasing lack of qualified employee resources given that 
several survey respondents commented on the “difficulty in finding enough qualified 
managers for execution of daily operations.” (Moscow Survey) This implies the creation 
of an added burden for the line manager in their allocation of time. In other words, they 
need to trade off supporting actions for subordinates versus doing higher value adding 
activities appropriate for their level in the leadership pipeline (Charan and Drotter et al. 
2001).   
 
3.7 Summary Conclusions Of Contextual Factors 
 
The overall context of the Case Company and the correlating environment in which its 
Strategic Leaders operated in was one where the viability of the organization was 
increasingly in question. From a net profitability standpoint, the continuous loss-making 
was not sustainable even with intermittent parent company financial support. The 
external market and industry conditions remained intense and challenging. Internally the 
attempt to create a “lean machine” had been partially successful as significant product, 
and operating cost reductions had been achieved. However, as cited by sequential CEOs, 
the reductions had not been enough. Further, the impact of the short-term focus on cost, 
quarterly profitability, and financial controls had taken a heavy toll on the organization’s 
morale as evidenced by the Employment Engagement Survey’s and employee turnover. 
(TRN Employee Engagement Survey results 2008 and 2009). The longer term 
implications of these factors on the strategic frames of TRN’s Strategic Leaders will be 
further explored in Project Three. The associated apparent possible constructs of the 
Executives managing in this context will be outlined next.  
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3.8 Preliminary Constructs 
 
The intent of this phase of the research was to uncover and gain insights to the central 
contextual drivers influencing TRN’s Strategic Leaders and induce potential constructs 
and elements that may be influencing their strategic frames.  Based on this data collection 
the researcher was enabled to more effectively build the Repertory Grid interviews for 
Project Two of the research while providing a foundation for more deeply grounded 
analysis of the results and their implications.   
 
Therefore, based on field research conducted during Project One and analysis of data 
sources several sets of potential constructs related to the strategic mindset of the Case 
Company’s Executives were induced by the researcher. These were grouped under the 
following headings and are presented in the order they were induced during thematic 
analysis: 
 
 Sources of Competitive Advantage 
 Growth and Profitability (Existing vs. Blue Ocean) 
 Financial Health and Resources for Action 
 Market Development (Emerging vs. Mature) 
 Industry Clock Speed (Fast and Slow) 
 Uncertainty and Complexity 
 Strategic Posture and Positioning 
 
Each of these constructs and the interrelatedness is discussed below. 
 
3.8.1 Sources Of Competitive Advantage  
 
As referenced above many of the actions taken by the Case Company seemed to be 
consistent with the competitive moves described in Potter’s (1991) Hostile Market 
Theory (HMT). While components of HMT and many other strategic theories build on 
the foundations of Industrial Organization and Industrial Economic theory, HMT seems 
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to tightly describe the TRN and telecommunication industry evolution. For example, 
evidence that the hostile market perspective was extant can be seen in corporate 
communications such as the current CEO’s statement that “We operate in a ferociously 
competitive market, against often unscrupulous competitors who seem prepared to do 
anything to win share: from giving away free base stations to offering crazy, uneconomic 
financing” (CEO communications Q3 2010). According to HMT after an initial phase of 
predatory pricing to gain market share, incumbent leaders continue to believe that quality 
and customer loyalty will support premium pricing (Potter 1991). In TRN, this belief was 
complimented by heavy investments in Total Quality Management initiatives. However, 
when the effectiveness of this tactic falters incumbents engage in “Self-defeating cost 
reduction (reduced spending on quality, R&D, suppliers, etc) and a focus on margin 
maintenance”. Given the contextual factors cited above and the extensive coverage of 
margin levels both in CEO communications and strategy documents it would appear that 
this competitive response was top of mind for the Case Company executives. Further 
correlation between HMT and Case Company competitive actions can be seen in Phase V 
of Consolidation and Shakeout where overhead reduction is achieved via reducing 
workforce, pruning the business and M&A activity (Potter 1994). These actions correlate 
extremely well to the TRN turnaround strategy (TRN Plan 2012 Priorities). In addition to 
the downsizing activities noted above the Company has been engaged in several 
acquisitions with one major competitor absorbed. Among the recommended competitive 
responses cited by Potter’s HMT are differentiating on reliability, turning price into a 
commodity and achieving an effective cost structure (Potter 1994).  According to internal 
strategy documents the company has identified “Execute consistently” as a Focus Area in 
its strategic plans and clearly recognizes the competitive importance of differentiating on 
factors other than price “We have a business which is largely built on trust and 
reliability” (TRN Plan 2010). The inaugural CEO emphasized this early on with 
statements referring to related competitive factors such as the following “the (X) deal in 
Singapore showed that competition with the Chinese is not a one-way street, and that 
quality and execution are as valuable as price” (CEO Communications Q2 2009). Yet at 
the same time margins and price which had significantly impacted the company’s cost 
base and focus were not irrelevant either as noted in the company’s strategic priorities 
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“we can’t stay in business without matching or exceeding the competition when it comes 
to cost efficiency” (TRN Plan 2011 Priorities). These actions were further intensified 
during Project One and Two when an additional push to achieve internal operational 
efficiency was established.  
 
3.8.2 Growth And Profitability (Existing vs. Blue Ocean) - “grow or 
die” (CEO communications Q2 2011) 
 
The link between growth and profitability is in itself a construct that is widely held in 
management theory and practice. This is perhaps a result of the comprehensive 19-year 
research study entitled Profit Impacts of Marketing Strategies that has had extensive 
influence both on academic publications and on companies such as GE, who have been 
heavily benchmarked during the past several decades (Buzzell and Gale et al. 1975).  
While there are plenty of successful high margin and high profitability niche examples 
both in literature and practice, this approach had not been as accepted in the 
telecommunications industry or for the Case Company. The consideration of whether a 
viable niche or focused strategy was even possible pre-dated the JV creation according to 
sources in the TRN strategy function. However, such a strategic position was not 
undertaken by any of the players until TRN was forced to do so in 2012. Reasons and 
implications of this shift on this research are discussed in Project Two and Three. The 
accepted mode of operation prior to this with its heavy R&D expenditure requirements 
made the “end to end” growth assumption seem inevitable as scale was seen as a 
fundamental prerequisite to cover the cost structure. There are also the psychological, 
morale and ego related factors associated with growth as noted in the internal strategy 
documents “Winning companies grow, and with growth comes the satisfaction of being a 
winner” (TRN Plan 2011 Priorities). 
 
Critically related to the growth question from a strategic perspective are the potential 
sources of growth. The product-market matrix suggests five possibilities (Aaker 1995). 
These involve market penetration, product expansion, market expansion, diversification 
(related or unrelated) and vertical integration. The Case Company made efforts in all of 
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these areas. Market penetration was attempted via up-selling, selling higher margin 
products and generally “increasing share of wallet” from the installed base. Product 
expansion had been extensive and perhaps mandatory given the nature of the 
technological evolution in the industry and the end-user’s sophistication of demand. 
However considerable internal communication and effort was made in an effort to 
transform the organization from one selling ‘boxes” to one providing solutions. Market 
expansion was primarily in the context of new geographical markets of which more will 
be discussed below. Additionally, some efforts were made to target new segments outside 
of the core CSP target group.  Diversification was also attempted in modest means 
primarily by the accepted practice of establishing small separate “Start-up” units to focus 
on potential new products and markets much as structural ambidexterity would suggest 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). The timing, financial resources and overall firm context 
did not support the feasibility of this option. 
 
The most substantial competitive construct was vertical integration via “outsourcing” by 
the customer. As a source of growth, the Case Company had analyzed that two-thirds of 
the “300 billion addressable market” is internal spending by CSPs (TRN Plan 2010). This 
meant forward rather than backward integration and resulted in a considerable change in 
the Case Company’s organization and competencies. The main method for this was 
Managed Services, which in itself reveals significant insights to the strategic focus of the 
Case Company executives. Managed Service involves taking over the running of network 
services of the CSPs and usually includes taking on the existing employees related to 
those services. Therefore, the Managed Services contracts change the organization's 
competency makeup considerably. To quote one former Head of Strategy and Business 
Development “Maybe outsourcing has been the most notable thing which has also 
changed the asset base that the company has. Instead of having R&D assets you actually 
have network operations assets” (SBD Head 2 interview). From a Strategic Flexibility 
standpoint, the outsourcing contracts increase the “stickiness” of the customer 
relationship by raising switching costs but equally lock in the Case Company to long-
term illiquid assets. The additional longer term impact of this asset shift was an increased 
overall employee population (growth to 78,000 employees). Over time, these new 
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employees changed the dominant percentages of the two original parent companies from 
97% to 45% by 2012. This dynamic put additional overhead cost pressure on TRN but 
also became one of the underlying catalysts for the consideration of the Culture 
transformation initiative arising from this thesis. 
 
An alternative method of growth is Merger or Acquisition. As referenced above this 
mindset is very prevalent in the industry and particularly in the rationale for consolidation. 
The current CEO positioned it as an enabler when he referred to the long-term objective 
of the Case Company “We have set as our long-term goal to be #1 in our industry. Again, 
this is not just because it is nice to be first. The reality is that consolidation has become a 
way of life in our sector (TRN Plan 2011 Priorities). The intensity with which this belief 
is felt can be seen both from what appears to be almost statements of survival “Be a 
consolidator, or become consolidated.” and from statements of pride from the conquest 
“We have moved from being talked about as ‘one of the consolidated’ to ‘stepping up as 
one of the consolidators’” (CEO communications Q4 2010). However this stance was 
tempered by the Case Company’s outlook in relation to its resources and the correlating 
recognition of the limits to growth by this method as evidenced by the inaugural CEOs 
reminder that “we have to be careful not to fall into the trap of relying only on 
acquisitions for growth” (CEO communications Q4 2008). Despite this, the acquisition of 
at least one major competitor became seen as almost mandatory and face-saving action 
after one failed attempt in 2010. As will be evidenced in Project Two interviews, this 
experience resulted in buyer’s remorse and did not significantly shift the Strategic 
Leaders’ mindset into exploring alternative growth sources. 
 
3.8.3 Financial Health And Resources For Action 
 
In contemplating strategic options for the company there appears to have been an 
association with financial resources and the ability to generate feasible strategic actions. 
A characteristic response from surveyed executives is that “Our financial situation does 
not provide us with the flexibility beyond the traditional telco business model” (Moscow 
Survey Respondent 2). Part of this also relates to possibilities within the 
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telecommunications industry as well and may be particularly strong in the Case Company 
as a result of the referenced above case of the market leader outbidding it for acquisition 
assets very late in the process during one high-profile occasion. Alternatively, it may 
have been a legitimate recognition of the balance sheet strength relative to the primary 
competitors as has been alluded to in comments of an executive when reflecting on the 
performance of his colleagues in a strategy role-play exercise “And being practical, it is 
also a cost issue. TRN does not have the cash the competitors have” (Moscow Survey 
Respondent 3). Although these are legitimate constraints for specific options, they appear 
to have been seen as more restrictive than might be the case in other industries. 
 
Closely related to the restrictions felt by limited financial assets is the aspect of risk-
taking. Although there may be the feeling that in a down-sizing environment it may not 
be wise to take major career risks, there was also the evidence that the organization did 
not feel it had many chances to waste in its struggle for viability and independence. In the 
words of one senior executive responsible for making portfolio decisions “I guess we also 
cannot afford making too big mistakes, therefore we have to be cautious” (Moscow 
Survey  Respondent 5). This perspective is quite opposed to the mindset expressed in 
Project Two by interviewees, regarding the comfort with which one of the parent 
company’s had historically made big bets. As will be evidenced in Project Two and 
Three, the differences between the two parent companies strategic frames added a layer 
of coordination costs that hindered options and speed of response. 
 
3.8.4 Market Development (Emerging vs. Mature) 
 
A variety of constructs relating to geographical markets and their classification for 
significance have been induced by the researcher from the time of initial observation in 
the Case Company and were later reinforced during the pilot focus group session. One of 
the key findings of the early focus group was the apparent ambiguity around market 
terminology in the company. Terms like emerging, developed, mature, developing and 
others were labeled based on different criteria. In a few cases, the term “emerging” 
referred to economic development. For others, the term emerging was in relation to the 
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Case Company’s market penetration even if that geographic area was advanced 
industrially. After further analysis and wider sources of data collection a number of 
aspects regarding how executives appear to view markets arose. The initial differentiation 
between mature and emerging markets came from the “land grab” phase of rapid growth 
and expansion of the early to mid-1990s. During this time, there was a clearer distinction 
of targeting new (to the company) geographic markets that were emerging economically 
as mature (economically advanced) markets became saturated. How this has evolved to 
present day and the implications for the need to vary strategic approaches and business 
models is outlined by a former Case Company Head of Strategy and Business 
Development “I think there are definitively some differences in how the services should 
be done, at what level the technology should be done- a slightly different methodology 
should be applied on how to treat the customers and how to evolve the business when 
there is a very mature market there with less opportunity for a "roll-out" and more of 
taking care of an installed base versus more of a roll-out or new build out - 
organizational capabilities and business models should be attuned according - but then 
there is a hell of a lot of space in between as well. More mature markets where we don't 
have an installed base and emerging where we have a large presence, so it is more of a 
continuum really - the extremes really need to be managed, but the reality is that there 
is a huge continuum as well” (SBD Head 2 interview),  [bold italics added].  This 
continuum adds to the complexity of strategic responses needed by the Case Company 
strategic leaders and is a source of ambiguity around market definitions as noted in the 
initial Exploratory Focus Group.  
 
The classification above is an important construct for reasons of focus and investment for 
the company. However, it also suggests a wide range of factors at play with different 
variables determining success and profitability. In the context of the Case Company, this 
meant the introduction of additional strategic references to markets as “Priority Markets.” 
From the initial introduction of the term in 2009, the number of markets labeled as 
priority grew from 5 to 7. The purpose of the labeling was to focus resources and grow 
market share. It is worthy to note that the priority markets were a mix of the original 
mature and emerging continuum “We are focused on the six priority markets of Brazil, 
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Russia, China, India, Japan and the US -- where we will target our limited resources in 
order to take market share and grow faster than the TRN average (TRN Plan 2010). While 
Korea was added to the list in 2011, the priority markets construct has a relation to a 
number of others including growth, profitability and portfolio theory all of which are 
captured in the following statement from internal strategy documents "We will also need 
to ensure that our regional footprint is balanced with strength in a number of key markets 
that offer a combination of growth and profitability " (TRN Plan 2011). 
 
3.8.5 Industry Clock Speed (Fast and Slow) 
 
Nadkarni and Narayanan’s (2004) research have built on Fine’s (1996) previous studies 
on industry clock speed and have proposed schemas (Complex and Focus) or strategic 
frames appropriate for each of the two speed categories (Fast and Slow). Clock speed is 
defined by three dimensions 1) frequency of new products introduced by incumbent firms 
2) frequency of new processes introduced by incumbent firms and 3) frequency of 
changes in the strategies and structures undertaken by incumbent firms (Nadkarni and 
Narayanan 2004). In the telecommunications infrastructure industry, the clock speed does 
not appear to fit exclusively into one of the two categories. The reason for this is that not 
all three variables align as fast or slow. In fact, even within the product category, there is 
a mix of frequencies depending on the portfolio and the market.  
 
In the words of one senior strategy executive referring to both the product and process 
speed there is a “Strange balance of slow moving and fast moving because the 
standardization in a way has to move in a certain practical pace, and there is some slow 
moving aspects, on the other hand, market movement takes place relatively fast (SBD 
Head 2 interview). However on the strategy and structure dimension, there was 
significant frequency in change of structures and competitive moves regarding 
acquisition and alliances throughout the industry. This is reflected in the Case Company’s 
quarterly review communications first in how it relates to the response needed by the 
company “The market pace is such, that we must speed up'” (Quarterly Business Review 
Q3 2009) and secondly in how the organization views the future of the competitive 
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environment “because the intensity of that competition can only increase” (Quarterly 
Business Q2 2007). The additional dimension that restricts the exact classification of the 
industry is the reality of how these dimensions play out on the ground. As referenced 
above the frequency of changes on these dimensions between emerging and mature 
markets has more of a continuum. Based on the data collected the result is closer to a mix 
in the range visualized in Figure 10 below.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Researcher Induced Case Company Market Dimensions 
 
In the product and technology realm frequency is not only dependent on the pace at 
which a market can absorb, afford or evolve to the products, there is also the challenge of 
predicting the life cycle of products and related approval-body processes. One senior 
executive with over 20 years industry experience put it in the following way when 
describing the on-going challenge and in particular the pre-merger selection of products 
“ there was also not a fully solid understanding of the future prospects of the portfolios - 
always difficult to understand in detail the longevity of the business portfolios” (SBD 
Head 2 interview). As discussed in the literature review there is a foundation in the 
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research for expecting that factors such as these increase paradoxical thinking. Prahalad 
and Bettis (1986) and Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) suggest that this added cognitive 
demand can occur for executives managing diverse geographies and business or product 
scope. 
 
3.8.6 Uncertainty And Complexity 
 
The uncertainty and complexity described above in the product portfolio was also felt in 
regards to the external context of the organization. This was expressed by the inaugural 
CEO when he stated that it is both an “increasingly uncertain world” and that the 
organization “faces an uncertain market” (CEO communications Q2 2008). This construct 
has also been articulated in executive survey responses in regards to the limitations of 
foresight capabilities and how from their perspective the horizon for predictability is 
shortening (Moscow Survey Respondents). This may have been closely related to the 
recognition of the complexity of a “converging industry” and the difficulty this adds to 
coping with and making sense of environmental signals. The growing numbers of 
“players” in different competitive “spaces” combined with the unknown evolution of the 
technologies themselves make for an increased diversity of potential industry outcomes.  
 
In the internal context, complexity had been noted as one of the focus areas of the 
company’s strategic priorities. As mentioned above the company established a 
“Simplification Office” in the largely unsuccessful hope to reduce complexity and the 
resulting related complaints from employees. On the operational level, this was seen to 
hinder execution and even the sales function. A common view is “Guys understand the 
financials, but the complexity of how margins are calculated and averaged across the 
business units has made the prediction of profitability very difficult” (Singapore Strategy 
workshop participant May 2011). 
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From an organizational and correlating individual level, uncertainty had been a way of 
life from the time of the JV creation. Speaking in 2009 the then CEO expressed the 
concern regarding viability “Just as we began to feel successful, there is a risk that some 
will now start to question our future, and whether we have what it takes to make it 
through the storm.”(CEO communications\Q1 2009). How this played out at the 
individual level was later put across and recognized by the succeeding CEO’s messages 
“While we have sought to conduct necessary headcount related measures in both of those 
countries in the least difficult ways possible -- voluntary exit packages in Finland and 
short-time work in Germany, I know that uncertainty and concern remain high (CEO 
communications Q1 2010). When taken together, these data point examples represent the 
on-going level of uncertainty and the struggle TRN faced at both the individual and 
organizational levels during Project One. These factors add to the level of pressure, 
performance, personal risk and the emotion of fear. This research finds (and discusses in 
Chapter Six) that these symptoms will later result in the factors described by Kanter’s 
(2003) research on firm’s “cycle of decline.” 
 
3.8.7 Strategic Posture And Positioning 
 
The concept of strategic posture is one that has been espoused by Courtney and Kirkland 
et al. (1997) and refers to a company’s participation intentions within an industry. These 
are categorized by Shapers, Followers and those “reserving the right to play”. While the 
researcher did not see evidence of this exact terminology being used in the field, the 
observed attitudes and opinions expressed during Project One appeared to indicate the 
existence of a mindset in line with this framework.  As referenced above there was an 
apparent belief and related constructs amongst the executives that the Case Company 
does not have the resources to be a Shaper. At the same time, there had been extensive 
dialogue around real means of differentiation with the typical observation being that “We 
are in a sandwich position between Company E (high-end competitor) and Company H 
(low-end competitor)” (Moscow Survey Respondent 4). This Michael Porter Generic 
Strategies Model type of reference to being stuck in the middle between high-end quality 
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differentiation and low-end cost competitors was quite widespread (Porter 1980). The 
associated construct is that TRN should probably be a Follower in one or the other realms. 
This question of direction appeared to be one of the most significant strategic challenges 
for the organization. Reflecting on the Case Company’s successfully overcoming 
customer’s confidence questions one executive expressed the directional problem this 
way “So now since we not only can claim “we are back” we need to tell the public what 
we intend to do being back (other than surviving)” (Moscow Survey  Respondent 4). 
Given the constructs around limited resources and the short-term turn-around pressure, 
the evidence suggests that one of the constructs for the executives was in line with the 
“reserving the right to play” intentions outlined in the literature (Courtney and Kirkland 
et al. 1997). During 2013 the researcher openly revealed this framework as one amongst 
many other strategic theories while conducting six separate Strategic Leader level 
strategy trainings held across four continents. The preliminary finding from Project One 
was further reinforced by the quickness and consistency with which the executives 
independently linked this approach to TRN’s journey. However, the overall data 
collection from the combined projects did not find supporting evidence of systematic or 
explicit application of this posture. 
 
3.9 Discussion  
 
3.9.1 Introduction: The Inherited Agenda 
 
The results and analysis of data sources above provided evidence that there was a 
possible incongruence between the Case Company’s aspirations and the status of the 
contextual factors and the potential constructs of the stakeholders involved. Based on 
interviews with key strategic stakeholders it was clear that “there was a game plan which 
included the industry consolidation scenario” even before the merger and that this 
construct continued to be a primary one that carried over to the newly formed 
organization (SBD Head 2 interview). Given the complexity of the merger and the 
intense competitive context the organization faced it is not surprising that not much in the 
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way of new strategic thinking materialized. In the words of the Head of Strategy and 
Business Development during the early days of the merger “So when you have that kind 
of business climate, hard competition attacking you almost each and every day, markets 
that are flattening or even declining a little bit, you are still in the middle of your 
integration - how strategic can you be?” (SBD Head 1 interview). This perspective was 
further evidenced in the Repertory Grid interviews of Project two and suggests that the 
intensity continued far beyond the initial merger phase. 
 
As this implies, long-term (beyond 1-2 years) strategic thinking in the traditional sense 
was extremely limited during the early quarters of the JV however at the CEO level 
directional discussions were launched as early as 2007. It, therefore, appears that in a 
merger situation there is at the start a natural tendency to be more top down in strategy 
creation since the front line people need to focus on customer transition issues, product 
migration, and other related issues. How much participation can come from contributors 
farther down in the organization or from those who are getting signals on the front lines 
depends greatly on the stage of evolution and the sophistication of the company.  In the 
Case Company situation, there is evidence that Strategic Foresight in the initial stages 
was actually derived from the strategic thinking of one of the parent companies. This 
foresight was established during what was a more stable and conducive period for longer 
term thinking on directionality but at the time of the merger, it was still not fully 
formulated. As expressed by one participant who was present and highly involved with 
both the pre and post-merger strategic dialogue it appears that taking strategic frames that 
existed previously was all there was capacity for “I think it took full concentration from 
everybody getting things up and running. And I think that the key thing that TRN has 
been pushing, like incapable of capturing the outsourcing opportunity or trying to define 
how you could approach the customer in a more comprehensive more customer oriented 
way,  I think those are more stemming from the late years of TN (SBD Head 1 interview).   
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3.9.2 Parallel And Emergent Strategic Thinking 
 
In addition to the lack of capacity available from the initial demands of the merger, there 
was an underlying sense that strategic foresight had become increasingly challenging to 
achieve in the industry. Despite the existence of a large unit devoted to strategy creation 
and development the reality of high-level thinking on directionality in the first two years 
appears to have been more emergent than structured, hierarchical and sequentially 
planned as in the deliberate perspective (Mintzberg 1990). Instead, many dialogues were 
launched in parallel at multiple levels of the organization. This relatively democratic and 
emergent process is described by the leader of one of the early catalyst projects: 
  
I really didn’t understand that it actually served more as a platform to for the first time to 
have a strategic dialogue about where is it that we want to go as a company? … And then 
we were trying to do too many things in parallel. That we were trying to have this 
executive level discussion about directionality and at the same time we were massaging 
this solutions company analysis, current state analysis and mapping the required 
competencies and, of course, you should do them more in sequence but because for many 
reasons they wanted to do it in a rather short period. So that sort of led that we did things 
in parallel. It was sort of difficult mentally because you ended up discussing different 
level of things in even the same workshops” (SBD Head 2 interview). 
 
This context illustrates dimensions of the cognitive processes of integrating and 
differentiating mentioned by Smith and Tushman (2005). It also has aspects beyond 
ambidexterity that link to shifting time horizons of strategic insight and foresight (Doz 
and Kosonen 2008).  In summary, the Case Company moved from strategic thinking that 
was relatively top-down and largely inherited to one that was highly democratic and 
participative. The timing of this seems to have been closely aligned with the releasing of 
capacity and coinciding reduction in internal focus. On the other hand, the level of market 
pressure intensified causing increasing awareness of the need for change and eventual 
movement towards other factors that inhibited cognitive strategic flexibility and 
paradoxical thinking (Lewis 2000). 
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3.9.3 The Recognition Of The Need For Speed And Strategic Flexibility  
 
Clearly the Case Company organization was disadvantaged at the start by coordination 
costs and the resulting lack of speed. We know from the research literature that “when 
firms adapt by changing strategy in response to changes in their environment they 
outperform firms who persist with unchanged strategies in response to changes in their 
environment” (Haveman 1992).  The relative speed with which this change is undertaken 
is, of course, critical as was recognized in the strategic priorities communicated to all 
Case Company employees in 2010: “Priority 4: Improving our speed. We need to be 
much quicker at responding to customer needs, making decisions and driving change 
internally. We need to create a work environment that enables agility” (TRN Plan 2010). 
As cited earlier in the literature review Sanchez’s (1997) research identifies coordination 
capabilities as fundamental to strategic flexibility and adaptive responses. To make such 
adaptations firms’ executives often need to generate flexible options that are outside of 
their normal repertoire and in some cases involve creativity or innovation. This additional 
cognitive variety needs to be enabled or at minimum not constrained. There is significant 
and repeated evidence that the senior management of the Case Company had genuine 
intent to create an environment where strategic thinking and flexibility would be enabled. 
The Case Company’s CEO acknowledged this when he put forth that the rationale and 
goal of further organizational change is to “enable employees to focus on core 
responsibilities with the freedom to allocate resources to new opportunities and align 
priorities”. Further, he stated that by “enhancing our collaboration and removing dotted 
lines, we will improve accountability and trust and foster quicker and decentralized 
decision-making” (CEO communications Q3 2010). This intent is strongly reinforced 
throughout 2010 by statements such as “Our future rests in becoming an agile company” 
and again in the 2011’s strategic plan goal statement of becoming “Financially strong, 
with true strategic flexibility”. (TRN Plan 2011) 
 
As described above in the Context section, several factors have been identified that 
contribute to the Case Company’s ability or inability to adapt to its environment. Despite 
the desire to have “everyone across the company act as a strategic business manager with 
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the knowledge and empowerment to make decisions that best balance our commitment to 
grow faster than the market, while delivering the levels of profitability needed for long-
term success”, there existed inconsistency between the desired organizational state and 
what is indicated in the data collected from company executives (CEO communication 
Q1 2010). This inconsistency became one of the early indicators of the need for 
organizational change at the cultural and individual levels. At the individual level this 
resulted in several initiatives including an extensive management appraisal overseen by 
the researcher and a reconsideration of the TRN leadership framework competencies and 
supporting mechanisms. At the organizational level it led to an investigation of the 
company’s values and ultimately to its sustainability. 
   
3.9.4 Value Chain And Shifting Landscape 
 
The difficulty in navigating and predicting the industry landscape had resulted in mixed 
messages and changing priorities internally and externally.  Part of the issue was in the 
nature of the changes to the customer base and the Case Company’s strategic decision to 
be “customer-centric” in a Business to Business (B2B) context (TRN Plan 2010). This 
focus left the company vulnerable given that its customer operators/CSPs became 
increasingly professional in procurement after the fallout and negative financial impact of 
3G licensing bids earlier in the century. This shift which coincided with the “tech bubble” 
of 2001 and the closely following collapse of the telecom bubble impacted the strategic 
frames of the Case Company veteran strategic leaders who had been with the company 
during the preceding boom period of the 1990s. This factor was referenced by the 
inaugural CEO in 2009 in his appeal to senior leaders in communications shortly after the 
break of the global financial crisis.  In his attempt to provide some encouraging 
perspective and a sense of realism on the duration of the impact he stated that “We have 
many leaders across the company who experienced the extraordinarily difficult 
environment earlier this century when the telecoms bubble broke, and markets declined 
by between 20% and 40% for three years” (CEO communications Q1 2009). 
.   
118 
 
This combination of cost pressure and the financial crisis provided opportunities for some 
of the strong CSPs who arose to consolidate and internationalize. This gave the CSPs 
even greater transparency in pricing across markets and the scale needed to have a 
sophisticated understanding of their business models and revenue horizons. The resulting 
intensification of competition at the CSP level led to a greater squeezing of suppliers 
including the Case Company. 
 
The end-users were also evolving and were increasingly price sensitive while demanding 
vast leaps in levels of performance and quality. Devices such as smartphones and the 
general increase in video downloading (as compared to voice usage) also impacted the 
strategic position of the infrastructure suppliers. This was recognized relatively early on 
by the same CEO when he identified the opportunity of “helping operators meet the 
challenge of a 100-times growth in traffic by 2015” (CEO Communications Q4 2008). 
The related issue of “convergence” seems to have been one of the stronger constructs 
driving uncertainty around just what type of industry the company was in and how fast 
things were changing. This also prompted some limited thinking and investment 
regarding new products and customers. This ambiguity is expressed in the Case 
Company’s Plan 2010 “The increasing importance of Internet-based communication and 
rapid development of social media is challenging our customers’ core business models 
and changing the ground rules for success” (TRN Plan 2010). The associated conclusion 
is that “Our industry has evolved to become much more like the Internet sector: fast-
paced and ever-changing” (TRN Plan 2011). Despite the growth of “Over The Top” 
players’ (OTT) increased provision of content and services at the end-customer interface 
level, it was unclear whether the sector was becoming truly a close analogy for the 
competitive dynamics of the internet or whether these and similar comments were meant 
more for psychological impact to support the need for  rapid change. 
 
By comparison, the need for profitability had been a consistent message from the start of 
the company. Yet even communications around these objectives and results were subtly 
managed. The emphasis was on Operating profit rather than on Net profit. This was 
partially rationalized by its closer alignment to results more controllable through the 
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actions of the mass of employees. These relatively positive numbers also supported 
confidence internally but more importantly externally as pointed out in this Quarterly 
results communication “. Our operating profit margin in Q1 was 0.8%.  At €21m, that 
profit is small, but it is immensely valuable in terms of the perception of TRN among 
external stakeholders, and, in particular, our customers.” (Quarterly Business Review Q1 
2010). The level of recognition, understanding, and awareness of the dire state of the 
company’s true financial position may have not been widely understood by both the 
general employee population and even amongst some senior leaders. This is evidenced in 
comments of self-surprise during the Central Senior Executive Reliability Interview in 
Project Three and in the extensive approach to more clearly highlight the financials and 
total losses during the 2012 turnaround launch (Central Senior Executive Reliability 
Interview). 
 
The inconsistency in or lack of a clear strategic intent around just how to achieve growth 
was an underlying issue that resulted in frequent changing of priorities and impacted the 
mindset of the strategic leaders. The struggle to meet the merger business case revenue 
numbers was an initial driver. The industry logic around scale to support heavy R&D 
investment was likely another construct as was evidenced in the Repertory Grid 
interviews of Project Two and the Cross-Repertory Grid analysis of Project Three. From 
a competitive strategy perspective, the emphasis on measurement of market share 
consistently emphasized in CEO and Quarterly Results communications from 2007-2009 
seem to indicate a clear association with the “market share relates to ROI” (and 
profitability) mindset and research findings of the Profit Impact of Market Strategies 
research (PIMS) (Buzzell and Gale et al. 1975).  However initial growth by all means and 
directions gave way to the more focused strategy of “Smart Growth” (selective 
investment and customers) which proved to be untimely in its implementation just before 
the global financial crises. After eight consecutive quarters of sales decline the opposite 
emphasis returned with “Drive for Growth”.  The discipline and strategic frame of this 
latter initiative comes through an evolution of emphasis on related constructs such as 
“Value creation”, Value Capture” and finally “Value Leakage” (TRN Plan 2010, TRN 
Plan 2011, TRN Plan 2012). Combined, the above dynamics and communications 
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evidence the challenges TRN faced in interpreting and responding strategically to its 
landscape and in determining its own role in value creation.  
. 
3.9.5 Theoretical Constraints On Strategic Thinking 
 
Many of the theorists in strategic management conclude “that it is interpretation rather 
than noticing that plays the most important role in triggering strategic adaptation” 
(Bogner and Barr 2000). We see extensive evidence in the Case Company that the 
majority of executives were “working on very short term achievements and don’t have 
that much bandwidth to really analyze, deeply enough, the changing business landscape” 
(Moscow Survey Respondent 1). Even at the corporate central function level the 
complexity facing individuals placed significant cognitive pressures on strategic thinking 
as was articulated by one Strategy Function member reflecting on the first years of the 
merger “As a corporate I think that there was perhaps a little bit of the challenge that, are 
you actually reading those signals, are you absorbing them or are you trying to cut them 
out and say please don't complicate our world anymore. In the strategy process and 
looking at the environment etc you should somehow take those with a rather open mind” 
(SBD Head 2 interview). 
 
According to the literature, an additional challenge to receiving signals is the idea that 
our strategic frames or schema become more resistant over time and that stress, 
incongruity or some form of shock to the system is needed to cause change or revision 
(Bogner and Barr 2000, Beinhocker 2006, Galambos and Abelson et al. 1986). 
Supporting the motivation to build and solidify these schemas is the fact that it is exactly 
our ability to learn from experience and the application of that experience that both 
reinforces our mental models and often leads to professional advancement. As 
Beinhocker (2006) notes, hierarchies are filled with the most experienced people at the 
top. This is primarily due to “their large storehouse of specific responses” that are 
“usually among the best for execution in a stable environment”. Data collection in 
Projects One, Two and Three strongly support that the complexity and overload of new 
signals or signals that did not fit established schema were impacting the Case 
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Company’s’ executive’s inclination to reframe and include data. Eisenhardt builds on this 
phenomenon from the exploit vs. explore dilemma perspective and the impact of intense 
competition on the reliance or influence of the successes of past performance when she 
states “Many managers use the past wisely. But sometimes these managers are fooled by 
their success. They may skillfully craft strong business models but neglect to change 
them after competitors have launched more attractive ways of competing. Other likely 
victims are managers whose businesses are caught in intensely competitive markets. 
These managers become so wrapped up in gaining the efficiencies the past can bring to 
today’s competition that they forget the relevance of novelty for reinvention and growth 
(Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). This success trap and over focus on gaining efficiency and 
operational excellence were reinforced in TRN after the successful turnaround of 2012-
2013. The implication was similar to the case in Polaroid, where clinging to the logic of 
old business models impeded the Case Company’s senior leaders from recognizing the 
new (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000).  To further complicate things it appears that there were 
“essentially quite different business models being bundled within the same umbrella of 
the companies” in the industry (SBD Head 2 interview). This factor made it harder for 
executives to reconcile how these paradoxical business models may or may not fit 
together and how to anticipate their long-term financial and strategic implications.  
 
When considering the Executive team and the origin of the merger, the literature would 
raise issues around individual self-interest motives about controlling larger businesses 
and the personal rewards involved both financially and prestige wise (Staw 1981, Kiesler 
and Sproull 1982, Miller 1991). Certainly the level of complexity facing the decision 
makers to go forward was overwhelming given the size of the product portfolios and the 
global reach of the two companies. The decision to move forward may not have been 
based on personal factors alone but rather on the industry dominant logic or strategic 
frame that consolidation is “inevitable” in what could have been perceived as a” do or 
die” situation (Prahald and Bettis 1986). The continuation of this consolidation paradigm 
is consistently evidenced far beyond the merger case and continued past the duration of 
this research. In the end, personal bandwidth relative to the level of complexity of the 
decision context may have given way to an underestimation of the “secondary 
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implications” of the merger that went beyond the initial set-up and integration issues. An 
additional factor that continued throughout the short life of the Case Company was that 
the key senior executives involved in the merger decision had limited or no previous 
experience in this type of process as they had primarily been Business Unit Heads and 
not Executive Board members of standalone entities.  
 
Almost all of the original Case Company Executive Board members had long and 
focused industry tenure. Although this can be seen as a strength, it can also be limiting in 
the ability to recognize change, and thus the literature suggests that there is a resulting 
justification for cleaning house when such change is needed (Miller 1991, Beinhocker 
2006). In the Case Company there was higher than average turnover amongst the 
executive population and the Executive Board itself. However, this was due less to 
planned intention and more due to the weak performance of some individuals and the 
natural attrition of a struggling organization losing its talent.  
 
The literature also suggests that troubled firms become active risk takers and that some 
amount of risk is necessary for innovation or even exploration (Bowman 1982). However, 
as noted above without appropriate interpretation limited action will be taken. Yet there 
were other factors at play. Miller and Milliken et al. (1996) found that firms would 
continue to simplify their repertoires unless there was a feeling of threat or significant 
amounts of slack resources were present. The evidence supporting the struggle to achieve 
a sense of urgency and lack of slack cited above supports the possibility that narrow 
focus was extant in the executive population.  The data obtained during the repertory grid 
interviews of Project Two further evidence these conclusions. 
 
When looking at the overall context of the organization there seemed to be grounds for 
the perception of a “burning platform”. This classic context for initiating change is often 
fueled by the discomfort individuals feel from the loss of certainty that the overall threat 
brings and is more recently supported by findings of Neuroscience (Rock 2008). On the 
positive side, Sharfman and Dean (1997) have found a link between uncertainty and 
increased flexibility in decision makers. Unfortunately, they have also found that “in the 
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very conditions where managers need the most flexibility (high competitive threat and 
low slack) they are the least likely to be flexible” (Sharfman and Dean 1997). One might 
speculate as to what the reasons are for this lack of flexibility at what would appear to be 
decisive moments. Could it be explained by tighter cost controls and approval systems? 
Might it be that these dimensions inhibit risk taking at the individual level? Alternatively, 
could it be that constant short-term firefighting limits executive’s time and motivation to 
explore new ideas and the assumptions behind a firm’s strategy? Although Project One 
provided initial affirmative evidence to support all of these possible explanations, more 
in-depth investigation was needed. Project Two and the eliciting of constructs from the 
executives themselves provided this further evidence as well as a more complete 
understanding of how the dynamics played out in practice.  As Raisch and Birkinshaw et 
al. (2009) conclude based on numerous studies, context is essential for explanatory 
purposes when researching individual level characteristics. 
 
3.9.6 Conclusion: From Contexts To Individual Constructs 
 
Project One provided an in-depth coverage of the Case Company Context and factors 
underlying the dynamics both in the internal and external environments.  The context and 
initial data collection from Project One suggested the likelihood of a number of potential 
constructs permeating the strategic frames of the senior executives of the Case Company. 
As was discussed, these preliminary constructs were induced by the researcher but also 
have theoretical support for their possible presence from the strategic management 
literature. Yet to go beyond the induced and theoretical potential of these constructs, 
further establishment of their existence was needed by collecting deep rooted data 
directly from Case Company’s Strategic Leaders. We now turn to Project Two where 
obtaining the constructs and factors impacting the target group in a direct and thorough 
methodology added further validation of the state of cognitive strategic flexibility in 
TRN’s Strategic Leaders.   
 
. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
Project Two:  
 
Repertory Grid Interviews  
And  
Elicitation Of Executive Constructs 
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4.0 Introduction 
 
Project Two uncovered and analyzed the elicited constructs of five key senior 
Executives in the Case Company. These five executives all had held a variety of critical 
strategic positions proceeding and during the Case Study. Project Two was undertaken 
between May 2011 and April 2012. This period saw no significant changes in the 
competitive, macro or microenvironments of the Case Company. The research timeline 
and methodologies are outlined in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11: Project Two Research Timeline And Data Collection Methods 
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4.1 Specific Purpose Of Project Two  
 
Project Two was designed to uncover the range and depth of the strategic constructs held 
by strategic leaders in the Case Company. The additional methodologies that were 
employed aimed to provide deeper insight into the extant strategic constructs. It also 
attempted to provide a further understanding of the factors influencing the potential for 
cognitive strategic flexibility. The direct but nonintrusive method employed via the 
repertory grid interview technique resulted in both fine-grained and rich sources of data. 
These sources confirmed not only many of the preliminary constructs and factors but also 
revealed several new constructs and influences not anticipated or uncovered in Project 
One. 
 
4.2 Data Sources And Recording Methods 
 
4.2.1 Repertory Grid Interview  
 
The repertory grid methodology appears to be relatively simple and straightforward in its 
design. However given that the objective of using the repertory grid interview technique 
is to illicit constructs in a non-invasive way the design and implementation of the method 
are demanding. For this reason, a very structured format was followed based on best 
practice outlined by academic and practitioner models. Practioner recommendations and 
tips were also taken into consideration. In addition, the researcher rehearsed and practiced 
the methodology several times before going live with the target group. This practice was 
done by using non-target group interviewees and additional topics to ensure proficient 
experience with the methodology.  
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4.2.2. Purposefully Selected Target Group  
 
This research was aimed at exploring the strategic frames of executives who are engaged 
in strategic thinking and not just operational execution. Therefore, only a limited portion 
of the senior management hierarchy of the Case Company was originally targeted. The 
hierarchy classification of Strategic Leaders in the Case Company meets the requirements 
for the scope and impact of strategic thinking. This population was selected due to the 
strong correlation between the leadership level and the significant percentage of “time 
applications and focus of effort” that this leadership level applies to strategy and vision 
(Charan and Drotter et al. 2001). This expectation is confirmed by the company’s 
Strategic Thinking, Leadership Competency description. For this level, the expectation is: 
“Creates TRN’s strategy and promotes the vision ensuring it evolves to meet global 
needs” (TRN Leadership Competency Framework). Additionally, the Case Company had 
a very flat organization and was culturally non-hierarchical. During the researcher’s time 
in the field, there were several initiatives aimed at maintaining this flatness by reducing 
the span of control with each restructure or reorganization. As Beinhocker and others 
have observed, not only does a flat hierarchy result in more stakeholders contributing to 
strategic decisions. It also helps “to prevent a small number of mental models from 
dominating the organization” (Beinhocker 2006). 
  
The total population of this classification of leaders at the start of this research was 
approximately 415 executives or .006 percent of the employee population as outlined in 
Figure 1 in Chapter One. The geographic location of these executives is not evenly 
distributed but enough so as to provide a large diversity of perspectives from all global 
regions and many of the various markets within those regions. Despite the size of the 
relatively large number of Strategic Leaders, their responsibility and influence are 
strategic given the size, culture and truly global processes of the Case Company. The role 
and scope of the firm’s Strategic Leader classification is further described as follows:  
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“Establishes a vision, culture, and philosophies for how results are achieved and/or 
contributes to and influences direction, policy, and strategy. Authorizes investments.  
Independent and strategic decision making that provides a new direction for the 
company, or imperative for change.  Operates at the global level (BU, Function) or large 
geography.  Integration of functions of units or with BU wide impact.  Policy approval 
level. Participate in strategy planning and support or provide critical expertise in the 
strategically important subject areas. Knowledge basis of industry & commerce 
interrelationship & legislation. Decisions based on intuition, creativity, and judgment” 
(TRN Leadership Competency Framework).  
 
This description gives significant emphasis to longer-term thinking, new directions, and 
leading change. Given the data collected and interpretation made during Project One of 
this research, there is evidence of inconsistency in expectations of the company 
Leadership Model and the focus and attention of its Strategic Leaders. This inconsistency 
in expectations was one of the themes that the repertory grid interviews were intended to 
explore further. Ultimately the research results strongly impacted the detailed design of a 
new TRN Leadership Framework and competency model and the supporting actions 
outlined in Chapter Seven.   
 
The target group noted above for this research has been further narrowed based on 
learning in Project One. Although all Case Company strategic leaders have the scope and 
role to drive or influence strategy, some of the leaders are in more influential roles than 
others. Project One discovered that Region Heads, Business Unit Heads and Strategy 
support function members have more strategic thinking requirements. Further, as Don 
Sull (2013, pers. Comm., 22 January) has stated, most CEO’s know the 40-80 top leaders 
they need to involve to drive the strategy. TRN has had such a selective group attend 
three different critical annual summits during the research period. The researcher had 
been involved in creating this selective list and took note of the status given these 
individuals. The selection of this target group was based on three criteria i) Role ii) 
diversity of experience in the industry iii) relative diversity of geographic and functional 
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scope. With these factors in mind the researcher selected five interviewees for 
participation in the repertory grid interviews.  
 
The recent roles and responsibilities of these executives can be described as follows: 
 
Interviewee One: BU Head To Region Head To Corporate Headquarters Country Head 
Interviewee Two: New Ventures Executive To Corporate Strategy Executive To 
Customer Team Head 
Interviewee Three: Asian Regional Customer Operations Head To CEO Chief Of Staff 
to Region Head 
Interviewee Four: Customer Team Head To Global Services Strategy Head  
Interviewee Five: Region Head For South West Europe To Region Head for North East 
Europe 
 
As mentioned above the repertory grid interview is a simple but powerful process. Reger 
and Palmer (1996) refer to it as an “innovative method” and acknowledge that it is highly 
suited for eliciting cognitive processes. Nevertheless, the researcher relied heavily on 
advice outlined by Valerie Stewart’s Business applications of Repertory Grid in planning 
and designing the interviews. Devi Jankowicz’s (2004) The Easy Guide to Repertory 
Grids was also extensively referenced in regards to the conceptual process and analytical 
methodologies to ensure rigor in both design and process. 
 
4.3. Interview Design 
 
4.3.1 Interview Setting  
  
The interviews were all done face to face and lasted 2 hours in duration. In making 
design decisions for the interviews, the researcher considered using software created 
specifically for customizing and capturing repertory grid information data. After piloting 
one such software (Enquire Within), the researcher decided not to use the greater 
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convenience of the technology as its main functionality was to capture digitally what is 
being applied in a paper format. This decision was based on the potential barrier that a 
computer would have both on the interviewer-interviewee rapport and the sense of 
confidentiality of the interviews. Instead, the interviews were all recorded with 
permission of the interviewee with the recorder used in an inconspicuous way. All 
interviews were later transcribed and combined with the handwritten notes made by the 
researcher during the creation of constructs and the open-ended portion of the interviews. 
 
The locations for the interviews were all on Case Company premises, but the rooms were 
chosen intentionally to be physically and psychologically removed from internal 
company observation. Thus, rooms normally used for hosting external guests were 
chosen as they provided an atmosphere that was relaxed, isolated and known to be a place 
that could not be disturbed.  
 
4.3.2. The Topic 
 
The interviews were all initiated by the researcher via email by “providing doctoral thesis 
research support” as the justification for the interview. The theme of strategic decision 
making was provided in advance, and the interviewees were very agreeable to make time 
for the session.  All interviewees appeared to be relaxed, comfortable and intellectually 
stimulated during the process. The introduction of the grid process itself did not seem to 
surprise any interviewees or create any strong reactions. 
 
Step one of the interviews was a general introduction to the purpose of the interview and 
establishing that all results would be anonymous and confidential. This step was followed 
by some casual questions about the individual’s background and other neutral topics to 
build comfort and rapport with the interviewee. 
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4.3.3. The Elements 
 
The process of Element Elicitation was done first using an open (creation) method to 
prevent the interviewee from getting “boxed in” or anchored to what is “strategic” and 
what is not. While Reger and Palmer (1996) used supplied elements as this fit their 
purpose, they also admitted surprise in the diversity of constructs elicited. Their 
conclusion was that for “most of the executives we interviewed, strategy is more 
multidimensional and more dynamic than is currently conceived in academic theory” 
(Reger and Palmer 1996). Therefore to maximize both automatic and controlled 
responses, the open method was used followed by the recommend process of adding the 
defined (supplied) elements to complete the list for the creation of the repertory grids 
(Jankowisz 2004)  
 
The first groupings of Element Creation Questions were shared all at once and repeated 
two or three times. These were positioned under a summary Element Creation Question: 
“Can you name strategic decisions in TRN you have been involved with; or have 
influenced strategic decisions in your area; or that you know a fair amount about and feel 
strongly about them; or have strong opinions regarding them?” The remaining Element 
Creation Questions can be reviewed in Appendix 1. The element creation questions are 
used until the interviewee has exhausted listing all of the possible elements they can 
generate. Once the element pool is created the interviewee is guided through the 
Repertory Grid Interview Process. 
 
4.3.4. Repertory Grid Interview Process 
 
The Repertory Interview process design followed a consistent 10 step approach for all the 
interviews to increase reliability (Long and Johnson 2000). The approach outlined below 
is based on methodology suggested by Jankowisz (2004). Using the full set of elements 
(strategic decisions induced and selected by the interviewee) the following process is 
used: 
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1) Which of these two are the same in some way, and different from the third? 
2) What do the two have in common, as opposed to the third? 
3) Check to make sure there is a bi-polar expression 
4)  Write down the thing in common on the left. Write down the contrast on the right. 
5) Present the grid as a rating scale of 1-5. Imagine the words on the left “define” the 
one on the scale and the words on right “define” the five on the scale. 
6) Rate each of the three strategic decisions on the construct. 
7) Rate the remaining strategic decisions on the construct. 
8) Repeat question 1 (and following steps) with the same triad 
9) Use a new triad 
10) Objective is to get 7-12 constructs rated for all elements 
 
A visual example of how the process results are recorded can be seen in Figure 12 
 
 
Figure 12: Example Of Repertory Grid Interview Recording Template 
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4.3.4.1 Qualifiers 
 
As part of the interview process, it is important to narrow and stimulate the interviewee’s 
focus to support the overall objectives of the intended purpose of the methodology by 
using “Qualifiers.” (Jankowicz 2004, Stewart 2009). These qualifiers assist in the 
matching and comparing of the elements during the elicitation of constructs. For the 
purpose of these interviews, the short list of qualifiers in Figure 13 was used. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Repertory Grid Interview Qualifiers 
 
At the conclusion of the Repertory Grid Interview Process, an open-ended interview was 
undertaken of approximately 30 minutes. A standard format and set of questions were 
prepared in advance but were customized based on the interviewee's background, context 
and the outcome of the formal Grid interview process. For example, when an issue of 
unique experience or context needed further clarification then additional questions were 
added in the open-ended section. With each interviewee, a follow-up session of 45 
minutes was held. The purpose was to explain further the intention and outcome of the 
interviews and to check the accuracy of the results via respondent validity. This 
methodology is recommended to improve reliability, validity and rigor (Long and 
Johnson 2000, Golafshani 2003, Creswell 2009). 
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4.4 Data Analysis  
 
Analysis of the individual repertory grids involved both content analysis and looking for 
relationships amongst elements and constructs within the grid (structure). For this 
purpose, three main methodologies were used. The first method of eye-ball or process 
analysis was repeatedly done as a starting point for the Cluster Analysis methodology. A 
software package called WebGrid5 from the University of Calgary, Canada was utilized 
for the Cluster Analysis methodology. The grid methodology is itself a way “of 
describing individuals and the characteristic and differing ways in which they construe 
experience” (Jankowicz 2004). The ultimate aim is to make their tacit knowledge explicit. 
However, despite the effectiveness of the grid elicitation methodology, there is a lot of 
information not easily revealed by the eyeball analysis.  Therefore, cluster analysis is one 
of the most effective methods for making visible relationships that are not as easily 
visible. The six-step analysis procedure recommended by Jankowicz (2004) was used for 
both the elements and the constructs. The final step of analysis was to review the open-
ended interview content to look for connections and themes that might be hidden or that 
might be reinforced in the grid. 
 
4.5 Results and Interpretation of Individual Grid Interviews 
 
4.5.1 Interview One: BU Head To Region Head To Corporate 
Headquarters Country Head 
4.5.1.1 Process and Descriptive Analysis 
The interviewee was a long-term telecommunication employee who had worked 
primarily for one company his entire career. He was confident and experienced with all 
the elements that were elicited. His current position and previous positions had allowed 
him to be very involved with the topic of the grid (Strategic Decision Making). Although 
the element creation questions allowed for examples to come from any time in his career, 
the examples were all relatively recent and related only to the current company. The 
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elicitation of constructs and natural thought pattern that emerged seemed to evolve from 
what might be thought of as “strategically appropriate” constructs to more reactions to 
reflective thoughts. The range of scores was balanced across the elements although on 
several occasions it seemed that the elements were seen as more complex and thus harder 
to rate one-dimensionally.  
As can be seen in Figure 14 below a total of 7 constructs were elicited with the first three 
expressing traditional strategy concepts and terminology and the last 4 describing more 
the context under which strategic thinking was done.  The primary distinction between 
the two groups is the separation of strategic frameworks that can be used versus the 
constraints and factors influencing the use of strategic frameworks. 
 
Figure 14: Interview One Repertory Grid  
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4.5.1.2 Construct Characterization 
 
Core (having a deep and personal significance to interviewee) Versus Peripheral 
Constructs 
Three of the seven constructs appear to have been Core (Ivory Tower versus Field Lead, 
Constrained versus Free Choice and Timely versus Untimely). These three appear to be 
closely linked to the emotional value attributed to the elements and whether the decisions 
were “right” and whether things could have been done differently. Given the direct 
impact these element decisions had and continued to have on the daily and long-term 
work environment of the interviewee, it is not surprising that a strong judgment is seen in 
the ratings. As indicated above, there appears to have been a move from strictly “safe” 
strategic framework constructs at the start of the interview e.g. Cost Efficiency. To an 
increasingly contextual and value judgment oriented set of constructs in the latter portion 
of the interview such as Timely. All the constructs were Constellatory. In other words, 
the researcher did not see these as “clichéd” responses but rather ones that were close in 
experience. 
The primary conclusion from an eyeball analysis of the repertory grid was that the 
interviewee appears to have a fairly high level of sophistication in the area of strategic 
thinking. He did not easily elicit a lengthy number of constructs perhaps due to the high-
level category of the strategic decisions he chose as elements. On the other hand, he had 
strong judgmental opinions about the elements and was able to elaborate on the political 
or special interest reasons for why some decisions were made, as and when they were 
made. The biggest surprise to the interviewee from the process was the realization that he 
perceived that the company had more freedom of choice than he had previously 
considered being the case. This observation is consistent with the recent findings of the 
Corporate Executive Board research that suggest the majority of factors influencing 
performance are controllable by management (Olson and Bever et al. 2008). Overall the 
impression is that decisions were made too late and only when forced. Those decisions 
where more free choice was possible were more often than not, less than ideal. 
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4.5.1.3 Relationships Within the Grid: Dendrogram Cluster Analysis  
4.5.1.3.1 Dendrogram Elements Analysis  
 
The process of cluster analysis resulted in a major reorganization of almost all the 
elements. Based on the statistical correlations, the cluster analysis process of following 
adjacent lines until they meet a common apex and the content of the elements there are 
three main clusters: 
 
1) Smart Growth, Fast Growth, and Service Strategy 
2) R&D Cost Leadership and TRN Merger-Design Decision 
3) US Market Entry (Partner Decision), TRN Merger (Partner Decision). 
 
Figure 15: Dendrogram Diagram From Interview One1 
                                                 
1 The mean of responses measuring the construct was assigned by the Repertory Grid 
Interview software for element answers of “not applicable” as recommend by Sekaran 
(2003). 
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It appears from the clusters in the Dendrogram in Figure 15 that this executive has 
divided the elicited strategic decisions into three categories. Category one is related to 
decisions on customer segmentation; category two is related to firm structural decisions, 
and category three is related to the firm scope of activity decisions. This would suggest 
that the executive is very familiar with traditional strategic theory frames and views 
decisions largely from this mindset. The differences in ratings within each cluster are 
primarily due to context (whether a decision was made on time or not) or purpose (to 
achieve cost efficiency/scale or enhance the value proposition by product/market access 
and business model issues).  
 
As can be seen when vertically following the construct scores for each cluster in the 
Dendrogram, element cluster one is rated very similarly across all constructs except for 
the “timeliness” of the decisions. Cluster two is rated almost identical across all the 
constructs. Cluster three differs only on the Cost Efficiency/Business Dimension and 
Company Structure/Industry Business Model Choice aspect.  
 
The highest match rating is 89.3% between smart growth and fast growth. The second 
highest match is between fast growth and services strategy. It would appear that the 
services strategy was a decision or method for achieving the other two growth strategies. 
The only other relatively high matching element (68%) is the 2011 Restructuring element 
with the “Scope of Activity” or Partnering category that includes the TRN Merger and 
US Entry partner decisions. There is some logical causal relationship between these three 
elements as partnering/acquisition decisions relate to the need or lack thereof to 
restructure. In the context of the Case Company, the relationship is due to structural 
overlap and a non-competitive cost structure. The close ratings of R&D Cost Leadership 
and TRN Merger Design Decision provide evidence of the deepness of the need for scale 
paradigm. In this case, it relates to the high level of R&D expenditure which was a 
primary motivator in the merger decision design. 
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4.5.1.3.2 Dendrogram Constructs Analysis  
 
During the construct cluster analysis, there was some shifting of constructs from the 
correlation. This resulted in the reversal of poles for two constructs (Strategic 
Imperative/How we drive the company from a financial perspective and Field Lead/Ivory 
Tower). As can be noted in the construct tree portion of the Dendrogram of Figure 15 the 
statistical correlation process, the cluster analysis process of following adjacent lines until 
they meet a common apex and the content of the constructs reveal that that there are two 
main branches:  
 
1) Company Structure/Industry Business Model Choice with Constrained/Free 
Choice  
2)  Ivory Tower/Field Lead, Strategic Imperative/How we drive the company from a 
financial perspective and Timely/Untimely  
 
The first branch suggests that there may be a link in the interviewee’s mind between the 
Industry Business models and the Degree of Free Choice involved. The second branch 
appears to connect How we drive the company from a financial perspective and the 
degree of timeliness of decisions being linked to whether they were Ivory Tower or Field 
Lead.  
 
When horizontally following the element scores for branch one there seems to be very 
close ratings on almost all the elements with the exception of the US Market Entry 
Partner Choice. This implies that the interviewee frequently perceived that there was a 
relatively high degree of freedom of choice across the spectrum of strategic decisions. 
However in the case of the US Market Entry Choice the fit to the business 
model/company structure was a strong factor in the choice. This is supported from 
statements made during the interview in which it was expressed that in addition to limited 
alternatives, the final choice was made due to fit with the product portfolio which was 
closely related to the business model. 
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In the second branch, the ratings of the three constructs within the branch are all 
relatively close except for the two partner decisions and P&L Governance decision. 
These three are all seen to be as highly untimely decisions that were strategic imperatives. 
This suggests that they may have been forced decisions due to their lateness. There is the 
additional relationship to them all being considered as Ivory Tower.  
The highest percentage similarity score is 80.6% between the “How we drive the 
company from a financial perspective-Strategic imperative” and “Timely-Untimely”. 
This suggests an overall view of the importance of timing to critical decisions. This view 
may be related to the perception of the industry clockspeed. The next highest similarity 
scoring is 71% with “Company Structure-Industry Business Model Choice” and 
“Constrained-Free Choice”. This relationship suggests a connection between the industry 
environment dynamics on the amount of free choice the company has. This supports 
strongly the impression that the interviewee is well versed in strategic concepts such as 
Strategic Fit (Selznick 1957).  
 
The first impression from combining these relationships is that the interviewee perceived 
that there was considerable free choice in strategic decisions but that many were made 
late or with poor timing. The other implied meaning when comparing the entire ratings of 
the second branch is that Ivory Tower decisions that were Strategic Imperatives (critical 
issues) were all seen to be untimely. Whereas Ivory Tower decisions that were about how 
we drive the company from a financial perspective were very timely. The implication is 
that when the pressure is on, Ivory Tower decisions have not been ideal (Field lead were 
not any better). Therefore, the interviewees overall underlying view regarding the 
company’s ability to make critical decisions is that it has not been able to do so 
effectively or with speed.  
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4.5.1.4 Observations From The Open-ended Interview Discussion: 
“Sleeping with the enemy.” 
 
In the view of the interviewee the business logic or primary mindset underlying the initial 
Case Company merger was to achieve scale and obtain an end to end capability both in 
the infrastructure and devices domains. However, it became clear shortly after the TRN 
JV that the end to end relationship with the leading handset and device parent of the 
merger was not of significant value. Further, it became apparent that the advantage of the 
link to the handsets and devices did not compensate enough for the customers TRN got 
locked out of due to conflicting parent company relationships. According to the 
interviewee, in some customer relationship cases, the link provided increased value, 
customer insight, and switching costs. While in other relationships this connection was 
seen as a threat by existing and potential customers. 
 
Another recurring theme and partially related construct was in regards to “How do you 
want to drive your company”. The specific meaning implied in this case was about 
whether “you want to focus on top line or profitability” (Interviewee one). This perceived 
dilemma seems to have been a disruptive force in both the strategic thinking of the 
employees and the overall operations of the company. In the words of the interviewee 
“Initially, there was a focus on growth to achieve the merger business case but every 18 
months we changed” (Interviewee one). The “Smart Growth” element was one example 
of these fluctuations provided during the open-ended interview. This decision was 
personally sensitive for the interviewee, and his frustration with this element was 
illustrated in his statement that he “felt that someone was smoking something 
somewhere.” According to the interviewee, there was a perception amongst some senior 
leaders that “we can drive the industry and that we thought we had the muscle to do it”. 
There is a correlation here to the anticipated preliminary construct identified in Project 
One as Strategic Posture and Positioning. Specifically that the increased size of the firm 
due to the merger seemed to give some executives the perception that they were a 
“shaper”. As evidenced by the outcomes of Project One, this was clearly not the case. 
More specifically the element was linked to a disconnect of some senior executives to the 
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front lines. Interestingly the Smart Growth decision was not seen as something that was 
done under pressure. This reinforced the interviewee’s emergent observation that it was 
now “clear that some of our decisions were not under pressure, not as much as we might 
think. Only in a couple of places, we did not have a choice. We were more the master of 
our own destiny” (Interviewee one).   
The subtle distinction and shift in strategic thinking from one stressing the need for end 
to end presence versus just having overall scale can also be seen in the question posed by 
the interviewee of whether “we want to be a big company or rather focus?” Two factors 
were at play here. The first was the top of mind presence of the “absolute R&D spend” 
and the second was the belief that the “unit cost of R&D for the Chinese was one-third of 
ours”. It was obvious in the view of the interviewee that the Case Company had to 
respond to that even to the extent of “sleeping with the enemy” through a small JV and a 
major site visit to the most disruptive Chinese competitor’s main campus and Academy. 
 
Another strategic theme at play was an underlying decision on whether to be a product 
driven or market and customer driven company. This has implications regarding the 
degree of internal and self-determination the company wants to have. For the interviewee, 
product lead seemed to be more about cost efficiency while customer driven implied 
degrees of responsiveness.    
 
One final dimension that arose during the open discussion was the ability of the company 
to make timely decisions. The issue here appears to be that most decisions involving 
external interaction were perceived as rather late. In addition, when these types of 
decisions were done quickly they often caused problems or were not well executed. This 
implies that the interviewee did not see speed as a company capability. Further, the lack 
of external orientation perceived suggests limited strategic foresight and poor 
responsiveness. The exceptions were primarily for decisions that had internal control. 
Perhaps one of the underlying factors enabling or limiting the speed of decision making 
was the differing mindsets of the two parent companies. As expressed but the interviewee 
“Parent Company T and Parent Company R could not have been further apart in how we 
run a company.”   
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4.5.1.5 Conclusion  
 
While the results of this interview reinforce and confirm many of the anticipated 
constructs and dynamics from Project one, there were also new dimensions emerging. 
One of these was the “Ivory Tower” dimension elicited in the interviewee’ constructs and 
open-ended portion of the interview. The open-ended portion of the interview also 
evidenced a closely related perceived weak feedback loop from the front lines. This was 
partially referenced to as “Field lead” on the contrast side of the Ivory Tower construct. 
The results show that the interviewee sees a clear causal link between important large 
decisions being made late due to there not being “a feel for the front line” at the top of the 
organization.  There may be some association here by the interviewee for the need to 
keep up with the perceived industry clock speed preliminary construct identified in 
Project One. As mentioned above the dissimilar strategic frames and interests of the two 
parent companies may have also added significant coordination costs to timely decision 
making.  
 
Another unanticipated dimension that surfaced relates to strategic decisions involving 
ecosystem business models. Although this was only mentioned to a small degree, it can 
be seen that there exists some foresight of not just looking at cost efficiency but also of 
the complexity of the wider industry dynamics and business models. 
 
Overall the interview demonstrates a high level of knowledge in strategic thinking. His 
grid is built on a balance of strategic frameworks and context enablers. Clearly he 
provides evidence of the existence of most of the preliminary constructs expected from 
Project One. These include consistent reference to scale and cost efficiency as sources of 
competitive advantage, the dilemma of growth and profitability, limitations due to 
financial health, strategic positioning and industry clock speed. How this corresponds and 
aligns with the other repertory grid interviews will be presented in Chapter Five. This 
summary of Cross Repertory Grid Content Analysis will cover further conclusions and 
implications.  
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4.5.2 Interviewee Two: New Ventures Executive To Corporate Strategy 
Executive to Customer Team Head 
4.5.2.1 Process and Descriptive Analysis 
The interviewee was a long-term telecommunication industry employee who had some 
shorter experience outside the industry, primarily in the legal and venture capital domains.  
He also had held a good variety of roles within the company, and this was reflected in the 
range of elements that were elicited within the strategic decisions topic. The interviewee 
seemed to enjoy the rating process because it allowed him to make deeper reflections on 
some decisions that could not be considered as black and white but rather multi-
dimensional. He did appear to be very passionate about the overall topic and its impact on 
the company.  
A can be seen in Figure 16 a total of 8 constructs were elicited. Many of these concepts 
were from the perspective of process or how the decisions were made and feelings related 
to the process. This may have been due to some of the qualifiers, or it could also be the 
closeness of his involvement with the decisions. The researcher’s first impression from 
these constructs was that the interviewee was very direct, down to earth and transparent 
about his interpretation of the elements. His wide variety of roles was an additional factor 
that very strongly influenced his ability to see many sides to the element category.  
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Figure 16: Interview Two Repertory Grid 
 
4.5.2.2 Construct Characterization 
 
Core versus Peripheral Constructs 
 
Reflecting on the overall interview process, the emotion and intensity expressed by the 
interviewee two of the eight constructs strongly appear to have been Core (Freedom of 
Choice/Limits Constraints, Political/Transparent). In addition there seems to have been a 
preference for the excitement experienced in the “No clear framework, seat of your 
pants” approach over the “Structured Approach” within this construct. Therefore, this 
suggests that it is also a core construct for the interviewee. 
  
The conclusion from the eye-ball analysis of the repertory grid is that the interviewee 
values the process of strategic decisions. However, the degree of freedom, transparency 
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and non-political nature of the decisions seem to be highly important as indicated by the 
core constructs. There also appears to be a relationship between the levels of 
engagement/excitement with the degree of newness of the strategic decision 
implementation. This may be impacted by the interviewee’s previous roles in Venture 
Capital and start-ups and/or their overall decision-making orientation.  
 
The overall categorization of the constructs shows a wide variety of types of constructs 
used. The key distinction being the “strength” of the core constructs and their impact on 
other constructs in relation to whether they are seen as energizing, visionary and 
generally accepted positive attributes.  
 
4.5.2.3 Relationships Within The Grid: Dendrogram Cluster Analysis  
 
4.5.2.3.1 Dendrogram Elements Analysis  
 
The process of cluster analysis resulted in a major reorganization of almost all the 
elements. Based on the statistical correlations, the cluster analysis process of following 
adjacent lines until they meet a common apex and the content of the elements there are 
three main clusters: 
 
1) Industry Consolidation Exercises TRN, Low Cost Country Migration  
2) Future Approach on GSM R, Growth vs. Integration (Smart Growth)  
3) Start-ups at TRN, Strategy Frame TCO-Emerging Markets 
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Figure 17: Dendrogram Diagram From Interview Two 
 
It appears that this executive divided the elicited strategic decisions into many categories 
with limited obvious shared meaning within the categories. Yet there are clear similarities 
in the underlying dynamics for cluster one. These are related to industry-level pressure 
around the need for overall cost efficiency and having offerings at a competitive rate. In 
the second category or cluster, the relationships are less clear. Although the two elements 
are to some degree generically about growth, the relatedness is complicated by the fact 
that the Smart Growth element has as part of its name an implied trade-off with the 
“integration” progress. This element is expressed in such a way as to be almost a 
construct in itself. However, this is an element and not a construct. The apparent 
ambiguity is due to the element category of decision making which by definition will 
always have a contrasting trade-off whether expressed in the tone of the element or not. 
The third cluster of elements involves two decisions that have clear characteristics of 
pioneering and entrepreneurial aspects to them. Overall the lack of stronger relationships 
in the elements suggests that the interviewee has been involved in a significant number of 
unique strategic decisions of different intent.  The two highest matches both have ratings 
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of 78%.  A possible reason for these close similarities is that three of the elements are 
responses to the flat or declining industry issue. The next highest match is 77% between 
Start-ups at TRN and Strategy Frame TCO-Emerging Markets.  
 
As can be seen in the dendrogram element section of Figure 17 by following the ratings 
vertically, cluster one was rated very similarly across all constructs except for on 
Structured Approach and Demoralization. The similarities follow largely because the two 
decisions were driven by the same dynamic around cost reduction and competitiveness. 
The primary differences in the constructs were because the Low-cost Country Migration 
was much less clear in its planning and had a devastating impact on the home country of 
the interviewee. Cluster two is rated very similarly on all but two constructs. The key 
difference here being on the scope or level of impact of the two decisions. Smart Growth 
was a little more future looking and clearly much more global and universal in its impact. 
Cluster three differed mainly on the Adding Value construct. Clearly, the limiting of 
operations of “Start-ups at TRN” was seen as difficult to the interviewee and Value 
Destroying.  
 
4.5.2.3.2 Dendrogram Constructs Analysis  
 
During the construct cluster analysis, there was some shifting of constructs from the 
correlation process. This resulted in the reversal of poles for two constructs (No Clear 
Framework, Seat of Your Pants/Structured Approach and Transparent /Political). As can 
be observed in the construct tree portion of Figure 17 there are two main branches with 
one branch having two sub-branches: 
 
1) Creating a new way/Winding down-exiting and Energizing-exciting/Demoralizing  
2) Global operating/Local limited impact and Destroying value/Adding value 
 
The first branch and its sub-branches appear to have a clear common theme around traits 
of strategic decisions where the actions are corrective in nature. Specifically, these 
decisions are out of necessity but with little intellectual stimulation, flexibility in options 
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and are routine (carried out “mechanically”). At the other pole this grouping suggests that 
the interviewee sees a positive relationship between strategic decisions that are 
pioneering with considerable autonomy in decisions and actions. The second branch has 
less clarity in the construct relations. There may be some implied relationship that can be 
construed from the open-ended interview questions related to the perception that the 
interviewee gives to the value of global policies and central direction versus local 
customization. For branch one there seem to be very close ratings across all four elements. 
For branch two the ratings seem to be very close across the elements except for on two 
elements that were rated as global initiatives that added more value. This variance is 
consistent with the perceived view of the interviewee that most global initiatives are not 
adding value.   
The highest percentage similarity score is 88.9% between the “Creating a new 
way/Winding down-exiting and “Visionary/Mechanical follow through”. The combined 
constructs and similarity in ratings suggests that the interviewee sees a close relationship 
between new and creative strategic decisions. When combined with the second highest 
sub-branch of “Freedom of choice/Limits-constraints and Energizing-
exciting/Demoralizing” (80.6%) it can be seen that these type of decisions are viewed as 
much more engaging and empowering. The next highest similarity score is (78%) for the 
Global/local and Destroying/Adding value constructs. As mentioned above, there is a 
pattern that supports a relationship between local or customized approaches and adding 
value. 
 
The first impressions from reviewing these relationships were that despite the difference 
in the scope of the strategic decisions, the interviewee appears to value the more 
entrepreneurial or intrapreneurial type of strategic initiatives regardless of their overall 
impact.  
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4.5.2.4 Observations From Open-ended Discussion: “I don’t believe my 
own PowerPoint’s anymore” 
One of the general themes that emerged during the open discussion was the interviewee’s 
realization of the huge gap between the Executive Board and corporate strategy function 
(SBD) with the front lines and “trenches”. His expression that “I no longer believe my 
own PowerPoint’s” indicated that there is a big difference between doing things in 
theoretical frameworks with an Ivory Tower orientation and the reality and execution on 
the ground. After leaving the strategy function and going to a front lines position he 
observed that the translation of the strategy is lost, stating that “there is such a 
discontinuity, and the gap..it was shocking.”    
In addition, to there being a need for more effective communication downwards there 
was also the increased awareness that the truth and accuracy of information was not 
moving upwards either. “In SBD, all our products worked fine. All our products came on 
time; all our products were always appreciated.  And in the trenches, it is 180 degrees 
opposite of that.  We were living in denial in SBD about the reality.” Or to put it in other 
words “life in the trenches is slightly different than at HQ next to the king. In the trenches 
you see rats running around in the mud and here (at HQ) you live cleanly.” [bracketed 
text added]  
 
This disconnect also impacted to some degree a lack of realism or pragmatism in strategic 
thinking and planning. From the Corporate perspective and specifically that of the 
strategic planning function the interviewee’s perception of obtaining financial objectives 
was less complicated. When planning in “SBD numbers were always millions or hundred 
millions.” This perception was far removed from knowing “how hard it is when you try 
to get $10,000 from the customer.” In other words, the implication of making such 
numbers, in reality, was often not taken into account when considering strategic options. 
 
The interviewee believes that despite this over-optimism in planning, there was a realistic 
view of the market.  The lack of realism came more from not having a true picture of the 
company performance. This was due to information either not getting through or when it 
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did get through, it was not dependable. From the interviewee’s current role on the front 
lines his view had changed radically. Reflecting on the current state at the time of the 
interview, he summed up the downward information flow as follows “I would say that 
corporate information is propaganda at its best. And that people, the trench troops don’t 
believe the propaganda. We don’t buy it because we see the reality differently”.  
 
The interview also elicited several contrasting mental frameworks at play between the 
corporate level thinking and thinking in the “trenches.” The direct Profit and Loss 
accountability at the frontlines and the overall short-term pressure in the company made 
the strategic frames much more “about operational or tactical issues with a really 
mechanical execution”. This coincided with a much more short-term focus whereas in 
corporate Strategic Business and Development “all your actions are long term”.  
However, this perceived short-term mindset and actions sometimes impacts results and 
strategic constructs over a much longer horizon. During the research, there have been 
several examples of frontline exploratory actions turning into long-term strategic 
commitments. Another example provided by the interviewee was the concept of “Total 
Cost of Ownership” (TCO). “We were the first ones to come up with that term five years 
ago in marketing – it started very local in emerging markets, but now it impacts 
everything we do, for us and others in the industry.” This basic construct was used in a 
very limited scope initially. It surfaced as a front line strategic response to position the 
way specific customers viewed the value of players in the value chain. As indicated by 
the interviewee it grew to be a fundamental strategic paradigm with far-reaching impact 
on the entire ecosystem and their business models. 
 
The challenge of flow of accurate information is one that has been and continues to be 
challenging for the Case Company. On the one hand, it is clear that at “SBD, of course, 
we had far more information on how to do larger things”. However, there had been the 
detrimental factor that critically needed tactical information had been missing which 
would have enabled SBD members to fully appreciate and generate feasible strategic 
options. On the other hand, the break in the lines of communication and resulting 
entrepreneurial actions on the front lines has led to divergent strategic thinking or actions. 
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In some cases, these actions have turned into long-term strategic commitments and 
shifted the strategic thinking of the entire organization and industry. At the time of this 
interview, a much stronger command and control model was in process. This was felt to 
such a degree that the interviewee perceived the climate to be one where if “you are 
saying something that is not aligned or not singing songs of the management your head 
gets chopped off.” 
 
4.5.2.5 Conclusions 
 
The interviewee referenced a wide range of elements which is consistent with his diverse 
background and roles. He clearly revealed a preference for entrepreneurial and emergent 
thinking as compared with long-term and structured forecasting. Despite this, he 
recognized the need for both strategic insight and strategic foresight “because somebody 
needs to win the war not just the battle.” Reflecting on his most recent change in roles he 
observed that “it has made me so understand that we need both.” As referenced above 
this dynamic of communicating and integrating strategic insights throughout the 
organization has been problematic. It also is linked directly to the organization’s 
capability to respond in an aligned, effective and strategically flexible manner. The 
interviewee captures this challenge in his own words stating that “The complexity of the 
machine is such that there is no valuation perspective of which is better or worse, both 
are needed they are just very very different roles.” These statements support the existence 
of the induced complexity construct from Project One. Further, it provides evidence of 
the researcher’s observation that the Case Company had a failure to integrate and 
leverage the two perspectives effectively.  
 
The interviewee also demonstrated that the degree of newness and overall intellectual 
stimulation of a strategic decision was a personal motivator. Associated with this was the 
relative freedom and autonomy in making the decisions. Some of this preference may be 
attributed to his previous roles in New Ventures and also in the relatively unfettered 
environment of SBD. This autonomy, when combined with limited input from the 
frontlines, seems to have created some of the naivety in the strategic thinking mentioned 
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above by the interviewee. The interviewee acknowledges this himself as indicated by 
comments such as “When we used to do the strategy we always talked about customer 
centricity and customer delight and all these sorts of things. Nice words, bullshit! We 
naively think that they are loyal to us if the TCO changes are bigger, and we are naive not 
to exploit it… it has an impact, but it is nowhere near as great as you think that it is 
because our customers are professional purchasers”. 
 
There is also a likely relationship here to what other interviewee’s have called an “Ivory 
Tower” orientation in HQ. In considering some of the previous strategic thinking in 
corporate HQ, the interviewee observed that “I think we had falsely based our scenarios 
on hope. And I have learned that hope is not a very good business strategy. That is I think 
we had hoped more than created growth strategies”. This again refers to an over-
optimism on both the performance of the company’s product performance and on the 
market itself. As expressed by the interviewee, this did not bode well or “match the brutal 
reality around the corner”. 
 
Underlying this strategic discontinuity is perhaps the mismatch of the merger partner’s 
ways of working and culture. The lateness of making tough decisions is partially 
attributed to these differences in the statement that, “We didn’t take the tough measures 
at the time when they were supposed to be taken. We didn’t even see them. That could be 
fair. We had constraints, could be contractual”. Here the divergent vested interests and 
stakeholder obligations of the two parent companies added constraints to what could be 
done and how fast decisions could be implemented. The level of awareness and 
transparency was also diminished due to these cultural differences. This was exacerbated 
further during the launch of the new focused strategy in late 2012.  Referring to the 
‘transformation” initiative launched to achieve the new strategy the interviewee lamented 
on the loss of the positive aspects of the parent culture he had come out of by making a 
rather harsh comparison; “when you look around at our culture which is founded on the 
very ideal of discussion, discussions honest and open discussions, transparency no 
politics – we are 180% from all of those at the moment”. 
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These factors begged the question of what type of strategic leaders would TRN desire and 
need when it arose from the turnaround? What type of Strategic Leadership expectations 
and competencies would match the strategic ambitions of TRN? Clearly, the degree of 
cognitive strategic flexibility needed would also be determined by the processes, 
practices and policies decided upon. In the judgment of the interviewee, the impact of the 
current practices are unambiguous as is conveyed in this negative assessment “I have 
never ever heard of a company that would be successful when the fundamental element 
of trust is taken away day by day by day by centralizing processes through approvals”. 
This indication of loss of transparency and trust combined with significantly increasing 
centralized governance became a recurring theme that led directly to the development of 
a number of interventions covered in more detail in Project Three. Importantly it 
supported the notion that changes in both soft-wiring (values and frameworks) and 
hardwiring (processes, systems, structures) would be needed to foster and enable 
cognitive strategic flexibility.  
 
4.5.3 Interviewee Three: Asian Regional Customer Operations Head To 
CEO Chief Of Staff To Region Head 
 
4.5.3.1 Process And Descriptive Analysis 
 
The interviewee was a long-term telecommunication industry employee who had worked 
primarily for one company his entire career. He was quite reflective about the elements 
that were elicited. This was likely due to his transition from the “front lines” to the CEO 
office and back to the “front lines. This mix of roles had given him a broad range of 
strategic decisions to consider with some more at the corporate level and a few at the 
Business Unit or regional level. Most of the elements he elicited or selected were 
relatively recent and at the corporate level. Overall, the interviewee appeared to be quite 
talkative, but eliciting constructs seemed to take quite a long time and did not result in the 
volume or diversity the researcher expected. Instead, the constructs remained on rather 
big generic strategy topics. This may have been due to his experience mix. Namely his 
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role and exposure to bigger “Ivory Tower” strategic topics combined with his longer term 
experience at the product portfolio level. 
In Figure 18 it can be seen that a total of 7 constructs were elicited with most of them 
being concepts that would be considered when making choices around product offerings. 
Despite this, the application of these concepts was meant to be from the corporate level 
perspective. As noted above, the researcher’s first interpretation of this is that the 
interviewee’s long experience at the product sales/marketing level has strongly 
influenced how he thinks strategically.  
 
Figure 18: Interview Three Repertory Grid 
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4.5.3.2 Construct Characterization 
 
Core Versus Peripheral Constructs 
 
Four of the seven constructs appeared to have been Core (Expanding offering/Narrowing 
offering, Portfolio and Market enhancing/Portfolio focus, Selective growth/General 
growth and Excellence and Depth in product/Breadth in offering). All four of these seem 
to underlie the interviewee’s long term experience and dilemma around finding the right 
balance in the area between growth and profitability. This preliminary construct from 
Project One is a theme that has also been playing out in the industry at large (TRN 
Business Intelligence and Quarterly Reviews 2011 and 2012). The remaining three 
constructs are more factors or consequences to be considered when making choices 
around offerings.   
 
The interviewee appears to have been able to offer a large number of elements. This may 
be due to his previous position in the CEO’s office. Although he spoke more holistically 
about the future of the industry in the open-ended portion of the interview, the constructs 
elicited during the grid discussion were rather limited and in some cases quite similar 
with only small distinctions between them. The level of sophistication of constructs was 
rather generic, and the breadth of ideas was limited. This was surprising given his central 
exposure to TRN’s CEO. However, it may be that it indicates his acceptance of the 
industry’s dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis 1986). This is evidenced by his open-
ended interview comment that “TRN was just trying to do the same things as the biggest 
guy”. 
157 
 
4.5.3.3 Relationships Within the Grid: Dendrogram Cluster Analysis  
 
4.5.3.3.1 Dendrogram Elements Analysis2  
 
The process of cluster analysis resulted in a major reorganization of almost all the 
elements. Based on the statistical correlations, the cluster analysis process of following 
adjacent lines until they meet a common apex and the content of the elements there are 
four main clusters in Figure 19: 
1) Acceleration TRN Merger, Low Cost Country Migration  
2) Focus on MBB, Smart Growth and Customer first 2001  
3) Nortel Acquisition and Motorola Acquisition  
4) Emerging Market Radio, Solutions Transformation, and TRN Merger 
 
Figure 19: Dendrogram Diagram From Interview Three 
                                                 
2 The mean of responses measuring the construct was assigned by the Repertory Grid 
Interview software for element answers of “not applicable” as recommended by Sekaran 
(2003)  
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It appears that this executive has divided the elicited strategic decisions into four clusters. 
Cluster one is related to decisions motivated by cost reduction or cost pressure, cluster 
two is related to customer or product segmentation/focus, cluster three is related to 
growth or market access strategies. The fourth cluster is not as homogeneous in its 
grouping. In this grouping, there is really one category related to market or business 
development strategies (Emerging Market Radio and Solutions Transformation) 
combined because of similar scores with a consolidation decision. These are clustered 
because they have similar scores on many constructs (the first two elements being scored 
almost identical) except when it comes to the issues of the breadth of offering and growth.  
This would suggest that the executive has elicited elements that cover some breadth of 
intent. However, two of the three elements in this cluster could thematically be clumped 
together as segmentation and business development elements (with the exception of the 
TRN Merger). This exception actually appears to fit more logically with cluster one as a 
cost-driven decision. The TRN Merger, its acceleration, and low-cost migration are all 
related to the industry consolidation pressure paradigm which is reinforced partially by 
the declining or flat market growth and its associated OPEX pressure. This one major 
dynamic appears to be behind many of the strategic decision elements elicited. 
 
Cluster one is rated very similarly across all constructs except for Market driven vs. 
Technology driven. This is largely due to the fact that both elements were not related to 
typical “competitive” constructs. Cluster two is rated almost identical except for the 
degree of emphasis on scale. Cluster three differs only on the Market vs. Technology 
driven construct. The main issue here is that they were both market entry acquisition 
decisions but the Motorola acquisition had the added dimension of acquiring a specific 
technology gap. Cluster four has the largest variation in element ratings. The main 
differences are in relation to Breadth and Scale versus Focus and Excellence. 
 
The highest match rating is 75.4% between Emerging Market Radio and Solutions 
Transformation. These two elements likely have similar ratings due to their association 
with being customer interfacing offerings. The main differences being around Focus 
versus General Growth in product offering. The second highest match is 73% between 
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Smart Growth and Customer first 2001. These are closely matching due to their both 
being aimed at selectiveness of customers. The third highest match rating is 68.3% 
between the Nortel Acquisition and Motorola Acquisition. As these are both acquisition 
processes, it is not surprising to see some degree of similarity. The main difference in 
ratings comes due to the differences in the acquisition targets and the timing of the 
acquisitions. Overall, the clusters indicate a high degree of elements related to two 
underlying dimensions. Firstly, the dimension or paradigm of cost-driven industry 
consolidation is prevalent. Secondly and closely related is the dilemma of how to achieve 
profitable growth. 
4.5.3.3.2 Dendrogram Constructs Analysis  
 
During the construct cluster analysis, there was some shifting of constructs from the 
correlation process. This resulted in the reversal of poles for two constructs (Strategic 
/Cost Focused). There are two main branches in Figure 19:  
 
1) General growth/Selective growth and Breadth in offering and Excellence and depth in 
product 
 2) Focus/Scale, Strategic/Cost Focused and Expanding offering/Narrowing offering 
 
The first branch suggests that the interviewee sees a link between growth and the quality 
of products. The second branch appears to reinforce the tradeoffs of Breadth of offering 
in the sense of how it relates to how much scale can be achieved. There is also an 
implication that this impacts cost. Less directly matching but within the same branch is 
the Narrowing/Expanding offering construct. This might be expected to be more closely 
related to the first branch but likely connects here due to the subtle distinction made by 
the interviewee regarding the differences in intent or objectives possible in this strategic 
decision.  
 
For branch one there seem to be four elements receiving similar ratings close to the 
emergent pole, two not applicable and three that are closer to the implicit pole. This 
seems to be consistent with the underlying intent behind the decisions related by the 
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interviewee regarding tradeoffs of Selective versus General growth. For Cluster two there 
seems to really be a key sub-cluster related to scale and cost as noted above. The ratings 
across elements can be grouped into two dimensions. One with highly similar scores for 
six elements that are about growth or processes related to growth. The second dimension 
is primarily related to cost structure or OPEX.  
 
The highest percentage similarity score is 73.5% between the Scale/Focus and the 
Strategic/Cost Focused constructs. As noted above this suggests a subtle split in the 
notion of scale and cost reduction driven decisions versus others that are not cost 
motivated and perhaps, therefore, more strategic in orientation. The next highest 
similarity scoring is 53% with General growth/Selective growth and Breadth in offering 
and Excellence and Depth in product. This match is quite low and combined with 
comments from the interviewee it suggests that although he sees a relationship between 
breadth of offering and general growth, the link between these two and quality is not 
always as direct. 
 
The first impressions from reviewing these relationships were that despite there being a 
wide range of elements there are relatively few construct dimensions. On the other hand, 
it can be seen from the perspective that the interviewee has many small subtle distinctions 
within larger construct categories. This latter assessment is supported more by the open-
ended portion of the interview.  
 
4.5.3.4 Observations From The Open-ended Interview Discussion:  
“Something is lost in translation.” 
 
The interviewee had a wide range of scope and impact amongst the elements elicited 
during the formal grid portion of the interview.  This is likely due to his mix of closeness 
to the CEO and front line positions in multiple regions. Given this diversity of experience, 
one might have expected a wider breadth of strategic constructs. The industry dominant 
logic of consolidation and implications for OPEX reduction related topics seem to have 
been prevalent (Prahalad and Bettis 1986). This can perhaps be explained by the 
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interviewee’s participation in the merger integration project and his closeness to the two 
CEOs during the first years of the merger. During the open-ended interview, he did raise 
a broader number of strategic topics and demonstrated awareness of the changes evolving 
beyond the infrastructure industry. This may have resulted from his more recent return to 
a customer facing role. However his starting point for the open interview was a 
rationalization of the merger’s primary logic as an attempt to achieve increased scale and 
footprint which he saw as almost the same as achieving synergy and “focusing on cost.” 
On the practical level, this meant combining and pruning portfolios while reaping the cost 
benefits of “consolidating the R&D platforms.” All of these concepts evidence the depth 
with which the consolidation mindset was held by the interviewee and how it remains a 
starting point from which strategic thinking develops.  This is further supported by the 
current CEO’s statements supporting the consolidation paradigm. The strength of this 
paradigm (and the factors that support it) is clearly a strong limiting force on the scope of 
cognitive strategic flexibility. Its intensity and consistency in the data collection suggest a 
group think dimension and a “focused schema” or mindset as described by Nadkarni and 
Narayanan, 2004. 
 
Another highly influential theme that surfaced was the Ivory Tower orientation of 
Corporate HQ. When considering the information coming into the CEO, the interviewee 
conveyed his view that “Something is lost in translation.” The effort of the CEO to meet 
with a lot of customer CEOs did not prevent the existence of “a reality break”. Meeting 
CEO counterparts did not supply a sufficient perspective of business on the ground. 
Adding to this lack of connection to the operational level environment was the CEO 
office hearing what the interviewee called “faked out information.” In other words, this 
was information catered for the CEO’s office and, therefore, it was at times deficient for 
judging accurately key dynamics of the business. The existence of this dynamic increases 
the likelihood that the CEO’s office could have been vulnerable to confirmation and other 
related biases (Roxburgh 2003, Lovallo and Sibony 2006, Kahneman and Lovallo et al. 
2011, Heath and Lovallo et al. 2013). The combination of faked information and probable 
cognitive biases would suggest a limiting factor of the scope of feasible strategic options 
being generated. Apparently the Case Company’s first CEO was aware of this situation 
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and its potential detrimental impact on those who remain in the corporate functions for 
too long. This is evidenced by his following advice to the interviewee when he recruited 
him stating that “don’t do this for too long. You have to keep a check on me to not make 
you do this for too long. As much as I want you, I don’t want you to have this ivory tower 
perspective”. 
 
It is not then surprising to hear from the interviewee when asked to think about 
differences in his current role compared with his role in the CEO’s office that he 
identified the biggest difference as the “distance of the decisions from what our 
customer’s want.” This may have been an underlying factor in the ineffective execution 
of TRN customer-centric tactics. Clearly it was a significant factor in the creation of the 
widely held perceived disconnect between priorities of the Corporate HQ and the 
frontlines. As expressed from the interviewee’s perspective when thinking about the 
impact of some strategic decisions made at the top “It was more about yeah ok, we are 
dealing with big things but how many of these decisions are really going to count is 
something that just got lost.” This recurring theme of communication and execution 
failure is further reinforced by his observation that “Everything that we say and do, and 
what actually gets implemented at the front, you know there is a very big gap.” 
Sometimes the explanation for the gap is as simple as an example supplied by the 
interviewee of his own team. When referring to an issue of non-compliance to a CEO 
directive the response from his team was that “They hadn’t seen it”. This is a feasible 
possibility given the lack of slack and other dynamics at play in the company context 
outlined in Project One. In the words of the former Chief of Staff, “I think it is a bit of 
both information overload and not valuing the message from the center”. 
 
The skepticism and limits on trust between the “center” and the frontlines is seen in both 
the deficiency in the reliability of the information provided and in the autonomy cascaded 
through the organization. According to the interviewee, there exists a fairly high level of 
trust in the new strategy. Yet as he sees it “the request from the troops is give us the space 
and the trust that you think we deserve to help you execute that.”  Further, the rationale of 
focusing on “priority markets” (USA, Japan, and Korea) is also understood and accepted 
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as their “combined market access is almost 40% of the entire global telecom market.” 
However, despite the intellectual understanding of this differentiation of priorities, the 
execution has not gone down well outside of the priority markets. This is likely due to 
what is interpreted as a deliberate and parallel reduction in support for those countries 
that are not a “priority”. As summed up by the interviewee “these are the only three 
markets where there are no Chinese. So in a way – ground troops are saying you have 
decided to compete where there are no Chinese but how are you going to support me in 
markets where there are Chinese?” These combined factors outlined above promoting 
focused schemas, confirmation bias and limited trust/autonomy between the center and 
front lines had longer term effects on TRN’s cognitive strategic flexibility and its 
Strategic Leaders. In addition to discouraging diversity in strategic thinking, it also 
created a context of conflict within TRN in regards to espoused corporate values and the 
prevalent leadership style. Two results of these conflicts were the departure of senior 
leaders who could not thrive in this climate and a lasting mindset of not challenging 
upward. The implications of these factors will be revisited in more detail during Project 
Three.  
4.5.3.5 Conclusions 
As indicated above the constructs elicited in the formal grid portion of the interview were 
limited in breadth. However, the open-ended discussion revealed more depth in strategic 
thinking as well as reference to the influences of the wider eco-system. Some of these 
observations were anticipated based on results of Project One. For example, when the 
interviewee spoke of the addressable market and the inability to expand it, the immediate 
strategic response suggested was forward integration. In the telecom sector, this has been 
done largely via Managed Services deals. This type of strategic frame remains very 
focused on the idea of “What part of their job can you do?” This is a rather predictable 
response that all industry players have fallen into. Referring to the start of the Case 
Company the interviewee admits there was not much original thinking done on how to 
compete. As indicated in Project One, the Blue Ocean strategy preliminary construct has 
proven to be challenging to achieve (Kim and Mauborgne 2005). Differentiation also 
remained a central issue as shared by the interviewee in this description “We didn’t take 
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anything different we just said we want to be better than the biggest guy by doing the 
same things.” Further, this inability to differentiate was linked directly to a dependency 
on financial health preliminary construct induced from Project One. While recognizing 
the need to do something different than the “bigger guy” the interviewee’s view was that 
“the differently part, we just can’t tackle because we just don’t have the money and the 
resources. It is just a survival game.” While this latter statement supports the existence of 
a “reserve the right to play” mentality that was noted in Project One, it also demonstrates 
a narrow focus of strategic schema. Granted, having more financial and other resource 
forms is a benefit. Yet having limited resources should not in itself be a complete 
restriction on the generation of feasible strategic options. 
 
More unexpected was the recognition of the compression of the current addressable 
market due to advances in technology. Interestingly the interviewee associated every 
change in technology with further compression. The example provided was the ability of 
fewer and fewer base stations to provide more and more coverage. This “more with less” 
phenomenon is something that the Case Company and wider industry players have not 
been able to monetize successfully. The interviewee also showed considerable foresight 
to what he perceived as “value migration which is driving the sort of negative growth as 
the industry is defined.” Here there is recognition of the impact the wider ecosystem, 
convergence and the increasing impact of Over the Top Players (OTT). These OTTs are 
content providers that capture an increasing amount of the profit pools in the telecom 
ecosystem. The other recognition made by the interviewee is the subtle reference to the 
implication of how one defines the industry. This type of reference is a promising 
contrast to some of the previous limiting constructs. 
 
In considering the wider industry, there was clear evidence that he had been thinking 
strategically about adjacent industries and blue ocean type environments (Kim and 
Mauborgne 2005). For example, one of his models was a triangle with three points 
consisting of communications, entertainment, and transactions. In the middle is what he 
referred to as a unique identity. The idea of identity in various forms has been emerging 
for quite some time. For the interviewee, it could easily be a phone which could replace 
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credit cards and other transaction formats. Using his foresight, he envisioned the 
opportunity to move from the “red ocean” of Communications, avoiding the growing 
competition in entertainment and “grabbing transactions.” However, once again one of 
the primary barriers seemed to be that “Today we cannot afford this”. In addition, when 
questioned about the company’s future there was evidence of thinking beyond the current 
strategy and the recognition that “to survive as a long-term player will need to be very 
different.” Unfortunately, in the mind of the interviewee, this was not seen as highly 
probable. Referring to the current strategic thinking capability of the company his 
response was “Do we have the right mindset for this? No.”  These latter perspectives 
indicate that there may be more potential for cognitive strategic flexibility than the 
current context and dynamics are enabling. It also reveals the concern over the long-term 
sustainability of TRN and its ability to think differently. 
4.5.4 Interviewee Four: Customer Team Head To Global Services 
Strategy Head 
 
4.5.4.1 Process And Descriptive Analysis 
 
The interviewee is a very experienced telecommunication’s employee who had worked in 
a variety of roles within the industry. His current function was within the strategy area of 
one of TRN’s key business units. He, therefore, had a very knowledgeable and 
comprehensive way of discussing the strategic thinking topic. He was confident during 
the interview and largely drew on elements where he had a very strong personal role. 
Although he had also been closely involved in some of the larger strategic decisions, his 
first emphasis was on decisions where he was one of the central players.  
 
The qualifying statements did influence the interviewee’s flow, but the main stimulation 
during the early elicitation was the emotional connection of remembering and connecting 
decisions that had not been top of mind. Once the initial flow started the main thought 
pattern seemed to be chronologically sequential except in the case where through 
recalling one decision, another prior decision came to mind. The interviewee seemed to 
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keep the same level of discrimination about rating the constructs during the whole 
process. The range of scores seemed appropriate across the elements although there were 
a couple of cases where rating was not applicable given the constructs were not relevant 
to the decision. There were also a few elements where the decision was seen as more 
complex and thus harder to rate one-dimensionally on a given construct. These additional 
dimensions were noted by the researcher as part of the formal repertory grid interview 
process and raised again in the open-ended portion to check significance and any 
implications.  From Figure 20 it can be seen that a total of eight constructs were elicited 
with the first three describing issues that were more relevant early in the company’s 
history and mainly about the overall organizational mindset. The remaining five all 
appear to be related to the process of how the decisions were made and/or are subjective 
judgments on the nature of the decisions. The overall composition of constructs appears 
to be a mix of strategic concepts, contextual factors and people/process related topics.  
 
Figure 20: Interview Four Repertory Grid 
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5.5.4.2 Construct Characterization 
 
Core Versus Peripheral Constructs 
 
Four of the eight constructs appear to have been Core (Competitive Pressure versus 
Capabilities based, Structured Decision versus Decision by slideware (salesmanship) 
Timely versus Untimely and What type of Company we are versus Market Share). These 
four appear to be linked to the personal and professional value attributed to “how 
strategic decisions” should be made and also their fundamental implications for the 
capabilities of the company and its competitiveness. There may also be a link between 
the perceived timeliness of decisions, amount of structure and debate. Given the 
interviewee’s role in the strategy function, the depth of thought behind the constructs 
seems appropriate. 
 
The first impressions from the eye-ball analysis of this repertory grid is that the 
interviewee projects and provides a high level of knowledge in the area of strategy which 
clearly came across in his discussion of the ratings of the elements. His choice of 
elements appears to be largely product based decisions or Merger and Acquisition related. 
On the surface, this appears to be focused on growth issues but in all these examples the 
interviewee held a balancing perspective of capabilities and their implications for the 
organization and the environment within which it competes. As mentioned above his 
constructs are about choice intent, process, and subjective value judgment. He also was 
highly aware throughout all the elements of the political landscape underlying the 
decisions. 
168 
 
4.5.4.3 Relationships Within The Grid: Dendrogram Cluster Analysis  
 
4.5.4.3.1 Dendrogram Elements Analysis 3 
The process of cluster analysis resulted in a reorganization of several of the elements. 
Based on the statistical correlations, the cluster analysis process of following adjacent 
lines until they meet a common apex and the content of the elements there are two main 
clusters in the element portion of Figure 21: 
1) Focus on MBB and Services Focus 2011  
2) Go-ahead for MS 2003, Hosting go-ahead 2005, Motorola Acquisition, 3-UK 
Outsourcing deal and TRN M.S. Scope 2006-2007 
Within the second cluster there are 2 sub-clusters i) Go-ahead for MS 2003, Hosting 
go-ahead 2005 and ii) Motorola Acquisition, 3-UK Outsourcing deal 2005 
 
 
Figure 21: Dendrogram Diagram from Interview Four 
                                                 
3 The mean of responses measuring the construct was assigned by the Repertory Grid Interview Software 
for element answers of  “not applicable” as recommended by Sekaran (2009) 
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It can be observed in Figure 21 that that the interviewee seems to have divided the 
elements into two major groups. The first group relates to decisions about product 
category (portfolio) prioritization. The second and broader group relates to decisions on 
specific product or service cases. In the first category, the main underlying theme seems 
to be about the company’s internal capabilities with an internal focus. These decisions are 
both perceived as fairly straightforward perhaps due to their being high levels of 
constraint upon them. However, there is a wide variance in the timeliness of the two 
decisions. This perspective may be due partially from the interviewee’s long experience 
in the strategy function and thus, his seeing the “how” part of these decisions (once made) 
as familiar and routine. The second group of decisions relates to more market oriented 
options. These are all consistently seen as portfolio expansion/market share efforts in 
response to competitive pressure. However, there is a much wider diversity in the ratings 
of the remaining constructs especially on the level of debate involved. It may be that this 
diversity and higher levels of debate are related to the much greater level of free choice in 
this category overall. The other interesting dimension is that the interviewee perceives 
this category as being much more inconsistent on structured decisions versus “decisions 
by slideware”.  This could be due to the different stakeholder groups involved in the two 
decision group categories. In fact, it is this dimension that is the main difference in 
separating the two sub-clusters in this category.  
 
Cluster one is rated very similarly across all constructs except for the “Timely/Untimely” 
dimension. This is likely due to the size and scope of the two elements. Both had internal 
implications regarding capabilities. Yet given the size and down-sizing implications of 
executing focus on MBB, it differs on timeliness. As evidenced in other interviews, 
making tough decisions in a timely way had proven difficult for TRN.  Cluster two has 
quite similar ratings also within its two sub-groups. However on the dimension of High 
level of debate and compromise versus Straight forward there is a wider range in 
subgroup ii) and also for this larger cluster overall. The range here is primarily due to the 
Motorola acquisition having little debate and being perceived as relatively 
straightforward. By contrast, all four of the other element decisions involve forward 
integration in one form or another. As noted earlier this paradigm was pervasive in TRN. 
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The high level of debate was linked to the profitable growth dilemma since forward 
integration tended to increase top line while often reducing bottom line results in the 
short run and frequently overall. By comparison, acquisition is consistent with the 
inevitability of the industry consolidation strategic frame and is, therefore, less 
susceptible to debate. 
 
The highest match rating is 81.2% between elements in cluster two (Go-ahead for MS 
2003, Hosting go-ahead 2005, Motorola Acquisition, 3-UK Outsourcing deal). The 
second highest match is 77% between Focus on MBB and Services Focus 2011. It would 
appear that there is more similarity in decisions that involve major internal implications 
versus those that are about specific cases within portfolios. It should be noted that the size 
of decisions were quite different in their implications and impact. The only other 
relatively high matching (77%) is the TRN M.S. Scope 2006-2007 within the second 
cluster. This is a decision that is not about either decision groups but rather the scope of a 
portfolio category. In this sense, it should relate more to the internal capabilities 
dimension. However, it is grouped amongst specific cases within a portfolio. One could 
speculate given the dates of the related decisions that customer facing demands and 
opportunities forced more thinking about how far the company would go within the 
Managed Services area. This is consistent with the high rating this element and category 
have received on competitive pressure and customer mindshare.  
4.5.4.3.2 Dendrogram Constructs Analysis  
 
During the construct cluster analysis, there was some shifting of constructs from the 
correlation process. This resulted in the reversal of poles for two constructs. As can be 
observed in the construct tree portion of Figure 21 there are two main branches: 
 
1) Timely/Untimely and Constrained (limited choice)/Free Choice  
2) Capabilities based/Competitive Pressure, Internal Focus/Customer Mindshare, What 
type of company we are/Market Share, and Portfolio focus/Portfolio expansion 
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The first branch suggests a fairly obvious possible connection between the degree of 
freedom of choice and the speed or timeliness of decisions.  The second branch includes 
more constructs (four in total) and is more complex. However, the constructs can all be 
grouped on one side as being internal focused or on the other side more external 
environment focused. This suggests that the interviewee has divided these two areas as 
key dimensions in strategic decisions. 
 
For branch one there seems to be fairly close ratings on almost all the elements with the 
exception of the Hosting go-ahead 2005 and Focus on MBB. When reviewing the range 
of ratings of these two constructs there does not appear to be a direct and consistent 
relationship between the degree of free choice and the timeliness of the decision. Yet 
there does seem to be a significant amount of untimely decisions with a trend of untimely 
dimension relating to the size of the impact of the decision. This theme will be revisited 
in Project Three, but as mentioned above, evidence suggests that TRN struggled to 
proactively make big impact decisions. In the second branch, the ratings of the four 
constructs within the branch are very consistent across almost all elements. The construct 
that seems to be less aligned is the Capabilities based/Competitive Pressure construct. 
This suggests that there is a logical distinction being made between constructs that are 
more customer related (Market Share, Customer Mindshare, and Portfolio) versus 
competitive constructs such as capabilities and competitive pressure. 
The highest percentage similarity score is 94.4% between the “Internal Focus/Customer 
Mindshare” and the “Competitive Pressure/Capabilities based” constructs. This is a 
subset of the second branch identified above. The interesting aspect of these two 
constructs seems to be a clear distinction on focusing internally to deal with competitors 
or customers. The second distinctive pairing of this cluster is 75% and is between the 
“What type of company we are/Market Share” and the “Portfolio focus/Portfolio 
expansion” constructs. The small distinction in this pairing is that a relationship can be 
drawn between the company portfolio and its impact on “the type of Company” that is 
formed on one pole. On the other pole, there is a clear relationship between a company’s 
portfolio expansion and its market share. 
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The overall impression is that the constructs seem to be grouped around three areas. The 
first grouping that has the lowest relationship is in regards to the process of the decisions. 
There does not seem to be a consistent relationship between the degree of structure and 
how straight forward decisions were. There may be an unshared perspective about how 
straightforward a decision was and whether the “straightforwardness” was something that 
occurred after the decision was made. There also does not seem to be a direct link 
between structure and the level of debate. The second grouping appears to be related to a 
subjective perception of pressure and timing of decisions. Again there is not a consistent 
relationship in the ratings for these across the elements. One might expect that the 
Competitive Pressure/Capabilities based construct could fit under this dimension because 
of the relationship competition might have on free choice and pressure. However, this 
construct is grouped under the final category which as mentioned above seems more 
about an internal versus external dimension of the decisions. When reviewing the ratings 
of the elements on these three constructs one can conclude that there has been a balance 
of focus between an “inside/outside” orientations.  This indicates that the interviewee had 
a well-developed understanding of the trade-offs of creating sources of competitive 
advantage internally and strategic positioning pressure. 
   
4.5.4.4 Observations From Open-ended Interview Discussion: “Timing 
is everything” 
 
During the open-ended portion of the interview, the theme of the timing of strategic 
decisions surfaced in relation to a number of elements. One of the most painful and costly 
was in terms of a perceived lost opportunity with the failed acquisition attempt of Nortel.  
Competitor E’s ability to have deeper pockets and quicker execution likely has reinforced 
the Case Company mindset of the link between the preliminary construct of financial 
health and resources for action and limitations in strategic options. In this instance, the 
timing of the acquisition allowed the acquirer more opportunity to cash in on the assets 
and establish market share in one of the most critical regions. By comparison, the later 
acquisition of Motorola by the Case Company was almost a consolation and was far less 
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timely, speedy and attractive. In the mind of the interviewee, it appeared to be almost a 
“face-saving” move based to a large extent on public relations motivations over hard 
analysis and valuation. In his words, it was a “Decision by slideware” in which 
assessment was sometimes processed with the underlying approach that it “must be good 
because it says so in the slides”. It may be speculated that “decision by slideware is easier 
when the decision is consistent with the dominant logic of the industry (Prahalad and 
Bettis 1986). Being too late or at minimum not timely was also referenced when 
contemplating what the interviewee might do if he was CEO. Reflecting on the insights 
and recommendations made by Private Equity firms during 2011 and 2012 he confirmed 
that the current strategy is addressing all the key points (portfolio mix, overhead and 
focused growth in key markets). However his open question regarding what “if we had 
already done this in 2008” suggests that the possibility for action was there but that the 
opportunity was missed. At the same time there was also the recognition that in 2008 
“some customers did not believe we would survive” and “so from that perspective, we 
needed to move in areas where we can get market presence and grow fast. Get quick wins 
and that involved managed services.” With this external questioning of survival viability, 
one might expect faster decision making however this was not always the case as 
evidenced by the interviewee’s comment that “we discussed the go ahead with Managed 
Services for two years.” This observation is consistent with the findings of Kiesler and 
Sproull’s (1982) research that supports the idea that firm’s lack flexibility when they 
most need it.   
 
The topic of priority markets also arose in relation to both the Case Company viability 
pressure and the need for market share. This latter aspect is bound to the “need for scale” 
as a source of competitive advantage preliminary construct but is also indicative of the 
impact the “Chinese factor” has had on the competitive landscape. As expressed by the 
interviewee “there was business to be captured, margins to be captured, it was more about 
increasing our market share in the US and Japan which from a global perspective, it still 
has potential and is absolutely the reason why we are still here.” Significantly these are 
exactly the “markets where Chinese Company H and Chinese Company Z are not present, 
where in practice everyone is earning higher than average margins.” This recognition of 
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the negative impact of the two Chinese competitors on profitability provides evidence 
that the strategic differentiation of markets has conceptually changed several times during 
the short history of the company’s existence.  The interviewee seemed to be aware of this 
transitory nature of classifications and demonstrated foresight in his concern over 
whether the margins in the current priority markets would dilute over time. In addition, 
when considering the future, there remained the conceptual differentiation between 
competing in “mature markets and developing markets.” To the interviewee, this was also 
impacted by two factors. The first was the “consolidation of CSP’s” (Communication 
Service Providers) with associated market power factors. The second was from the 
implications on products due to technology usage.  The main issue was the challenge of 
predicting the life span and demand for products related to competing systems and levels 
of evolution through 2G, 3G, 4G, LTE and whether 5G would or would not materialize.  
 
In many of the interviewee’s comments there seemed to be a consistent philosophical 
basis from which to launch his strategic thinking. When considering elements and in the 
open discussion, expressions such as it “Starts very much from the technology and 
product perspective” were frequently used.  In referring to discussions at the time of the 
creation of the merged company the interviewee expressed some concern about “how 
much we talked about capabilities” versus organizational values. When combining these 
types of comments one might conclude that he was only internally focused and more 
grounded in the Resource-Based View of the Firm. However, he also conveyed many 
strategic options and building the business in the context of “how we want to be 
perceived in the marketplace. What kind of mindshare do we want to get from our 
customers?” Therefore, this internal capabilities perspective was balanced with what 
might be called a market positioning view that was concerned with “How we monetize 
the enablization of our CSPs.” Given this diversity of perspectives, one might expect that 
the interviewee was capable of a high level of cognitive strategic flexibility. 
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4.5.4.5 Conclusions 
 
The interviewee demonstrated that he was very knowledgeable about the industry and 
strategy both conceptually and at the practical operational level. His constructs range 
from strategic concepts to contextual factors to people and processes. Overall he seemed 
to have a high awareness of the political landscape and dynamics which was developed 
perhaps through his extensive experience in crafting and implementing strategy.  
Although he seemed to reveal a preference for formal planning and structured decision 
processes he admitted that “Being wise can involve knowing that things don’t always 
work out  as you have planned, and things can get worse before they get better”. 
Interestingly when discussing the unpredictability of the landscape he openly admitted 
the limits of strategic foresight, “In our business case sometimes we did not consider all 
the possibilities, things went in a different direction than we thought. Or we did not have 
any other choice, and we did not talk about those other choices.” This latter dynamic has 
relevant implication for both the level of cognitive strategic flexibility of the individuals 
involved and the Case Company culture for making strategic decisions. When probed for 
views on the company’s strategic mindset the interviewee expressed faith in its 
capabilities stating “I think we have creative thinkers, yes. Yet in the same breath, he 
counters this by the contradictory phenomenon that “We are using consultants – lots of 
them.” This implies that the senior management of TRN is not leveraging what strategic 
thinking capabilities exist internally. This factor will be a recurring theme in Project 
Three and significantly impact the proposed and implemented interventions of this 
research including not buying off the shelf solutions to strengthen the senior leadership 
pipeline. 
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4.5.5 Interviewee Five: Region Head For South West Europe To Region 
Head For North East Europe 
 
4.5.5.1 Process And Descriptive Analysis 
The interviewee was a long-term telecommunication industry employee with experience 
primarily on the front lines. He had held positions where he was in charge of regions or 
markets and thus his elements combine both customer related themes and structural 
topics. The interviewee seemed to be quite reflective during the rating process and took it 
seriously. As with some of the other interviewees, there were several moments when new 
insights were elicited due to the interviewee’s thinking about them from a new or fresh 
perspective. He was very passionate about the overall topic and the implications they had 
for the company. He clearly felt strongly about the “right and wrong” of some of the 
ways the decisions had been carried out. Overall the qualifying statements were used 
when there were pauses in construct elicitation. However, the interviewee was very 
enthusiastic and stimulated so this did not occur very often. Given that the interviewee’s 
roles have been mainly on the front lines it was not surprising that several of the elements 
were directly related to client decisions.  
In Figure 22 it can be seen that a total of nine constructs were elicited. Some of the 
constructs relate to typical competitive strategy questions such as positioning, structure, 
scope of activities, and degree of control. Others are more philosophical in the sense that 
they relate to the ethics or quality of the decisions. Finally, there are constructs that relate 
to attitude or mindset on a personal level. Overall the constructs are quite diverse in their 
range. The interviewee mainly provided elements that were either customer or region 
related which was consistent with the roles held during the past 15 years. The ratings of 
the elements are mainly quite polarized in that they appear to be largely to one pole or the 
other with very few instances of neutral scores. The only exception is the “Smart 
Growth” element. This suggests that the interviewee tends to perceive most decision 
events quite unambiguously in relation to his constructs. 
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Figure 22: Interview Four Repertory Grid 
 
4.5.5.2 Construct Characterization 
 
Core Versus Peripheral Constructs 
 
Three of the nine constructs strongly appear to have been Core (True Strategic 
Value/Value destruction, Principled decisions/Choice amongst options and Personally 
engaging/Outside control with huge impact). In addition, during the course of the open-
ended portion of the interview, it was clear that the interviewee had strong views on the 
appropriateness of some decisions and their implementation. Further, it became apparent 
to the researcher that the construct Principled decisions/Choice amongst options was 
likely the one that had the highest emotional significance for the interviewee. The overall 
categorization of the constructs shows a wider variety in the type of constructs used when 
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compared with the other interviewees. The key distinction being the “strength” with 
which the core constructs were felt. 
 
4.5.5.3 Relationships Within the Grid: Dendrogram Cluster Analysis  
 
4.5.5.3.1 Dendrogram Elements Analysis 
 
The process of cluster analysis resulted in a reorganization of several of the elements. 
Based on the statistical correlations, the cluster analysis process of following adjacent 
lines until they meet a common apex and the content of the elements there are two main 
clusters in the element portion of Figure 23 with two sub-clusters inside a larger cluster: 
1) US Market Acquisition Choice and Partner decision for TRN  
2) Wireless Access Transformation stands alone 
i) Design Decision for TRN Merger and Splitting West South Europe forms one sub-
cluster 
ii) while DT Turnaround and Smart Growth forms the other sub-cluster  
 
 
Figure 23: Dendrogram Diagram From Interview Five 
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In the elements portion of the Dendrogram in Figure 23, it can be seen that cluster one is 
rated very similarly across all constructs with five of the nine constructs receiving the 
same score and the remainder having only one point difference. The close correlation is 
likely due to the fact that both elements involve partnering choices which involved 
considerable integration. Both were seen positively by the interviewee in the sense that 
they were personally engaging and judged as achieving True Strategic Value. They were 
also perceived as “moving forward” in positioning the company but executed in a rather 
tough demeanor. The second overall cluster seems to be aligned quite closely, but this is 
primarily on four constructs. These are Interactive/external control, Structure & Focus, 
Partnering and Decision of free will. Combined they indicate a theme around elements 
that were chosen with a high degree of free will to work with the external environment 
either in formal partnerships or looser alliances to define the focus and structure of the 
company. The key difference amongst this cluster is in regards to the amount of 
engagement the interviewee had with them based on the amount of control he was able to 
exercise. 
 
From Figure 23 it appears that this executive has divided the elicited strategic decisions 
into a few categories. The first is more strategically routine in that it considers decisions 
based on the focus of activity. That is, whether they are about “what we do” internally 
versus how we interact externally and for what purpose. A second dimension involves 
constraints on the decisions. These are either the relative freedom due to pressure from 
outside forces (Forced) or internal philosophical (Principled). Alternatively, similarly 
whether there was a perceived range of options extant. In the case of principled decisions, 
there is clearly a sense of subjective expectation that these are preferred although 
throughout the interview there was also a sense of pragmatism and real-world 
understanding that this is not always possible. A third category was very much on the 
level of subjective value or perspective. These elements were seen through the eyes of 
whether they were positive or negative. This was expressed by “moving forward” or “true 
strategic value” as opposed to terms that bring to mind retreat and significant loss.  The 
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final category is more related to emotional aspects through the level of engagement or 
degree of toughness expressed in the process.  
 
In cluster two, the first subclusters ratings are very highly correlated with two identical 
ratings and the remainder only having one point difference. The two elements entail 
similar actions as they both involve organizational design and choices about how 
resources will be reallocated. The primary difference is the relative scale of the actions 
and that the “TRN Merger” was initially involving an external partner. However it is seen 
by the interviewee very much as an action done “on own.” The second sub-cluster 
actually has more exact matches in the ratings (five in total) but an overall lower 
similarity score. Both elements are related to customer facing decisions and the level of 
engagement, products and share of wallet the company was trying to achieve. They were 
therefore also about how the company positions itself in the market place and in relation 
to customers. The main differences were on the degree of control/engagement as one 
decision was directly in the interviewee’s realm while the other was company-wide and 
although it had major impact it was not something in which he was directly involved in 
deciding. Another interesting aspect is that “Smart Growth” was scored “N/A” for the 
“Principled/Choice amongst option’s construct. Based on comments made during the 
broader dialogue of the interview, this perspective may be due to the interviewee’s 
feeling that this was more of a political decision or one based on a key stakeholder’s own 
background and preference.  
 
The highest matching score is 88.9% for US Market Acquisition Choice and Partner 
decision for TRN Merger.  The second matching cluster has a matching score of 70% but 
as noted above there are two sub-clusters in this larger grouping.  Sub-cluster i) has a 
matching score of 80.6% while sub-cluster ii) has a matching score of 73%. 
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4.5.5.3.2 Dendrogram Constructs Analysis 
 
During the construct cluster analysis, there was some shifting of constructs from the 
correlation process. This resulted in the reversal of poles for three constructs (Forced 
decision/Decision of free will, Exit execution (getting out) /Strategic position & 
Execution (moving forward) and True Strategic value/Value Destruction. There are two 
main branches with one branch having three sub-branches:  
 
1) The first branch contains Amicable/Tough (we mean business) and Choice amongst 
options/Principled decisions. 
2)  The second branch contains all of the remaining elements excluding Personally 
engaging/Outside of control with huge impact. The first sub-branch is made up of: 
a.  i) Partnering/On own and Interactive/external control/Internal control. 
The second sub-branch is made up of: 
b.  ii) How we position ourselves/Structure & focus and Forced 
Decision/Decision of free will. The third sub-branch includes 
c.  iii) Exit execution (getting out)/Strategic position & Execution (moving 
forward).  
In general, the percentage of similarities is not high for the branches or sub-branches.  
This suggests that the interviewee has given a wide range of scores across the elements 
with only one branch having a higher percentage of similarity score. For branch one there 
are four elements given identical ratings with the remainder having only one-point 
differences. These four elements appear to be seen as “we mean business” decisions of 
which a range of options were available. All seem to involve some degree of interaction 
or negotiation with an external constituent either directly or by implication. The second 
branch did not have a high similarity percentage score and given it has six constructs; 
there is considerable diversity in score amongst most of the elements. From and eye-ball 
analysis perspective one can see the grouping of related elements as decisions where 
most, if not all of the decision was “on own.” For sub-branch one i) there are only two 
elements which match exactly for these two constructs. These are Design decision for 
TRN Merger and Splitting West South Europe. Given the two constructs have at one pole 
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“on own” and “internal control” it is not surprising that these similar internal structural 
issues were rated much the same. For sub-branch two ii) there are five direct element 
scoring matches despite the overall similarity score being relatively lower. For sub-
branch three iii) there is the highest percentage match between constructs. Six of the eight 
elements received the exact same scoring on these two constructs, primarily at one or the 
other end of the poles. This suggests that the interviewee perceives elements to be either 
“black or white” on these dimensions. The highest percentage similarity score is 90.6 % 
between “Strategic position & Execution (moving forward) and/Exit execution (getting 
out) and “True Strategic value/Value destruction” constructs. The remaining branch and 
sub-branches all have similarity % scores in the range of 78%-79%. 
 
The first impressions from reviewing these relationships are that the interviewee 
demonstrates a relatively wider range of ratings of the constructs across the elements in 
comparison to the other interviewees. This suggests that he thinks deeply and with 
complexity about strategic decision making. However given his rather black and white 
approach around strategic value and moving forward, there may be an orientation to 
categorize strategic decisions on these two constructs for “go” or “no-go” criteria. Or at 
minimum, a preference for decisions that are made for the “towards state” decisions 
(rather than exiting and minimizing damage or value destruction).  
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4.5.5.3.4 Observations from Open-ended Interview Discussion:  “They 
were using the same words but with entirely different mindsets.”  
 
The open-ended section of the interview revealed some new underlying facets of the 
organizational mindset as well as for the interviewee.  From the organizational level, two 
strategic dimensions were of central importance from the outlook of this executive. The 
first and most deeply underlying factor was the difference in the two parent company 
perspectives regarding “philosophy and business philosophy”.  This divergence came in 
areas related to making hard decisions, big bets, the degree of strategic focus and 
strategic horizons. For example, in the case of Parent Company T it “was able to take 
tough choices you know before they were absolutely necessary and who had a history of 
going very far, sometimes too far.” As the “wonder child of the industry” they had been 
able to achieve major turnarounds and “when they hit a goal they had it all right and were 
never half pregnant”. By contrast, from the interviewee perspective Parent Company R 
had a more balanced and “basically a tradesmen view on this. If you can make money, 
make money.” This more “emergent” style was more risk adverse and less strategically 
focused, but it also meant that you would not “make dents in the universe.” On the other 
hand Parent Company R’s less decisive mindset did not result in situations as it did in 
Parent Company T where according to the executive “if they screwed up, they screwed 
up big time “. In the mind of this interviewee, the Parent Company R’s approach was 
more sustainable in the long run yet limited or delayed the ability to make timely tough 
choices in the short run. While this dimension was referenced in the other interviews, it 
was made more explicit and detailed by this interviewee. 
 
In speaking about some of the hard choices such as downsizing or portfolio choices, it 
was clear to the interviewee that when the two parent companies entered the merger, 
“they were using the same words but with entirely different mindsets.”  This revelation 
was reinforced while talking with a CEO of one of his Parent R company suppliers. 
When referring to terms such as “transformation” or “revolution” the CEO commented 
that “When you talk about revolution it is just too massive, we do not have a word for it. 
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We would never do that.” According to the interviewee this miscommunication on a 
conceptual level not only impacted TRN at its birth but continued to do so until the 2013 
buy-back of full ownership by Parent Company T. The degree of divergence was 
expressed in this interviewee’s highly descriptive imagery of the current state “If you are 
sitting there and you agree that this is a merger that actually you know is a perfect match 
because you want a revolution and we want a revolution. You mean entirely different 
things. Fine when I say revolution I’m actually going to shift places I mean I’m going to 
move some chairs around…and the other ones means I’m going to tear down the building, 
I’m actually going to tear down the building. We’re going to start afresh. I don’t think the 
owners have the same view”. 
 
The second organizational mindset dimension that arose was regarding the ability to truly 
exploit the strategic choices it makes and respond with strategic flexibility. A primary 
example provided by the interviewee was the current focus on “priority or strategic 
markets”. While this classification was seen to be in line with the classic strategic 
principle of defining where you will and will not go, the lack of consistency in 
application had hurt the company. In the interviewee’s words “It’s one of those wobbly 
things right because we had strategic markets for quite a while and then all of the sudden 
they were different”. It may be that this dynamic was one of the underlying factors that 
influenced the ambiguity in market definitions discovered during the Exploratory Focus 
Group and the preliminary market development construct. In the interviewee view the 
pain and expense that each organizational restructure had brought was a high price to pay. 
Alternatively, one might interpret these changes as an organization being able to 
recognize its mistakes with the courage and flexibility to pull out rather than pursue 
losing causes (Shimizu and Hitt 2004). Nevertheless, the executive revealed additional 
consequences and implications from how this choice of strategic focus had been 
executed. 
 
Firstly, he asserted that the diverted resources and attention reduced non-priority market’s 
ability to deliver on their commitments. In practice, this came in the form of reduced 
support in areas such as R&D and customer relationships. The lack of R&D meant that 
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there was “nothing new” to offer while on the sales side there was no show of executive 
presence indicating the importance of the customer relationships. In the words of the 
executive, “I’m empowered to do whatever I want. But don’t disturb. Don’t ask us for 
help. Stay away because you are not in strategic focus”. Given the long lead time of 
contracts (1-5 years) and the time needed to build customer relationships; the ability to 
choose the “correct” focus for investment decisions is crucial in the telecom 
infrastructure business. It was clear from the interview that this executive held but openly 
recognized his own personal interest and biases from the strategic focus at the time of the 
interview. What made the situation more deeply felt was his perspective “that we have 
decided to take away part of the focus and not necessarily put it somewhere else.”  In his 
view, it was difficult but not impossible to accept the implication of being out of focus. 
Yet it was even more “maddening because I think that you are spending your time getting 
ready and you weren’t. You know don’t spend the time wandering around pondering 
what you should do now.” This frustration comes partially from the interviewee’s 
disappointment in the opportunity cost spent ineffectively. Yet it is perhaps also related to 
his own preference for making decisive strategic decisions as is revealed by his comment 
regarding the current situation; “don’t make exactly the same mistake as we always do, 
and don’t be half pregnant.” This perception of indecisiveness or lack of full commitment 
also relates directly to the firm’s capability to respond flexibly. This is illustrated by the 
interviewee’s description of how the company positions its resources for exploiting 
emerging opportunities: “Yes you need to change your way of thinking and saying I put 
money here and actually invest in being ready. I now I have not won the deal yet. But 
that’s not in our DNA. Our DNA is, win the deal and I’ll have a look at it. Don’t put a 
single dime because we don’t know if we have the deal yet.” This relatively risk-averse 
approach has its benefits in reducing explicit downside cost. However in the telecom 
infrastructure business, it limits the speed of execution, expansion, and up selling. These 
latter factors are all critical for retaining customers and pre-empting or switching out 
competitors. These comments also highlight the impact of at least two preliminary 
constructs. First, the risk-averse reaction of non-commitment of resources is linked to the 
financial health and resources for action construct.  The strategic flexibility that is needed 
to exploit the majority of these opportunities is not achieved conceptually or in capability. 
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Secondly, the preliminary construct of uncertainty and complexity expressed by the 
inaugural CEO as “facing an uncertain world and industry” also appears to have impacted 
decisiveness and follow through commitment. When this is combined with the 
divergence of the two parent companies in regards to risk, it is not surprising to see limits 
on strategic flexibility in TRN. 
 
Aspects of the organizational mindset have likely impacted this executive’s view as well. 
For example, when discussing “what is possible,” the interviewee referenced the “very 
bad experience around this Nortel thing.” This failed acquisition may have reinforced the 
construct that strategic options are very limited by financial resources. In the Nortel 
example, the impact may have been deep given “we went out and talked about it and then 
it didn’t happen”. On the one hand, having the market leader use its superior financial 
resources to take the deal away at the last minute is demoralizing while on the other hand 
it provides a very real and salient reference of when lack of money becomes highly 
limiting in strategic options.  
 
Related to this thread of thought was a reflection by the interviewee that he found very 
engaging and new. Namely, the impact and trade-off of external forces on ones’ ability to 
make “principled decisions”.  In considering whether some decisions were about Value 
destruction or True Strategic value, new thoughts about the real motivation of decisions 
arose.  He began to question the decisiveness of some strategic decisions in terms of 
whether they were about protecting oneself or “moving forward to a place where you 
want to be?” In the words of the executive, “Are you in going to Nirvana or just getting 
out of hell?”  
 
Amongst the factors that came to play for the interviewee was whether you are taking 
“principled action”, “choice amongst options” or “forced decisions”.  Underlying this 
train of thought was the question of ethics and the ability to “stand tall” and “when to 
take principled action”? In the view of the executive all three of the above factors can be 
at play at the same time. His conclusion after some contemplation was that “I think you 
can make principled decisions without having your back to the wall”. In reconsidering 
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some of his strategic decisions, he noted the potential dilemma and pressures that the 
decision maker can face. He also hinted at the potential impact of maturity on decision 
makers by stating that increasingly “you get to a stage where your decisions become 
founded on your fundamental principles.”  
 
From the executive’s point of view, making principled decisions did not exclude the need 
for in-depth analysis.  He did share examples of strategic decisions where he took “three 
months analyzing and figuring out how to do it, building the strategy saying this is how 
we would do it. This is how we would execute this.” As was expressed in other 
interviewee results, factors at play are not either-or propositions. Rather as this interview 
demonstrates, there are multiple internal and external influences coming to bear on 
TRN’s strategic thinking. 
 
4.5.5.5 Conclusions 
As noted above the interviewee demonstrates the capability to think broadly and deeply 
about strategic issues. His 15 years of frontline and execution experience give him a very 
pragmatic perspective. Yet it also reveals his association of strategic decisions with their 
impact on the cost of building and maintaining customer relationships. Ethics and 
principles are also a major factor driving this executive’s strategic frames. This strong 
“right or wrong” orientation is reflected directly in some of his elicited constructs as well 
as in the comments expressed during the open-ended portion of the interview. Evidence 
from the grid supports the idea that the interviewee perceives strategic decision making 
as more serious and “tough business” oriented when his principles are involved.  
 
4.6 Conclusion and Next Steps  
 
The process of analyzing relationships within each of the individual grids revealed and 
confirmed the extant of several constructs and themes induced in Project One. 
Additionally new constructs and factors were uncovered through the repertory grid 
interview analysis related to how the individual executives think strategically and the 
factors influencing their potential to do so. However to gain further insight into the 
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overall combined strategic flexibility potential of the individuals and the factors at play in 
the case company organization a cross-grid analysis was necessary. This was achieved in 
Project Three by aggregating both the constructs and elements for the purpose of content 
analysis. To ensure temporal relevance and add source and method validity for both the 
research’s recommendations and interventions additional data collection was conducted. 
The results provided a basis for the creation of an empirically induced framework for 
diagnosing and implementing an extensive change initiative in TRN. 
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5.0 Introduction 
 
Project Two revealed rich and deep data regarding the strategic constructs of five key 
senior executives within the Case Company. To gain a more comprehensive and 
aggregated understanding of the case company’s potential for strategic flexibility, a 
cross-interview analysis was needed. As noted by Reger and Palmer (1996) “Qualitative 
analysis of the content of dimensions generated from repertory grid interviews is 
especially well-suited for comparing mental models across individuals.” Further, the 
intention of this type of analysis is to develop categories and themes into a framework or 
model. This objective was met in the iSCOPE Framework outlined at the end of the 
chapter. In addition, as the company continued to evolve over the duration of this 
research, checking the alignment of the elicited constructs with the current company 
strategic frames and context was essential. Therefore further data collection was 
conducted that provided temporal, thematic and conceptual validity. This was particularly 
relevant for the contribution to practice objectives of this research and for supporting the 
findings induced by the researcher.  
  
5.1 Specific Purpose For Project Three  
 
Project Three was designed to reveal further meaning through analysis of the combined 
repertory grids. This was done through the process of content analysis. To provide 
additional respondent validity, the content analysis was shared with the five executive 
interviewees from Project Two and the Central Senior Executive from Project Three. In 
addition, to provide more current data a survey and workshop with senior executives was 
conducted and company archives from the Project Three research time period were 
reviewed. This survey and workshop provided increased reliability regarding the research 
conclusions and temporal relevance of the findings (Maxwell 1992). The results of the 
three combined projects have been used to guide recommendations aimed at TRN’s 
individual Strategic Leaders and TRN as a whole. This has involved the redesign of 
TRN’s Leadership Framework supporting mechanisms and using this research as input to 
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the Cultural Renewal Project Initiative, taking into consideration both the current and 
future TRN need for cognitive strategic flexibility. The outline of Project Three can be 
seen in Figure 24. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Project Three Research Timeline And Data Collection Methods 
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5.2 Data Sources And Recording Methods 
 
As mentioned in Project One, according to Eisenhardt (1989a) and Creswell (2009) case 
studies usually combine data collection methods. Consistent with this principle the 
following sources and methods have been used in Project Three: 
 
- Cross- Repertory Grid Analysis 
- Central Senior Executive Reliability Interview    
- Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Survey  
- Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Workshop 
 
The objective of these combined methods was fivefold:  
 
1) Gain further insight into the factors impacting the strategic context of TRN. 
2) Obtain a deeper understanding of the strategic constructs extant in the senior 
leaders of TRN and their implications. 
3) Provide additional reliability of the temporal relevance of the research findings. 
4) Ensure that a high level of methods triangulation and validity was achieved. 
5) Gain empirical evidence and insights to support the specific design of the TRN 
intervention. 
  
5.2.1 Cross- Repertory Grid Analysis  
 
For the purpose of gaining additional insight into the overall themes and patterns of the 
strategic constructs of the senior executives interviewed by repertory grid methodology, 
content analysis was conducted.  According to Jankowicz (2004), “Content analysis is a 
technique in which the constructs of all the interviewees are pooled, and categorized 
according to the meaning they express”. To achieve this categorization the inductive 
methodology of “bootstrapping” was used in which themes were developed on the fly 
(Neuendorf, 2002). Consistent with the general inductive approach for analysis, building 
theories from the case method and grounded theory the researcher was influenced by the 
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relevant literature and the embedded nature of the case researcher within the case 
company (Eisenhardt 1989a, Yin 1994, Thomas 2006). The unit of analysis used for the 
bootstrapping was individual constructs and individual elements.  
 
5.2.2 Central Senior Executive Reliability Interview    
 
As the title for the interview suggests, a 2-hour deep dive was arranged for the purpose of 
gaining additional triangulation regarding both the reliability of the research results from 
Project One and Two as well as their temporal relevance. This confirmability check not 
only reinforced the validity of the findings, it also provided additional insights into the 
strategic and cultural factors of TRN. To effectively achieve these goals a senior 
executive was selected that met the criteria of having 1) breadth of experience from front 
lines to central functions 2) pre-merger to current state tenure and 3) key roles in the main 
strategic decisions of the company. The executive chosen met all these criteria due to his 
sequential roles as a Region Head, Head of Motorola Acquisition, and Head of the 
Restructuring Project. These positions exposed him to the entire Executive Board 
membership, the Chairman of the Board and Board of Directors (BOD) dynamics. It also 
gave him direct involvement with the strategic thinking and decision-making of the 
company. The interview was conducted at a casual location (coffee shop) close to the 
global headquarters of TRN.  
    
5.2.3 Strategic Thinking Survey 
 
A survey of 20 senior strategic leaders who had not previously been involved in the data 
collection was undertaken via email prior to the Strategic Thinking Workshop. As 
advocated by Patton (1990) the 20 senior leaders were purposely selected based on their 
organizational positions and their geographic diversity. An effort was made to select 
leaders who have significant strategic responsibility and represent a cross-section of the 
business functions of the company. The purpose of this survey was 1) to gain an 
additional and wider set of data as input to the reliability of the research findings 2) gain 
further insights on TRN strategic thinking beyond the earlier project data collection 
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methods 3) use the data from the survey as content for the Strategic Thinking Workshop 
4) provide additional reliability of the temporal relevance of the research findings and 
proposed intervention.  
 
By intention, none of the participants in the face to face workshop were included in the 
survey. This was done in consideration of the time constraints of the attendees. This same 
consideration was taken in designing the Strategic Thinking Survey. To ensure a higher 
completion rate, the survey was kept to five open questions related to 1) TRN’s strategic 
thinking and decision making 2) perceived best practice in strategic thinking 3) the 
survey participant’s own considerations in strategic thinking and decisions 4) enablers 
and inhibitors of their strategic thinking.  The full survey can be seen in Appendix 2. 
 
5.2.4 Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Workshop 
 
A total of 12 new senior executives who had not previously been involved in the data 
collection were purposefully selected based on achieving as much diversity and cross-
functional representation as possible in a small group. Eight executives attended the 
session. The attendees were all invited by email with the topic, duration (1.5 hours) and 
explanation that the session was strictly for research purposes. Confidentiality and 
anonymity were also promised.  In the final Outlook calendar invite an adapted version of 
the questions from the Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Survey were included for 
reflection purposes. The workshop was positioned as a “discussion group” to create the 
anticipation of a more informal event. The initial number of 12 invitations for the 
workshop had anticipated the possibility of some cancelations in attendance with the goal 
of achieving 7-10 participants with the end result of 8 attendees.  
 
The objectives of the workshop included 1) ensuring an additional level of method and 
source triangulation 2) gaining a very direct validity check from on the accuracy of the 
Strategic Thinking Survey and data collections results from Project One and Two 3) 
obtaining further validation of the temporal relevance of the research findings and 
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potential intervention 4) gathering further understanding of the strategic constructs extant 
in the senior leaders of TRN and their implications. 
 
 5.2.4.1 Workshop setting  
 
The workshop was held at the corporate headquarters in Espoo, Finland. The room 
chosen was located away from the main internal business offices in an area categorized as 
“for external use”. This reference meant that it was not in an area used for daily activities 
and was therefore removed both physically and psychologically from potential 
interruption or observation.  
 
5.2.4.2 Workshop Design  
 
The design of the workshop took into consideration the original objectives and purpose of 
the data collection and the results of the Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Survey.  
Given the time available, the five phases of the discussion primarily mirrored the survey 
topics. However some new areas were added that further informed the research objectives, 
but that could not be as easily covered via a survey. These new areas were created by the 
researcher based on induced insights from the earlier data collection and anticipation of 
what dynamics and content face to face dialogue could potentially create. The five phases 
were as follows: 
 
1) Orientation: purpose, confidentiality, and introductions. 
 
2) TRN’s Strategic Thinking following three phases: i) 1-2 word descriptors 
individually written and then shared ii) Influencing factors individually written and 
then discussion, iii) sharing of Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Survey results for 
impression and discussion. 
 
3) Factors influencing TRN’s Senior Leader’s Strategic Decisions: individually 
written and then shared for discussion. 
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4) The prominence of strategic thinking: 3 scales done individually, then charted on a 
wall scale, followed by discussion. 
 
5) Strategic Flexibility: Introduction of the concept, discussion of current and future 
status.  
 
5.3 Data Analysis  
 
One of this research’s primary goals was to achieve an understanding of meaning from 
the participants’ mindset.  The study was designed to explore how the Case Company 
executives make sense of events and what factors influence their sense-making in regards 
to strategic thinking. The interpretive approach taken in this qualitative study was 
consistent with achieving this goal (Rainbow and Sullivan 1979). To assist in this process 
the three main tasks of qualitative data analysis of data reduction, data display, and 
conclusion drawing were utilized (Miles and Huberman 1994) 
 
Three qualitative analysis strategies were employed and combined in the first two 
projects of this study.  These three strategies were continued during the final project to 
ensure rigor and increase validity. The first strategy was categorizing. For example, this 
thematic analysis was carried out in reviewing and creating categories for both the 
interview elements and constructs during the cross-grid analysis. This process followed 
the preferred methodology recommended by Jankowisz (2004) and reproduced in 
Appendix 3. Although frequency counts were eventually established and recorded, the 
main purpose of this strategy was to “fracture” the data to enable comparison (Strauss 
1987). The categories were developed primarily by general inductive methods or 
grounded theory (Thomas 2006, Glaser and Strauss 1967). From the constructs, 12 
“substantive categories” were induced with the researcher attempting to stay close to the 
interviewee’s concepts and beliefs without relying on more abstract theories (Maxwell 
2005, Thomas 2006). It was not until the second phase of categorization that a more 
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theoretical and abstract framework was induced. It was from this process that the 
inductively developed iSCOPE framework emerged. 
 
By comparison, existing theory did influence several of the 12 element categories.  
However, the researcher did attempt to stay close to the terminology of the interviewee’s 
elicited strategic decisions (elements).  Despite this, in the creation of the 12 categories 
and subsequent five themes, there was significant influence from strategic management 
concepts and theory that will be further described in the operalization of the framework. 
Upon reflection, this could be due to the “objective” nature of the elements themselves 
and/or the researchers embedded knowledge of the majority of the elements through 
employment in TRN. However, the primary objective of the elements content analysis 
differs to that of the constructs. 
 
The “memos and displays” qualitative analysis strategy was also used but primarily for 
analysis of the cross-grid data (Maxwell 2005).  Tables 1 and 2 were very helpful for the 
researcher’s reflection on relationships amongst and within the categories. This eased the 
ability to descend and ascend the data to draw insights. As noted by Miles and Huberman 
(1994), the use of displays can help reduce the overall data in ways that allow seeing the 
bigger picture. The use of displays for seeing the bigger themes and trends was also 
leveraged by the creation of the Word Cloud representation of Figure 25. This analytical 
methodology made major influences and factors of strategic thinking easily visible. The 
result was highly valuable for the researcher’s understanding of the participant’s 
constructs and for sharing those constructs with peers during the Senior Executive 
Strategic Thinking Workshop. 
 
Connecting strategies were also used. In this case, it was by ascending up from individual 
data sources (the cross-grid analysis, survey results, workshop results and interviews) to 
look for relationships and how they contribute to the larger themes of the case study and 
research questions. This methodology helped to confirm some of the main enabling and 
inhibiting influences on cognitive strategic flexibility in TRN’s context. It also supported 
the development of a more holistic solution amd for the realization that the development 
198 
 
of a more holistic approach would be needed to enhance TRN potential strategic 
flexibility. 
 
5.4 Validity and Rigor  
 
Strauss (1987) argues that the researcher’s own experience and insight should not be seen 
as a bias to be filtered out or eliminated. Rather it should be seen as valuable 
“experiential data” that contributes a major source of hypothesis and validity checks. In 
this research, it was also a source for improving the design of the study through who was 
interviewed, the questions that were asked and the general quality of the data collected. 
As outlined earlier by Eisenhardt (1989a) and Yin (1994) in their guidance for case 
studies, the researcher gains relevance by not being too tight on design and methods of 
data collection and can therefore effectively adapt based on knowledge gained during the 
research. Thomas (2006) reinforces the importance of this when he emphasizes that the 
“The primary purpose of the inductive approach is to allow research findings to emerge 
from the frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the 
restraints imposed by structured methodologies”. Reason (1988) warns that the influence 
of reflexivity and experiential data does not mean the researcher can impose views and 
values but that the use of “critical subjectivity” is recommended. Reason (1988) describes 
this as a “quality of awareness in which we do not suppress our primary experience; nor 
do we allow ourselves to be swept away and overwhelmed by it; rather we raise it to 
consciousness and use it as part of the inquiry process”. As noted above, in Chapter 
Three of this research the process of recording memos and a field diary were two of the 
recommended methods used for achieving both insights and critical subjectivity (Long 
and Johnson 2000). Additionally, as recommended by Coffey and Atkinson (1996) data 
collection and analysis was done simultaneously. This helped to better formulate the 
Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Survey and subsequently the Senior Executive 
Strategic Thinking Workshop. In the process, relevance and also comparison validity was 
enhanced (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
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As was outlined in Project One in the section of “role of the researcher”, there has been a 
long and in-depth involvement of the researcher with the phenomenon being studied. 
According to Becker and Geer (1957), this provides the opportunity for more variety of 
data and more direct data. It also reduces inference and the possibility of inaccurate 
associations or premature theories (Becker and Geer 1957). Finally, by allowing for rich 
data collection, it uncovers a more complete picture and one that is less likely to be for 
public consumption. 
 
To counterbalance the benefits of the “awareness of primary experience” and any 
potential biases and limits of one method Denzin’s (1970) strategy of method 
triangulation was used extensively. Yin (1994) outlines six sources of data collection for 
case studies. In this Project the following five of the six sources were utilized: i) 
documentation ii) archival records iii) interviews iv) direct observation and v) participant 
observation. The 6th source of ‘physical artifacts’ was not used due to its limited 
relevance to the research topic. Project Three continued the rigor of Projects One and 
Two, following recommended practices to maintain the consistency and reliability of data 
collection. Example methods included those deemed most appropriate for achieving rigor 
and validity in qualitative research such as purposeful sampling, triangulation and 
respondent validation (Golafshani 2013, Barbour 2001). By using these multiple methods 
and sources, validity and generality of the findings were enhanced.   
 
5.5 Results and Interpretation:  Cross Repertory Grid Content 
Analysis Method And Results 
 
The Cross Repertory Grid Content analysis followed two overall procedurally linked 
methodologies. The first method was a categorization procedure undertaken following 
the seven-step process recommended by Jankowisz (2004) and outlined in Appendix 3. 
The second overall method was a refinement, consistency and reliability method 
consisting of five following steps recommended by Jankowisz (2004). First, all the 
constructs and elements were listed according to the interviewee number and sequence of 
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elicitation in the individual repertory grid interviews. For example listing of 1.4 refers to 
interviewee one and construct four. Secondly, the overall percentage of each category in 
relation to the total population was calculated. Thirdly, an eyeball analysis was then 
conducted based on the overall titles for both the strategic construct and strategic 
decisions (elements) categories. The purpose was to see what patterns or themes could be 
induced. Fourthly, based on the categories and the individual constructs/elements further 
sorting into themes was carried out following recommended practice (Thomas 2006). 
Finally, within each theme all units of analysis were further reviewed in context to the fit 
for the theme as a reliability check for consistency of application and for the overall 
meanings that could be construed. 
 
5.5.1.1 Cross Repertory Grid Strategic Construct Categories And 
Themes 
 
The cross-grid content analysis resulted in the grouping of 12 categories of strategic 
constructs. Table 1 provides a detailed representation of the induced categories. As noted 
above, it also indicates the corresponding interviewee number and sequence for each 
elicited construct.  Finally, the percentage relationship that each category holds with the 
total construct population is calculated.  From an eyeball analysis, it can be seen that no 
one category dominates the population from a size perspective. There is a mixed 
distribution in the interviewee sources across the categories. The only exception appears 
to be in the “Portfolio Choices” category where interviewee number three contributes 
75% of one of the largest categories. This same interviewee is the sole contributor to the 
smaller “Company size” category. This phenomenon has been recognized in the 
individual grid analysis discussion in relation to the interviewee’s perspectives in the 
sales and CEO office positions. This first analysis suggests that the cross grid constructs 
represent a breadth and diversity of construct categories. 
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Table 1: Content Analysis Of Combined Repertory Grid Interview Constructs 
 
When further considering the construct categories by a process of repeatedly descending 
into individual constructs and then ascending to the category level, the researcher was 
able to induce a further overall thematic framework. This methodology of general 
inductive approach for analyzing data as is explained by Thomas (2006) “The intended 
outcome of the process is to create a small number of summary categories (e.g. between 
three and eight) that in the evaluator’s view capture the key aspects of the themes 
identified in the raw data and are assessed to be the most important themes given the 
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evaluation objectives. Inductive coding that finishes up with many major themes (e.g. 
more than eight) can be viewed as incomplete". The thematic framework and the 
associated categories are as follows: 
 
Intent: Portfolio Choices. Cost Driven vs. Strategic. Company Size. Moving Forward vs. 
Exiting. 
Strategic Foresight: Timeliness. 
Constraints: Degree of Free Will. 
Orientation: What type of company vs. how we position ourselves. External vs. Internal 
Orientation. 
Process: Degree of process rigor. Political. 
Emotion: Value Assessment. Emotional dimension of decision. 
 
The iSCOPE Framework 
From the content analysis of the above strategic constructs elicited from the interviewees 
a framework of the primary dynamics influencing the strategic thinking and decision 
making of the TRN Strategic Leaders was derived. The iSCOPE framework as 
formulated above contains the six following dimensions: Intent, Strategic Foresight, 
Constraints, Orientation, Process, and Emotion. Further discussion of each dimension of 
the framework will be conducted below. The application of this framework as an 
integrative diagnostic tool will be outlined in Chapter Six. 
 
5.5.1.2 Strategic Construct Themes 
 
The Intent construct theme refers to constructs related to goal orientation. In other 
words, constructs with specifically intended business outcomes or results. These include 
product portfolio, cost efficiency, the scope of activity (company size) and other forms of 
strategic maneuvering. This theme contains the widest range of strategic constructs.  It 
also contains the highest percentage of constructs at 28%. On the one hand, this could be 
expected as the traditional view of strategic thinking centers on maneuvering options e.g. 
“where you will play and how you will play” (Favaro 2013). On the other hand, it is 
significant that the vast majority of strategic constructs (72%) lay outside of this theme 
and supports the necessity to look far beyond just the “what” of strategic thinking. 
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When looking closer at the individual constructs within this theme, several insights 
emerge that are consistent with the preliminary constructs outlined in Project One. First 
are the references to and the presence of scale and cost efficiency as a basis for 
competition. Even more prevalent and perhaps driving this strategic construct theme is 
the growth and profitability dimension. This can be seen in the related terms of 
“expanding, breadth, enhancing” and others. There are also terms representing the other 
pole of the constructs such as “narrowing, focusing, selective” with an association or 
implication to the overall quality of the offering. This consistency with the preliminary 
constructs of Project One provides further credibility to the presence of the constructs. 
However, it also indicates that the focus of TRN’s executives was quite narrow and 
primarily related to meeting cost and “red ocean” growth targets (Kim and Mauborgne 
2005). 
 
The Strategic Foresight construct theme is an inferred category that has a close 
relation to the subjective value dimension in the emotional construct theme. This theme 
consists of one small (5%) construct category with two identical constructs. While this 
theme has a small overall representation in the construct population, it is 
disproportionately important given its highly frequent reference in the unstructured 
interviews and in subsequent data collection in Project Three, e.g. the Central Senior 
Executive Reliability interview. In addition, strategic foresight and insight are two key 
concepts that support the capability for cognitive strategic flexibility (Doz and Kosonen 
2008). 
 
The Constraints construct theme refers to the interviewee’s perceptions regarding 
whether or not there existed restrictive factors on the strategic decisions made. This 
theme is made up of the biggest single construct category (15%) and has contributions 
from four of the five interviewee’s constructs. Conceptually this is a very tight 
categorization with four of the five constructs directly referencing free choice or free will. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding revealed in this construct theme is the psychological 
dimension. Clearly there is evidence of how external sense making is filtered and 
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interpreted as applying pressure, force or limitations on strategic decision making 
(Kiesler and Sproull 1982). In addition, there is consideration of an internal cognitive 
framework of ethics or principles that are used as an additional filter in considering 
strategic options (Staw 1981). 
 
The Orientation construct theme refers to the degree of emphasis individuals (and 
organizations) put on focusing attention and resources internally versus externally as the 
basis for competitive actions. This category is relatively tight and represents 18% of the 
overall construct population. In addition to internal factors, it includes a range of external 
dynamics including competitors, customers/market share, industry business models, and 
partners. Underlying this inside-outside balance is a perception of the degree of control 
the company might have over its actions. This orientation relates well to discussions in 
the literature regarding the Resource-Based View of the Firm where there is more 
emphasis on developing internal capabilities compared with positioning theory which 
looks more externally towards finding attractive market positions to defend (Rumelt and 
Schendel et al. 1995, Porter 1980). In relation to what has already been induced about the 
Case Company’s context, at least two issues are relevant here. Firstly, this construct 
theme illustrates the struggle the Case Company has had defining itself competitively in 
relation to its own capabilities and the changing external dynamics. Secondly, and 
partially related to the above, is the recurring dilemma of focusing on internal 
coordination and efficiency issues to increase competitiveness or to focus more on 
external sources of profitability. As noted previously, without an ambidextrous 
orientation TRN’s sustainability is questionable.   
 
The Process construct theme refers to the “how” of strategic decision making. The 
combined construct categories represent 13% of the total construct population and 
capture a relatively wide range of concepts. In reference to rigor and structure in the 
decision process, there exist two opposing ideas revolving around the lack of structure 
and influence through salesmanship instead of substance. On the political dimension, we 
see reference to the locus of decision impetus and the amount of openness of decisions. 
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Finally, there is the inclusion of the relative level of agreement or controversy of decision 
implied from how much they are debated. 
 
The Emotion construct theme refers to constructs that involve feelings in relation to 
strategic decisions. The combined construct categories within this theme represent 15% 
of the construct population and include several dimensions. One dimension is the impact 
that a strategic decision context can have on the individual. This is primarily within a 
range from very high to very low. Additionally, the emotion derived from the strategic 
decision context can drive the individual’s attitude range e.g. amicable, mechanical 
follow through and so on. Finally, there is the emotional or subjective value attributed to 
the strategic decisions e.g. truly strategic, Visionary or value destroying.  
 
Miscellaneous 
Two constructs were outside of the induced construct themes and remained under the 
miscellaneous category. The first involves the scope of impact (Global/Local) of a 
decision. This construct does have a loose connection to the intent category but is not 
strong enough to include decisively in any one of the induced construct themes or 
construct categories. The second construct has a relation to the orientation construct 
theme. It contains “market driven” which clearly connotes an external orientation. At the 
other end of the pole, it is defined as “technology driven” which could be interpreted as 
an internal product-based focus or an external, technology standards, or technology 
market-evolution orientation. Given the relation to two potential categories, it was placed 
here following the recommended process steps (Jankowisz 2004). Further discussion of 
this framework and its application will be covered in Chapter Six. 
 
5.5.1.3 Repertory Grid Strategic Decision Element Categories And 
Themes 
The use of the 7 step categorization process used for constructs was also utilized for the 
cross-grid content analysis to enhance reliability and validity. This resulted in 12 element 
categories being induced by the researcher. Table 2 provides a detailed representation of 
the derived categories and indicates the corresponding interviewee number and sequence 
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for each elicited element.  The percentage relationship that each category holds with the 
total element population is also calculated. From an eyeball analysis, it can be seen that 
there is one very large category (20%) related to industry consolidation. There also 
appears to be a balanced distribution and mix of the interviewee sources across the 
element categories. The only exception is in the “Vertical Integration” category where 
interviewee number four provided all of the strategic decision elements. As noted in 
Project Two this is likely due to the interviewee’s strong role in the Managed Services 
business area which is a form of forward vertical integration.  
 
 
Table 2: Content Analysis Of Combined Repertory Grid Interview Elements 
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The analysis of the elements (strategic decisions) that were chosen is important as they 
provide the overall context and range of strategic decisions upon which the constructs 
were drawn. Nevertheless, this analysis must take into consideration some limitations on 
the conclusions that can be drawn from the elements. The limitations are due to the fact 
that some of the elements were supplied (26% of the total used in the grids) and some 
elements were further refined based on the original element that was provided to the 
interviewee. For example, “TRN Merger” was broken down into a sub category of “TRN 
Merger-Partner Choice”. However, an effort was made by the researcher to provide in the 
supplied elements category, only those elements that would be recognized easily (high 
profile) and be relatively top of mind for the interviewees. In other words, the supplied 
elements that could potentially be chosen by the interviewees were significant and highly 
publicized (known to all employees). Thus, these would have had a high probability of 
consideration by the interviewees even if not supplied. In this way, the level of influence 
of the supplied elements was minimal as there was a high probability that these would 
have been raised freely by the interviewees themselves. On the other hand, the elements 
elicited through an open element creation method allowed for the interviewees to reveal 
both their unique individual backgrounds and their perspective on what is or is not a 
strategic decision. 
 
The same process that was utilized for construct content analysis was employed for the 
elements. By repeatedly descending into the individual elements and ascending to the 
element categories the researcher was able to induce an additional set of themes. These 
element themes and their associated categories are as follows: 
 
Profitability: Scope of Growth, Low Cost Locations, Focus Choices, Exit. 
Product Expansion: Vertical Integration, Services Growth, Technology Decisions, 
Miscellaneous. 
Consolidation Actions: Consolidation Growth Methods. 
Organizational Coordination: Structure and Governance, Growth vs. Merger 
Integration. 
Customer Management: Customer Engagement Approaches. 
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Overall when comparing the elements elicited with the TRN company archives and 
communications, no significant elements appear to have been overlooked or avoided. 
However given the narrow and short-term focus of TRN, it is not surprising that more 
elements regarding new ventures, unrelated diversification or big bet themes were not 
present.  
 
5.5.1.4 Repertory Grid Element Themes 
 
The Profitability Element theme contains four element categories and 27% of the 
overall element population. This large representation is consistent with contextual factors 
found in Project One, which described the profitability factor both from the perspective 
of financial health and from the competitive pressure to achieve a lower overall cost 
structure. Although the original business case for the merger estimated much higher 
levels of revenue there seems to have been an early shift to the recognition that profit and 
not overall revenue was the ultimate goal. This can be inferred from the names of some 
of the strategic decision elements under this theme such as “Smart Growth” and “Focus 
on MBB.” Both of these strategic decision examples were aimed at selectively choosing 
more profitable segments in which to compete. As indicated above, a supporting factor to 
the drive for profitability is the need to achieve cost efficiency through selective or 
focused investment. This is seen in elements such as low-cost country migration and 
exiting or divesting areas that do not show short term profitability. The elements in this 
theme also provide confirming evidence for the existence of aspects of at least two of the 
preliminary constructs of Project One; “Sources of competitive advantage” (cost 
efficiency) and “Growth and Profitability” (scale as a means to overcome cost structure 
pressure on per unit average cost). The Focus on MBB decision captures both sides of 
this objective. First, by restructuring 17,000 people and divesting low or unprofitable 
portions of the portfolio, it reduces variable costs and the overall fixed cost structure. 
Second, it attempts to achieve scale in a focused area rather than be subscale across the 
wider end to end spectrum of the infrastructure business.  
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The Product Expansion element theme includes three element categories and 24% of 
the overall element population. Given the initial merger business case revenue forecast, 
the declining, flat or low industry growth numbers; it is not surprising that there is a 
significant proportion of the decisions relating to means of growth through expansion of 
the product portfolio. The clearest link to Project One’s preliminary constructs is the 
emphasis on growth and profitability with one element category consisting entirely of the 
forward integration option provided by managed services. As indicated earlier, and 
supported by results of the Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Workshop, the expansion 
of products has been an on and off phenomenon in the company due to the company’s 
challenge to find profitable growth. 
 
The Consolidation Actions element theme is made up of the single largest element 
category which represents 20% of the overall element population. As was highlighted in 
the preliminary “Growth and Profitability” construct in Project One, and is evidenced by 
the size of this category, merger and acquisition are central strategic paradigms for both 
the industry and the case company executives. The element titles in this category indicate 
at least two relevant aspects to the merger and acquisition motivation. The first is the 
already stated benefit that consolidation brings regarding reduced competition and 
increased scale. Secondly, the consolidation partner choices bring with them access to 
desirable markets or technologies and in some cases a combination of both.  
 
The Organizational Coordination theme consists of two element categories and 15% 
of the overall element population. As has been indicated above in the contextual factors 
of Project One, the original merger design and execution created a tremendous inward 
focus. However, the duration of this distraction continued long after the stabilization of 
operations due to unanticipated factors coming from the global financial crisis and low-
cost competitors. For this reason, the original design decision came under additional 
pressure. These pressures can be evidenced in the strategic decision element titles by 
references to “acceleration” and “integration”. In both these cases, we see a trade-off in 
the focus of the company due to the coordination costs involved. One coordination 
dimension that is not captured by these elements is the cost of the multiple 
210 
 
reorganizations (meaning organizational structure and not just headcount reduction). 
While this topic emerged during the open interviews of Project Two, no element 
examples were provided with the exception of “2011 Restructuring” which has a broader 
connotation to the more comprehensive focused strategy decision.      
 
The Customer Management theme consists of one element category and 13% of the 
overall element population. The topic of customer focus or centricity has been a central 
theme throughout the history of the Case Company. Yet three of the six element 
examples that were elicited pre-date the existence of the company and were related to the 
parent companies. However, one of these is the “TCO” or total cost of ownership concept 
that continues to be highly relevant to the Case Company and throughout the industry. 
There are two underlying principles behind these elements that are not revealed by the 
titles themselves. The first is the perceived need to protect profitability and market share 
through deep relationships with customers. The second is the “solutions” mindset. This 
refers to the transformation from “selling boxes” to customized solutions that focus more 
on the customer’s benefits than the supplier’s product features. This latter emphasis has 
been reinforced in the company strategy statements, namely the intention of creating 
win/win solutions through an outside-in approach. The final strategic principle not fully 
captured in the element titles is the emphasis on leveraging the installed base as a means 
of competitive advantage over new entrants. These latter factors provide additional 
evidence of the lack of innovative strategic thinking given that both customer centric and 
solution selling are decades old concepts and therefore “me too” strategies. 
  
5.5.1.5 Cross Repertory Grid Analysis Observations 
 
In conducting a Cross Repertory Grid Analysis, there is a methodological challenge of 
moving to higher level observations to draw broader conclusions without losing too much 
of the significance of individual constructs and elements (Jankowicz 2004). The 
bootstrapping method recommended by Neuendorf, (2002) was used since it starts at the 
single unit of analysis level and then moves towards the classification of categories and 
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themes. However, as noted earlier an effort was also been made to descend back to the 
single units of analysis before making final observations and conclusions. 
 
In considering the construct categories, it is revealing that for the relatively focused topic 
of strategic decisions and the total number of constructs elicited (39) there are 12 quite 
diverse categories induced. This suggests that the interviewee’s constructs represent a 
rather wide range of dimensions in strategic decision making. The further classifying of 
these categories into six themes follows recommended practice yet still allows for a 
considerable range of factors impacting the strategic constructs of the individual senior 
executives interviewed (Thomas 2006).  
 
There were also 12 categories induced from the elements. As has been indicated above 
only five broader element themes were derived. The fact that the current company 
context was the primary source of strategic decision examples considered somewhat 
limits the potential range of element types. While this limitation may impact the overall 
diversity of the construct population, this focus is consistent with achieving one of the 
main research objectives of this study. Namely “Understanding the meaning, for 
participants in the study, of the events, situations, and actions they are involved with, and 
of the account they give” (Maxwell 2005). Considering the relatively dynamic nature of 
the industry and the strategic context of the Case Company one might also argue that a 
wide range of strategic decisions was available from which to draw upon. However as 
noted earlier the evidence from the data suggests that the main focus of TRN was on 
decisions regarding short-term exploitation of the current competitive environment 
compared with longer term exploration opportunities (March 1991). The overall 
conclusions, implications, and integration with other data collected will be discussed 
further in section 5.6 in the Discussion portion of this Chapter. 
 
5.5.2 Central Senior Executive Reliability Interview  
   
The 2-hour semi-structured interview was conducted using four of the Senior Executive 
Strategic Thinking Survey questions as a guiding framework (see Appendix 2). Question 
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three on “characteristics and practices of good strategic thinkers” was not included. 
Instead during the final stage of the interview Table 1: Content Analysis of Combined 
Repertory Grid Interview Constructs was shared to determine whether the existing 
categories created by the researcher resonated with the executive. As the executive had 
not previously participated in the researcher’s data collection, his feedback provided 
temporal relevance of the constructs and a highly informed organizational respondent 
validity check (Bryman 1988). The executive clearly had a passion for the strategy topic 
and was very open in his sharing. This openness was partially based on the trust 
established by the long-standing relationship between the researcher and the executive.  
In discussing the issues related to the four survey questions a very close relationship to 
the 12 construct categories induced by the researcher emerged. There was also a 
reinforcement of many of the preliminary constructs induced in Project One. For example, 
when referring to the first years of TRN, the interviewee stated that the “Strategy and 
strategic thinking has mostly been classical in nature – scale, market share, BCG matrix” 
(CSE interviewee).  Here we see a close link to the “Company Size” construct category 
and preliminary construct “Source of Competitive Advantage.” In both cases, we can see 
the strategic constructs of growth and scale. Additionally, the interviewee expressed that 
the “name of the game was market share, very R&D driven” (CSE interviewee). This 
focus on market share also correlates closely with the construct category of “What type of 
company vs. how we position ourselves”. Underlying this latter category is the view that 
there is an orientation towards either chasing size by all means or pursuing a distinctive 
position. According to the interviewee, these strategic themes continued in later stages of 
the company’s strategic thinking. When referring to the largest acquisition and one of the 
key elements from the repertory grid he expressed his intimate knowledge of the thinking 
behind it in the following words “Motorola was the same logic. Driven by scale and R&D 
synergy” (CSE interviewee).  
 
There was also reference to the financial health of the company, but surprisingly even 
this senior executive had been slow to realize the extent of the overall problem. In his 
reference to the influence of Private Equity assessment (done by three firms in 2011), he 
expressed wonderment at how it was possible not to have seen this earlier.  Undoubtedly 
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the private equity firms brought “an outside view” and “the thinking was then, why wait 
for Private Equity?” (CSE interviewee). When this comment is combined with his 
reflection that “It did mean acknowledging non-profitability, and forced us to see we 
were a disaster” it can be seen that the company was slow to react and also did not do so 
proactively (CSE interviewee). Further, this decision pressure has clear links to 1) the 
“Degree of free will” construct category, given that the choice for action was really about 
doing it before someone else forced it upon the company and 2) the “Timeliness” 
construct category as the state of “disaster” was extant for several years. 
 
According to the interviewee, once the decision to restructure and focus was taken it 
meant “Divesting 6-8 businesses, and being in survival mode” (CSE interviewee). Here 
we see links to two other construct categories; “Portfolio Choices” and “Moving forward 
vs. exiting”.  In the area of portfolio choices, it has also meant exiting many businesses to 
the extent that currently “our portfolio is a bit weak” and there is “now a panic. How do 
we grow?” (CSE interviewee).  These comments evidence both the on-going struggle 
around the preliminary construct of “Growth and Profitability (Existing vs. Blue Ocean)” 
and the two construct categories mentioned directly above. Additionally, the overall 
mental focus appeared to have been and continued to be one of survival. According to the 
interview, this has meant what he considers being a less than ideal state where “We 
manage the company only by financials driving our thinking which is very short-term” 
(CSE interviewee).  In this case, there is almost a direct definition of the “Cost-driven vs. 
strategic” construct category. 
 
Overall the interviewee’s assessment of TRN’s strategic thinking on the corporate and 
individual level was that “we are very inside out, cannot see the customer and 
environment” (CSE interviewee). In addition, when recalling his considerations of 
strategic decisions while in the position of Region Head, he indicated that “I spent 
perhaps 25% of the time thinking about the future and the rest on “what’s broken?”. Very 
capability driven.” (CSE interviewee).  As has been referenced in earlier data collection 
both from grid interviews and survey responses of executives, 25% is perhaps a high 
percentage. It does, however, provide supporting evidence for the existence of the 
214 
 
“external vs. internal orientation” construct category. It also indicates that the interviewee 
had some harsh judgments regarding the level of strategic thinking in the company. This 
ranged from statements such as “We have no corporate layer” to expressing that we are 
doing many things “tactically and not strategically” (CSE interviewee). These sentiments 
are consistent with two trends of the data collection in regards to TRN’s orientation. First, 
the overwhelming perception of the strategic leaders was that the external environment is 
a threat and one that is primarily something to be reacted to rather than proactively 
influenced. Secondly, the internal environment as outlined in Project One and reinforced 
in Project Two and Three is seen more as a constraint. This combination of perceptions 
supports the conclusion that TRN saw itself as not being in a position to be holding a 
strategic posture of “shaper.” Rather as direct quotes such as “doing the same as the 
biggest guy” indicate, TRN was attempting to be a “follower” in its early years and by 
default a “reserving the right to play” posture in its latter years when its strategic 
direction was uncertain (Courtney and Kirkland et al. 1997) 
 
Yet it would misrepresent the interviewee’s sentiment without highlighting areas he 
considered major achievements. He was quite proud of the fact that the 2-year 
restructuring plan’s goals were accomplished in one year. He also emphasized that during 
the restructuring the new management additions (Chairman of the Board, Chief 
Restructuring Officer, and COO/CFO) had brought discipline and rigor to the decision-
making process. As described by the interviewee “Politics and lack of commitment to 
decisions was over, from 2011 no excuses” (CSE interviewee). The harshness of the 
change was described by the executive in rather vivid terms as follows “in Q1 it was 
deliver or be fired” (CSE interviewee). The surprising factor for the executive seemed to 
be that the new performance was being delivered by “the same machinery that was 
making losses” (CSE interviewee). In his most recent actions, he expressed enthusiasm at 
the uptake and ability of the organization to make major achievements by just “doing 
some thinking and getting behind a plan” (CSE interviewee). This evidence also supports 
the potential for strategic thinking to be enhanced in the existing TRN Strategic Leader 
population. On the hand, his description of the new management style and context 
supports the relevance of both the “Degree of process rigor” and “Political” construct 
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categories. The level of scrutiny of decision making and the sensitiveness of the political 
landscape are also substantiated by the McKinsey consultant factor. In this case, the use 
of McKinsey consultants was not as is the norm of working as a client to the employee 
population. Rather the consultants were working directly for and reporting back to the 
Chairman of the Board. This dimension created both an unpopularity of the consultants 
and a general paranoia around their motivations. 
 
Additional aspects coming out of this interview included insights around the strategic 
frames of the company. In referring to the CEO’s recurring mantra that there is only room 
for three players, he described a cartoon shared by a strategy professor where a hunter 
sees two bears in his rifle scope with one bear pointing at the other bear suggesting to 
shoot it and not itself.  Drawing a direct correlation to TRN, he stated “that seems to be 
TRN’s strategy. I mean this belief in only three players. The lack of strategic action as if 
we hold on to be the “last bear standing” (CSE interviewee). This perception based on 
CEO statements repeated since late 2009 also support the preliminary constructs noted 
above around Strategic Posture and Positioning. Waiting for the other bears to be shot 
suggests a default reserving the right to play mentality or at minimum a more reactive 
follower strategy.  
 
There is also the presence of the “Uncertainty and Complexity” preliminary construct 
particularly related to the recent past and the short term horizon. Firstly, according to the 
interviewee “Since mid-2011 to April 2013, for almost 18 months there has been 
uncertainty around direction of the company” (CSE interviewee).  Secondly, related to 
the more positive future uncertainty he shares what was on the mind of almost the entire 
employee population at the time when he states “Of course now we have a new situation. 
What will Parent Company T do with the cash?” (CSE interviewee). Finally, this Central 
Senior Executive alludes to one of the looming challenges for the company when he 
assesses the present state in the following terms “The cost has been high. We have 
narrowed our executive profile, driven out some of our big hunters who went for the long 
term big deals. The process happy people are still here. This is very short term” (CSE 
interviewee).  Overall the interview with this central figure in the company’s strategy 
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reveals that the majority of strategic constructs and contextual factors uncovered in 
Project One and Two are still highly relevant. Further, the evidence suggests that all but 
two of the researcher’s induced construct categories (Value Assessment and Emotional 
dimension of decision) are extant. Although no direct link to the two missing categories 
was drawn here, there is support for them in the general judgments made about the value 
and originality of TRN’s strategic thinking and decisions. The overall correlation 
provides a significant source of triangulation of the validity of construct categories and 
extant strategic constructs (Denzin 1970). 
 
5.5.3 Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Survey Results 
 
The primary purpose of this survey was to ascertain the temporal relevance of the 
research findings while at the same time ensuring that a high level of triangulation and 
validity was achieved through methods and data diversity. In addition, it was also an 
excellent vehicle to check and discover further insights into the strategic thinking of TRN 
and its Strategic Leaders. Of the 20 executives sent survey requests 17 completed within 
the one-week deadline requested, resulting in a very high completion rate of 85%. The 
design of the five open-ended questions was intended to reveal the strategic thinking 
influences on the organization and the executives themselves.  The first two questions of 
the survey aimed to draw out differences in “factors or influences” on strategic thinking 
compared with the actual decision making of the company. Although some small 
emphasis in the factors was revealed, the overall conclusion is summed up well by a 
recent Strategy Head and survey participant when he reflects that “the differences in 
factors that influence TRN’s strategic thinking and factors that are impacting strategic 
decision making are very minor at TRN. One may draw the conclusion from this 
statement that we are lacking “strategic thinking” to a great extent” (Respondent 1). This 
is also reflected in the fact that in answering the two questions, several respondents 
indicated “see above” and then wrote small additions. Again the implication is that little 
difference is seen between the two dimensions. The implication suggests that from the 
Strategic Leader’s perspective TRN has been very reactive and external oriented in its 
decision making. 
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Nevertheless, the responses for the first two questions were initially reviewed separately 
as categories to determine any new unique themes, constructs, or essential dynamics that 
might have arisen. The two categories were then combined to gain a perspective on the 
overall frequency of the influences. Following recommendations for variation in data 
display and to gain additional visual perception to the list format a “Word Cloud” 
software was used as can be seen in Figure 25 (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
 
 
Figure 25: Word Cloud Representation Of “factors and influences” On Case 
Company Strategic Thinking And Decision Making 
 
Word Cloud software represents words from text based on their frequency of use. The 
most frequently used words are larger in size and can, therefore, be more easily 
distinguished from other emerging themes. While frequency is not the only determinant 
of impact, it does provide a strong guide to what are the overall influences that are top of 
mind amongst the respondents.  As can be seen from the size of the words, many of the 
constructs revealed in Project One and the repertory grid interviews analysis from Project 
Two and Three are still present and strongly support validation of the research findings. 
These include Shareholder (17), Competition (15), Financial Health (15), Short-term (9), 
Survival (7), Growth (7), Profitability (6) and Market Share (5). While many of the 
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concepts are expressed separately, some are reinforcing each other while still others have 
increased in significance. For example, “Shareholders” has clearly emerged much 
stronger than earlier. This is likely due to the salience of the shareholder change 
(Ownership structure moving to one Parent Company) just three months before the 
survey. This has possibly renewed the awareness of the longer term impact the differing 
parent company interests have had on strategic thinking and decision making. The other 
aspect that could have affected the response was the looming impact of the Shareholders 
Special Meeting occurring during the time of the survey. However, this “Special 
Meeting” was more to do with the future of the company and perceived current 
influences which were not yet fully known at the time of this survey. 
 
Several reinforcing and overlapping themes can also be recognized. These include 
Growth/Market Share/Scale/Profitability as they all have similar motivations or related 
intent behind them.  As this applies to the current company context, it is more concerned 
with “How broad our strategy has to be in order to show growth and profitability” 
(Respondent 16). Similarly, Financial Health/Survival/Cost Savings also have interrelated 
dimensions. A final example is Short term/Operational issues/Limited time where the 
idea of tactical and less long-term strategic thinking is indicated. This latter theme is 
supported further by representative respondent comments related to the level of strategic 
thinking and decision-making at the company level. A few representative examples are as 
follows:” Uncorrelated short-term tactical moves”, or “I have not experienced TRN as a 
strategically driven company”, or “reactive, not shaping our own destiny” and finally 
“Opportunistic attitude” (Respondents 2, 9, 12, 13). From the full text provided by the 
survey results, the evidence suggests that there is still a very short-term non-strategic 
orientation to the company. However, the respondents seem to have been able to 
rationalize or, at least, understand this status. At the same time, there is clearly a desire 
for a more long-term strategic orientation. This aspiration amongst TRN’s Strategic 
Leaders supports the timeliness and relevance of this research’s proposed and adopted 
intervention outlined in Chapter Seven. 
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The Word Cloud and detailed text do give increased emphasis to additional areas. The 
first is the issue of “IPO” (Initial Public Offering). This potential objective for the 
company is also related to the “Private Equity” (PE) influence that was mentioned in the 
repertory grid and Central Senior Executive interviews. The significance here is twofold. 
First, the outside-in view of PE firms seems to have brought a reality check and sense of 
urgency to the senior level executives. This took the form of a harsh assessment of 
company performance and what actions would likely be taken by a potential PE take-over.  
Secondly, there was a perceived influence on the strategic decision making of 
individual’s of the Executive Board and some senior executives at the motivational level. 
This perception was that “aspirational-level triggers” such as personal bonuses and other 
factors of self-interest were a driving force (Kiesler and Sproull 1982). In other words, 
many strategic decisions were seen to be motivated by trying to create a “Good story line 
for IPO” (Respondent 3). Another interesting factor that was expressed was the “EB 
inexperience”. In this case, there is the view that the Executive Board lacked experience 
and was therefore either indecisive or ineffective at key moments in the company’s short 
history. More neutral and sometimes even positive is the reference to “C-level”. In the 
neutral sense, there is the attribution of many key decisions being made by the EB. 
However, this is also accompanied by several observations regarding the lack of 
reception of strategic ideas by senior management. More recently and much more 
positive is the notion that the Executive Board is making disciplined action and sticking 
to the plan. The final dimension that is worthy of comment is “McKinsey Concepts” or as 
expressed by one of the respondents “consultant-driven analysis” (Respondent 10). In this 
case, there is the negative connotation that the thinking is being outsourced. This 
perception was seen as intensifying during the turnaround period and MBB Focus 
strategy launched in late 2011, and that was on-going at the time of this data collection. 
However, it was also raised as an influence during the initial merger formation and earlier 
periods of the JV although to a lesser extent. The cost of this practice on the strategic 
thinking capability of TRN combined with the impact of the Command and Control style 
of leadership during this turnaround was a central driver to the specific intervention 
methods proposed in Chapter Seven. 
 
220 
 
5.5.3.1 Characteristics And Practices Of Good Strategic Thinkers 
 
The second portion of the survey was designed to reveal both the ideal characteristics and 
practices of good strategic thinkers and then the actual factors at play with the 
respondents themselves. The intent of this data collection was to: 
1) Gain insights to the current status of TRN’s Strategic Leader’s understanding and 
perceptions of what is involved with ‘good’ strategic thinking 
2) Check for relationships between perceptions in practice by practitioners 
themselves and academic concepts. 
3) Inform the research’s intervention design by gaining context based data related 
directly to enabling cognitive strategic flexibility. 
 
The summary of the overall responses is captured in 28 components of good strategic 
thinkers in Figure 26. The components are presented in the order they arose while 
sequentially reviewing the survey responses. 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Summary Of Respondent’s View Of Characteristics And Practices Of 
Good Strategic Thinkers 
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It is interesting to note that from the above list the three most cited aspects where 1) 
Ability to anticipate discontinuity & future state analysis 2) having the long-term view 
and 3) ability for strong and comprehensive current state analysis. The former two are 
closely related to having strategic foresight while the latter characteristic is closely 
aligned with the concept of strategic insight. Combined they make up the key 
components of strategic agility as defined by Doz and Kosonen (2008) referenced earlier. 
The combined listing covers closely a great deal of the attributes listed in the literature. 
For example, the six essential skills of strategic leadership by Shoemaker and Krupp et al. 
(2006) cover many of these dimensions (Anticipate, Challenge, Interpret, Decide, Align 
and Learn). Additionally several of the practices such as “good sparring partners”, “being 
open to external advice and input” or “regularly talking with the front lines” anticipate 
guarding against cognitive biases referenced earlier in this research. Quite a few are 
context dependent but provide a good mapping of academic prescriptions. The caveat is 
that these characteristics are from a combined perspective and limited sample. 
Nevertheless, they have informed the selection of the TRN Strategic Leader 
Competencies in Appendix 4. Further, it has highlighted the need to launch a series of 
customized trainings on strategic thinking and decision making combining theoretical 
frameworks with TRN contextual applications.  
 
5.5.3.2 Factors And Influences On Strategic Decision Making 
 
The fourth and fifth questions of the survey aimed to get a more personal and 
individualized perspective of the strategic thinking of the executives including 1) the 
factors they consider in strategic decision making and 2) conditions that have enabled or 
inhibit their strategic thinking. In reviewing and summarizing the factors that the 
executive respondents took into consideration whilst making strategic decisions, several 
converging categories emerged. The five most cited considerations where “Customer 
Impact”,  “Company Capabilities”, “Profit Impact”, “Competitor Moves” and “Strategic 
Alignment”. An additional thirteen distinctive concepts were reported for a total of 
eighteen. These factors are illustrated in Figure 27 on the next page.  
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Figure 27: Mapping Of Strategic Decision Factors To iSCOPE Model 
 
Of the 18 concepts described, there were 12 that were core with multiple respondents and 
6 with only one respondent source. In summarizing the concepts, the researcher 
attempted to capture a wide representation of concepts. In practice, this meant erring on 
the side of inclusion of some concept categories that had very small frequency counts or 
subtle differences. Nonetheless, “the evaluator must make hard decisions about which 
themes or categories are most important” (Thomas 2006).  After completing the 
frequency count for the concepts the researcher reviewed the primary or core meaning of 
the concepts and the iSCOPE Framework. Again, the driving factor for representation as 
a concept was its stand-alone conceptual uniqueness. As can be seen in Figure 27, the 
vast majority of factors fit relatively cleanly under the six components of the framework.  
Two factors have primary meaning that could potentially overlap between two 
framework components. The first is “Strategic Alignment” which could be considered as 
a Constraint because it limits the possibilities of decision making. At the same time, the 
alignment assessment is also a formal internal Process that goes through specific decision 
bodies. The second factor with potential overlap is “Soundness of Analysis” which 
involves both internal and external capabilities, positioning and other related 
considerations that fit under the Orientation component of the model. Yet this might also 
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involve the assessment of Constraints and the perception of being constrained by the 
limitations of the analysis itself. While there were some categories noted that had the 
potential for dual inclusion under two of the iSCOPE components, this high level of fit 
between survey respondents factors/influences and the iSCOPE components provide 
increased reliability and validity for the framework. As will be discussed in the 
application of the framework section, the components will have interdependencies. As a 
diagnostic tool, it is intended to be used in an iterative method to better understand the 
phenomenon and the relationships of the complex factors. 
 
5.5.3.3 Enablers And Inhibitors Of Strategic Thinking And Decision 
Making 
 
The final two questions attempted to probe the respondents for influences on strategic 
decisions from their own personal experiences with reflection on any enablers and 
inhibitors.  Some of the responses picked up features from the ideal of strategic thinking 
in question three such as having access to information, making time for it, and being 
exposed to a diversity of ideas as might happen working in cross-functional teams. Two 
activities mentioned that reinforce these first three enablers are “trainings” and “off-site 
team meetings.” In both these examples the enablers of time, information, and cross-
functional views are readily available. However, the implication is that these enablers of 
strategic thinking and decision making are somewhat separated from the day to day work 
of the executives. One new aspect that had not arisen earlier was the impact of the 
executive’s superiors. In particular, the Line Manager’s seeking advice or encouraging 
“out-of-the-box” thinking was a frequent response. In addition, the overall influence of 
senior leader role models in the wider organization seems to have reinforced a culture 
that does not support or enable strategic thinking. Reviewing the negative impact of this 
latter factor in TRN strongly reinforced the formation of three central TRN change 
objectives arising from this research. The first was a focus on impacting strategic leader’s 
cognitive strategic flexibility. The second was to use both formal and informal 
organizational means to change the leadership style. This new leadership style’s intent 
was to formalize TRN leader’s responsibility to role model the new style and support the 
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creation of an environment that enables innovation, strategic foresight, and growth.  The 
final change objective involved a wider and more comprehensive culture change 
initiative via the formation of a Culture Transformation Program Office (CTPO). The 
CTPO’s mandate goes far beyond soft targets and includes hard targets such as 
organizational design and structure. The introduction of the new TRN Leadership 
Framework (and supporting mechanisms) with it targeted emphasis on factors that enable 
the aspiration for cognitive strategic flexibility will be covered in Chapter Seven.  
However, it should be noted here that part of the rationale is that the Line Manager or 
Senior Leader factor was raised even more frequently as an inhibitor. When the Line 
Manager’s focus is not strategic, the message seems to be clear. In TRN, this seems to 
have been reinforced in Business Reviews, which are perceived as “short-term focused,” 
“operational” and “lacking strategic thinking” (Respondents 14, 6 15). The overall 
operational focus of the company at the time of this writing seems to have created the 
perception in the senior executives that strategic thinking is “not recognized”, 
“approached with skepticism upwards” and that the EB is “not open to thinking 
strategically” (Respondents 2, 9, 15).  When this is combined with the frequently 
perceived inhibitors of lack of resources (financial and non-financial), a strong quarterly 
focus and lack of time, there would seem to be a confirmation that many of the factors 
influencing the overall thinking of the company are also influencing the senior executive 
strategic decisions.  In the words of one of the respondents “If you’re working 60 – 80 
hours a week then you want a beer…. Not a strategy fest. Lack of time is a huge 
limitation.” (Respondent 11). On the other hand, one respondent shared the interesting 
perspective that whether to think strategically or not is a “personal choice that does not 
need to be enabled” while at the same time recognizing the “short-termism limits 
motivation for it” (Respondent 17). In a similar theme, another survey respondent 
supported this notion that his level of strategic thinking depends very much on his 
“personal attitude towards TRN” (Respondent 10). These later responses provide 
additional evidence for the importance of the Emotion component of the iSCOPE 
framework. 
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5.5.4 Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Workshop Results 
 
The Senior Executive Strategic Thinking Workshop objectives were consistent with the 
five objectives outlined at the start of this chapter. The additional value was to leverage 
potential nuances and questions of clarity that face to face interaction can achieve. This 
workshop had a total of eight executive participants, none of which had previously 
participated in this research. As this was an intentionally small group, the results show a 
smaller breadth and variety of constructs than in the larger executive survey. However, 
there was considerable overlap and alignment on almost all the major constructs with a 
few new perspectives raised.  When prompted for 1-2 word short descriptors of TRN’s 
strategic thinking the lack of consistency was described in terms such as “floating, 
fluctuating, lost, superficial, roller-coaster, adapting” and similar terminology. The 
intentional choice of a firm to be strategically flexible can result in periods when a firm is 
floating, adapting and even enduring roller coaster states. However, it was clear from the 
discussion that these descriptors of TRN were not the result of intentional choice. These 
rather negative descriptions referred primarily to the situation before the restructuring. In 
contrast half of the participants directly mentioned “focused” and either stated or implied 
that there was now greater clarity. Yet as also revealed in the survey, the short-term, no 
long term view, growth vs. profit constructs were still present in the discussions.  
 
As for factors that have been influencing TRN’s Strategic Thinking, the vast majority of 
the discussion mirrored the survey responses around “Competition, Market, Customer, 
stakeholders/shareholders, and financial position”. Two new aspects were the Strong 
Engineering Heritage and not being able to conquer the whole spectrum. The Strong 
Engineering Heritage construct links well with the idea of product driven thinking. While 
the spectrum construct is close to the dilemma of whether to play end to end or just focus 
in the industry. Upon sharing the Word Cloud visual (Figure 25) of the Senior Executive 
Strategic Thinking Survey responses, there was strong agreement expressed but also 
some surprise. For example, the biggest reaction was that the size of the “customer” was 
so small in the visual. The implication and comments referred to the apparent fact that 
TRN’s effort to be “customer centric” was not driving the strategic thinking of the 
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company. Equally strong but considered amusing was the fact that “McKinsey” was 
bigger than the customer. While this was taken in a light-hearted way, it clearly has had a 
negative impact. Namely, in the motivation, opportunity and capability of TRN’s senior 
leaders to engage in strategic thinking. On a more individual level, it was commented and 
supported that individual (and team) financial interest and ego were factors once again 
recognizing “aspirational-level triggers” (Kiesler and Sproull 1982). The consensus was 
that this was unfortunate but true. Finally, the “growth” issue was commented on as a bit 
of a reality check with the following remark that “We don’t do growth well. When you 
really look at it we have had declining revenue (slightly) since 2007”. This was largely 
acknowledged by the group with some impression of surprise by a small portion of the 
participants. 
 
In regards to factors “influencing our Strategic Leader’s Strategic Decisions” there was 
an extremely high correlation and overlap with the constructs impacting the company and 
the survey responses. With minor exceptions such as “ego” and “available information 
including external views”, little variation occurred. While there may have been some 
influence by the use of the survey word cloud visual, the level of openness established in 
the group at this phase of the workshop was already high. These senior executives were 
not shy or hesitant in their responses as was evidenced by their sharing of several 
politically sensitive issues early in the discussion. In addition, this contrast of company 
level considerations followed by individual considerations was an intentional survey 
design feature intended to focus the participants thinking to the critical aspects of this 
research. 
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Figure 28: Prominence Of Strategic Thinking Scales 
 
 
The final sections of the workshop involved reflection on the amount of time senior 
leader’s spend on strategic thinking. The intent was to get an assessment of the 
importance of this task relative to the time and capacity available for the task. 
Throughout the overall data collection of the three projects, the evidence had suggested 
that there was very limited time. As can be seen in Figure 28 the participants rated the 
importance of strategic thinking very high. On the other hand, when considering the 
average amount of time spent by Strategic Leaders on this task the overall scores were 
relatively low. Prior to the rating, a discussion of what is and is not strategic arose. To be 
consistent with earlier data collection “strategic” was not tightly defined as e.g. corporate 
strategy but rather strategic also from the perspective of the individual sphere. This is 
consistent with the role expectations of the TRN Leadership Competency Framework 
(Ulrich and Smallwood 2000). However, some of the variance in the results of this 
exercise may be explained by specific role emphasis of two participants. These 
individuals were closely working with or in the strategy function of TRN and therefore 
likely benchmarked individuals in that function. In the final chart, the individual 
assessments tend to be much higher than the average they have indicated for their overall 
peer population. This is apt to be due to 1) the natural inclination of senior leaders to feel 
they are doing more of what is expected than their peers 2) the fact that the results were 
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being placed by themselves on a wall chart anonymously by an “x” but free for all to see 
in the process. Clearly it would be unusual for high-performing executives to want to be 
seen as less strategic than their peers. Nevertheless, this exercise was also meant to be a 
direct lead into the topic of cognitive strategic flexibility. At this point, the exactly 
written definition was shared by a handout with the reflective question “Is Strategic 
Flexibility alive and doing well in our Senior Leaders? Why? or Why not?”.  
 
The feedback from this question was limited and mixed. The limited feedback could have 
been due to the introduction of the topic so late in the workshop, and thus, there was 
inadequate time and energy. It might also have been due to the academic wording of the 
definition. While these potentially limiting factors may have influenced the level of input, 
the majority of perspectives confirmed that strategic flexibility at the individual cognitive 
level is “constrained, not high, playing by old rules, limited by financials or resources.” 
Nevertheless, the constraint was also expressed in the containment or need for strategic 
alignment with the current strategy. While this is also consistent with the iSCOPE 
framework component discussion on strategic alignment, it may relate to the command 
and control style that had been seen to limit risk taking and strategic thinking in the 
previous data collection.   
 
Overall, the workshop results mirrored closely those of the Senior Executive Strategic 
Thinking Survey Results. The consistency between these two unique groups provides 
increased reliability and confidence in the results. The outcome does add additional 
triangulation of sources and methods that increase the validity of the constructs and their 
temporal relevance to TRN.  
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5.6 Discussion 
 
5.6 .1 Research Questions Revisited 
 
During the initial phase of this research, the working definition of strategic flexibility was 
established as the firm’s intent and capabilities to generate firm-specific real options to 
exploit or respond to its environment. This definition was extended to the individual 
cognitive level of decision makers as the extent to which new and alternative options in 
strategic decision making are generated and considered. In exploring this phenomenon in 
the Case Study, several questions began to emerge. A primary question was how do 
different factors and contexts impact the strategic leader’s potential and motivation for 
cognitive strategic flexibility? Would there be a tendency for TRN to turn core 
competencies into core rigidities as was found to be the case by Leonard-Barton (1992) in 
studies of new product development. Similarly, at the individual level Mintzberg and 
Raisinghani et al. (1976) outlined in their research that “Managers are often seduced by 
familiar alternatives close to the status quo and prefer off the shelf over custom made 
solutions”. Was this preference also to emerge from TRN’s executives? What other 
factors would be revealed? Which of these would be apt to enable or inhibit the case 
company executive’s strategic frames when the “status quo” context shifted at varying 
speeds? Underlying these questions were the theoretical and very pragmatic questions of 
whether cognitive strategic flexibility is really needed? And if so, in which contexts is it 
most essential? The overall outcomes of the answers to these questions influence the 
strategic talent management objectives of TRN. The findings from this research indicate 
that enabling cognitive strategic flexibility is essential to the sustainability of TRN. The 
variation of factors and contexts uncovered suggest that mechanisms supporting cognitive 
flexibility and ambidexterity (including paradoxical thinking) will need to be 
implemented.  Unfortunately, the answers to these questions from the overall findings of 
this research lead to negative implications for TRN’s current state. However, the insights 
and findings gained from the research have effectively informed the methodology and 
objectives for enabling TRN’s change intervention. A more detailed discussion of the 
findings and their repercussions for TRN are covered next.   
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5.6.2 Strategic Frames: The TRN Context 
 
As Lant and Milliken et al. (1992) suggest and this study bears out, despite cognitive 
structures being an individual phenomenon, they are influenced by organizational 
context. Namely, “the organization’s recent performance biases manager’s strategic 
thinking and the range of action managers are likely to take” (Lant and Milliken et al. 
1992). Beinhocker (2006) also argues that firms have a natural tendency to simplify their 
strategic repertoires when they experience success. A particular set of successful 
activities may become an executive’s favorite due to the benefits associated with that 
success. This natural tendency to reduce search is often expressed in common sense terms 
as “if it is not broken don’t try to fix it”. The downside is that it may cause an executive 
to focus more narrowly on their favorite activities (Miller and Chen 1996). This 
phenomenon could be seen in TRN through the predictable responses to growth 
challenges in chasing vertical integration via managed services and in following almost to 
the letter the formulaic strategies of firms in hostile markets as outlined by Potter (1994).  
 
In a similar way, a dominant logic as described by Prahalad and Bettis (1986) can soon 
become embedded in the organization. Miller’s (1991) research on the tenure of CEO’s 
supports these findings and concludes that “the dominant strategic theme becomes 
codified via specialized routines, programs, and even information systems, which 
reinforce the narrowness orientation.” The clear implication is that firm interventions to 
modify strategic frames at the individual level require adjusting the mechanisms and 
systems that create such contexts. The evidence in this research of narrow schema, 
significant cognitive inertia and limited competitive experience in TRN do not bode well 
for aspirations of adaptation and growth (Sull 2005, Nadkarni and Narayanan 2004). 
Bogner and Barr (2000) in their study of strategic persistence have shown how a 
dominant logic can rise above the organizational level to become an industry framework 
or industry recipe. In the telecommunications sector, examples of this can be seen on the 
scale, “inevitability” of consolidation to three players, and “more of the same” rather than 
differentiation paradigms amongst all incumbent players (Repertory Grid Interviewee 
Three). Breaking out of these types of strategic frames can prove to be particularly 
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difficult when the environment continues to provide positive feedback. The motivation to 
seek further strategic options is minimal especially when competitive intelligence 
reinforces strategic convergence. An additional factor in this cognitive inertia can be an 
executive’s long-term tenure with a company (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990). Tenure 
may be further reinforced by industry tenure and the common practice of cross-company 
recruiting as in the telecom industry. Results from this research have indicated that the 
above factors were highly relevant during the first years of the Case Company. For 
example, the previous industry success of both parent companies dominated the 
experience perspective of the majority of the executive population. In the case of one 
parent company, the confidence and success was so prominent that it had been interpreted 
as arrogance by some external stakeholders. As outlined in depth during this Case Study, 
there was very limited capacity to be forward-looking both as an organization and at the 
individual level. Reinforcing this tendency for limited search, sensemaking, and 
consideration of new options over the duration of this research was the consistent 
reduction of the strategy function resources. This reduction resulted in an increased 
dependency for competitive and overall business intelligence from external sources. Part 
of this trend has been caused by the overall cost reduction efforts and the diminishing 
amount of resources and time available put to this activity. Also, the formal “strategy 
sharing” process and related events were streamlined or eliminated. At the time of the last 
data collection of this research, some effort was still being made to gain a feedback loop 
through surveys and interviews of customer facing employees. However, this trend of 
outsourcing sensing and sense-making may have been a factor in causing the “Ivory 
Tower” effect outlined in several of the Project Two interviews. The other contributor to 
the breakdown or distortion in information sharing likely came from the perception of 
risk involved in being the bearer of bad news. This perception was especially the case in 
the more recent atmosphere and practices of the command and control leadership style 
and accompanying mechanisms. When combined with the “McKinsey concepts” factor 
highlighted in the data, it is clear that not only was trust lost but that the opportunity for 
learning and creating a diversity of thought was largely diminished. 
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This research has outlined that the context of the company changed from a relatively 
stable environment to one with change and increasing uncertainty over the duration of the 
study. Much has been written about the impact of stable environments. As indicated in 
the exploitation literature outlined in Chapter 2 there are great benefits to be leveraged in 
landscapes that are not moving at a fast pace. Miller and Lant et al.’s (1996) research 
interest in strategic simplicity has supported the conclusion that in stable environments 
that are free of new challenges, firms will increasingly continue “to march towards 
simplicity”. Hall (1984) goes further to state that “Continued growth and profitability 
might even confirm and strengthen outdated models” especially in munificent markets. 
Hedberg and Jonsson’s (1997) findings already hint at one of the possible factors 
inhibiting strategic flexibility. The authors claim that “Munificence not only delays 
recognition of the need for change but also slows or prevents the development of 
alternative models.” By contrast, despite the relatively weak performance of the case 
company, there did not seem to be much motivation to change. Shimizu and Hitt’s (2004) 
research indicate that this is not uncommon and point out that firms can have poor 
performance for years “without deciding to commit further or withdraw”. The authors 
point out that it is often and external factor that is the catalyst for such strategic decisions. 
In the TRN case findings, the external lens of Private Equity groups and the pending 
implications were an example of this need for an outside catalyst. The context of 
“complacency” during the earlier years might have been the result of the combined effect 
of factors such as the merger euphoria and related expectation of success. Additionally, 
the practice of emphasizing operating margin (rather than overall profitability) while 
having the perceived assurance that “mom and dad” are always there to help out may also 
have been another supporting factor. However, as evidenced in the Central Senior 
Executive interview, even some of the most central key players did not effectively sense 
or interpret signals that were clearly there to be seen. Instead, the evidence from this 
research suggests that TRN and its executives focused on a narrow if not a simple set of 
strategic options. 
 
The implication and connotation of this strategic simplicity are likely to be seen as a 
negative one. Yet it does not necessarily imply inertia. It may, in fact, involve a very 
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active level of decision making. Miller and Chen (1996) have defined it as “a tendency of 
some firms to concentrate on just a few central activities.” As has been pointed out this 
may be intentional, efficient and more than appropriate especially when following a 
classic generic strategy such as the focus option outlined by Porter (1980) and others such 
as Rumelt and Schendel et al. (1995). Alternatively, this activeness can be problematic as 
noted by Sull (2005) in his observation that “Companies fall prey to active inertia, 
responding to even the most disruptive market shifts by accelerating activities that 
succeeded in the past”  Sull (2005). In the TRN case study, the active inertia was largely 
related to achieving cost efficiency first for survival but increasingly as a primary source 
of competitive advantage. This tendency is alarming for two reasons. First, Chinese 
competitors in the telecommunications industry have several low-cost base advantages 
that are difficult to match and less stakeholder pressure for short-term results. These 
Chinese competitors also seek diversification strategies through conglomerate structures 
that have advantages in emerging markets and also allow cross-subsidization and 
economies of scope in mature markets (Khanna and Palepu 2006). Secondly, recent 
studies by Raynor and Ahmed (2013) highlight the rarity of success and question the 
overall viability of cost leadership as a strategy. As Goddard and Eccles (2013) 
summarize the findings and their implications “Strategy is the rare and precious skill of 
staying one step ahead of the need to be efficient.” 
 
There are other factors that can result in strategic simplicity. These include factors such 
as lack of breadth in competitive experience or complacency due to age or size (Miller 
and Chen 1996). While in the recent TRN context complacency was no longer a likely 
factor, the lack of breadth of competitive experience could have come into play as a 
handicap. First, as has been evidenced in this research, there is a sense amongst many 
senior executives that the Case Company’s current focus strategy will not be sustainable 
in the long run. The questioning of sustainability may be due to the vulnerability of 
depending on the niche and the capability to defend the position while the competitive 
landscape continues to evolve with new direct competitor entrants. Secondly, the 
converging of the wider eco-system threatens the profitability of not just the Case 
Company but of its customers as well. Thirdly, the emphasis on customer centricity while 
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needed may blind TRN to new product development (Christensen 1998). Related to this 
is an increased emphasis on Totally Quality Management coming primarily through 
competencies and related strategic frames of an acquired (failing) acquisition target. 
Therefore, significant attention has been directed to dated repertoires from the industry 
recipe via an unsuccessful former competitor. Finally, the choice of a focused strategy 
brings potential contradiction to the “scale” construct as a means for competitive 
advantage. For TRN to achieve competitive sustainability, the implication is that it will 
need to find new ways to compensate for its focused approach and narrow competitive 
experience.  
 
With the uncertain horizon, the challenge of executing in a focused area while 
anticipating the future became increasingly relevant. As expressed by one of TRN’s most 
influential Executive Board members when referring to the competencies needed for its 
leaders, “strategic insight is lacking and crucial for our future success” (TRN Executive 
Board Member, S. 2013, pers. Comm., 7 October). Contrastingly,  the evidence from this 
research also supports the existence of a more recent intention to reinforce the simplicity 
mindset. As noted above, this can be extremely effective in reducing distractions and 
focusing attention on achieving high performance or at minimum operational efficiency 
in the current landscape. This emphasis on operational efficiency during the TRN 
turnaround has led to several TRN Executive Board members seeing it as a competitive 
advantage. Consistent with this belief, TRN chose to pursue a modified “Execution 
Edge” archetype (Keller and Price 2011). While this generic definition of an Execution 
Edge company is not just about operational efficiency the archetype’s name resonates 
well with the focus of TRN’s turnaround. At the same time, several TRN Executive 
Board members have continued to support the need for innovation and growth that imply 
other archetype choices illustrated in Appendix 5 (EB OHI workshop 2013).  
 
This paradoxical tension between the two alternatives is outlined in detail in the 
ambidexterity literature (Lavie and Stettner et al. 2010). The solution to TRN’s dilemma 
may not lay in the choice of the archetype. Rather it may be resolved via complementary 
organizational designs of structural and contextual ambidexterity. The complementary 
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overlap of leadership and management design mechanisms from the strategic flexibility 
and ambidexterity literature have potential to support both paradoxical thinking and 
cognitive strategic flexibility. Just as fast moving and slow moving clock speeds impact 
strategic frames so do organizational mechanisms and structures (Mom and van den 
Bosch et al. 2007, Ghoshal and Bartlett 1994). As this implies, there are several relevant 
strategic schematic concepts that are of interest for the TRN context. At the individual 
cognitive level two of these, complex and focus of strategic schemas, were referenced 
earlier in the discussion of industry clock speed research by Nadkarni and Narayanan 
(2004). By contrast to the simplicity described previously, Walsh (1995) defines 
complexity as the breadth or variety of environmental, strategy, and organizational 
concepts embedded in a schema as well as the degree of connectedness among these 
concepts. Complexity enables firms and individuals to attend and respond to more stimuli 
and as pointed out by Weick (1995) “organizations with more varied images will engage 
in sense-making that is more adaptive than will organizations with more limited 
vocabularies.” Clearly these attributes described by Walsh and Weick are prerequisites 
for TRN to achieve its aspiration of becoming strategically flexible. The TRN contextual 
dynamics established in Project One of this research provide significant evidence that 
there has not been a “breadth or variety of environmental, strategy, and organizational 
concepts.” The preliminary constructs further evidenced in the repertory grid interviews 
of Project Two reinforce the existence of narrow schema at the individual cognitive level. 
While the scale of interviews was purposeful yet small in number, the results indicate the 
presence of many factors that hinder the potential for breadth and variety of strategic 
schemas. A focused schema by contrast “is the degree to which a strategic schema is 
centralized around a few core concepts”. As has been more extensively evidenced across 
all three projects of this research, TRN appears to have focused schema around a limited 
number of concepts such as cost-efficiency, consolidation, scale and growth primarily 
through forward integration (Porac and Rosa 1996, Nadkarni and Narayanan 2004). 
Focused schema set the boundary of concepts attended to more tightly and intuitively 
restrict the breadth of options considered and thus implemented. The repercussion is that 
cognitive strategic flexibility has been largely underdeveloped in TRN.  
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As referenced previously in regards to the work done by Kosonen and Doz (2008), the 
two strategic cognitive characteristics of strategic insight and foresight were central 
phenomenon present in the strategic frames of the case executives. This research showed 
that with these characteristics, it was not whether one or the other was present. Rather it 
was to what degree each was present and which one might tend to dominate an 
executive’s strategic frame in the case study’s context.   
 
Figure 29 below shows a theoretical correlation between industry clock speed and the 
strategic frame of the firms in those industries as outlined in Nadkarni and Narayanan’s 
(2004) study.  Based on the theory of Doz and Kosonen (2008) an additional placement 
of their constructs has been made by the researcher. The placement suggests a possible 
association between Strategic Insight and fast clock speed industries and a parallel 
association between Strategic Foresight with slow clock speed industries.  
 
 
Figure 29: Clock Speed And Cognitive Frames 
 
While both of these approaches indicate that different strategies, structures and thinking 
are needed in fast changing environments, they tend to assume that firms operate 
primarily in one dimension or the other. This assumption likely holds true for the 
majority of firms operating in the industries that were classified into fast and slow clock 
speeds by Fine (as cited in Nadkarni and Narayanan 2004). However, as indicated earlier 
a central assumption of this research has been that some truly global firms operate in 
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contexts that cannot be distinctly classified as either fast changing or slow changing but 
rather are combinations of both. As outlined in Project One, there is support for this 
assumption in the telecommunications industry due to the existence of mixed speeds 
across the three dimensions of industry clock speed. This variation is further affected due 
to the global reach and the resulting range of market diversity. As Prahalad and Bettis 
(1986) have suggested, “managing diverse businesses should yield increased cognitive 
complexity.” Further, Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) propose that executives managing 
greater international scope should also have more complex cognitive maps than those of 
national scope. 
 
Given the extensive range of definitions of markets and environments in the literature and 
the results outlined in this research it is clear that speed of change is not the only relevant 
factor influencing the strategic frames of the Case Company’s executives. As evidenced 
in this research the case company appears to be experiencing stable and unstable, fast and 
slow and other contrasting environment factors simultaneously. This variation has the 
potential to provide mixed signals, uncertainty, and conflicting environmental feedback. 
Some of this dynamic was confirmed in the “Ivory Tower” versus “Front Lines” 
disconnect uncovered in this researchs’ findings. Also, several of the repertory grid 
interviews and survey responses express that market variation has indeed resulted in 
domain conflict. This conflict is primarily a result of self-interest over perceived 
corporate priorities/preference in various priority or strategic markets. 
 
As was revealed in the Project One interview of a former Head of Strategy and Business 
Development and illustrated in Figure 10 Chapter 3, the added dimension of emerging to 
mature market has been another factor impacting the strategic frames of the Case 
Company’s executives. This existing continuum would intuitively place different 
demands on the strategic thinking of the organization’s executives similarly to managing 
diverse businesses (Prahalad and Bettis 1986).  One might expect that mature markets 
tend to have more established rules of engagement, reduced new competitive entrants and 
advanced product knowledge (Aaker 1995). These relatively more stable environments 
should, therefore, allow for longer planning horizons, exploitation of assets and “strategic 
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schema, generally developed through gradual elaboration and feedback over a long 
period of time” (Prahalad and Bettis 1986, March 1991, Nadkarni and Narayanan 2004). 
In these market contexts, the criteria for learning and feedback would make strategic or 
expert intuition beneficial (Klein 2003).  By contrast, emerging markets might tend to 
have characteristics of uncertain environments with a greater variety of stimuli and faster 
changing factors correlated with fast clock speed industries (Nadkarni and Narayanan 
2004). These factors suggest that emerging markets would experience more turbulence 
and, therefore, depending on intuition or automatic cognitive processing would be less 
reliable (Reger and Palmer 1996). According to the research of Reger and Palmer (1996), 
the additional implication is that there would tend to be less consensus amongst managers 
within the firm and more constructs supporting cognitive complexity at the market level 
as a whole. 
 
When considering the separation and continuum of dimensions proposed by the 
researcher in Figure 29 the correlation would suggest a natural match between focused 
schema with a mature market and complex schema with emerging markets. The 
application of this principle can be problematic in practice. For example, in the TRN 
case, strategic leaders are frequently responsible for a scope of markets that represent a 
range of market contexts. There is the probability of finding markets, units, and roles 
where focused schema will be satisfactory or even preferred. On the other hand, the range 
of contexts outlined above further justifies the aspiration to enable effective paradoxical 
thinking and cognitive strategic flexibility for all TRN leaders. Therefore, the challenge 
will be to promote the development of strategic flexibility within the entire firm. As 
previously noted, leveraging lessons learned from the ambidexterity literature on 
mechanisms that enable contextual ambidexterity will also be beneficial. However, the 
complexity of the task remains substantial. To assist in managing this complexity, the 
utilization of the iSCOPE diagnostic framework will be delineated next in Chapter Six. 
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6. 0 The iSCOPE Framework: An Integrating Tool 
 
As referenced earlier in the methods section of this research “The outcome of an 
inductive analysis is the development of categories into a model or framework that 
summarizes the raw data and conveys key themes and processes.” (Thomas 2006). When 
considering the relatively wide range of data collected and the complex number of factors 
and contexts influencing the level of cognitive strategic flexibility in TRN’s executives a 
framework for understanding and planning a response was needed. Since the iSCOPE 
framework was induced directly from the TRN case study data and was built upon 
relevant theoretical literature, it was used as an intervention lens. It proved to be 
extremely useful as a pragmatic yet conceptually based integrative diagnostic tool. The 
researcher has used the six components of the framework to: 
 
i) Structure the current state of TRN’s potential for cognitive strategic flexibility 
from the research findings.  
ii)  Develop reflective questions to gain insights into the impact of each component, 
the relationships between the components and their implications.  
iii)  Propose and implement actions to enable TRN’s potential for cognitive strategic 
flexibility.  
 
While the iSCOPE framework was not considered or operationalized in a sequential 
methodology, it is presented in that structure below. It should be noted that there are 
many interdependencies amongst the components of the iSCOPE framework. Like many 
frameworks, the components should be considered in an iterative process to enhance the 
overall understanding and relationships of the phenomenon. In the coverage below, 
current state analysis and gaps will be discussed. TRN intervention actions will be 
covered in more depth in Chapter 7. 
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6.1 The Intent Component 
 
As this research has evidenced, Intent or goal orientation has been a central challenge for 
TRN.  From the initial merger complexity through to increasing financial and competitive 
pressure, the answer to the overall directional question has been lacking. This research 
has extensively outlined that the “short-termism” mindset or temporal myopia (Miller 
2002) has been deep and long lasting in TRN. While the idea of strategic intent as first 
espoused by Hamel and Prahalad (1989) may be overly ambitious, to enhance the 
possibility of sustainability extended strategic horizons need to be taken into account. 
The cost of focusing on short-term benefits to the detriment of longer term outcomes is 
one consequence of this mindset. Hines and Bishop (2006) describe this as “the fix that 
fails”. In other words, it is implementing “a short-term solution that increases the long-
term problem” (Hines and Bishop 2006). Another area of improvement would be to 
implement mechanisms and practices that would support the broadening of TRN leader’s 
strategic frames. The intent would be to enable cognitive strategic flexibility at cascaded 
levels within the firm.  
 
Sharfman and Dean (1997) point out that “to adapt, managers often must make flexible 
choices that are unusual, innovative or, at a minimum different from the norm”. This 
research’s findings suggest that TRN was increasingly in a state of exploiting the current 
environment and struggled with the question of where and how to find profitable growth. 
The strategic responses highlighted in the repertory grid interviews are a clear example of 
the inability of TRN to consider effectively and exploit dimensions such as related 
diversification, adjacent markets, monetized innovation, new business models or 
significant new profit pools. Building on the insights and research of Weick (1995) and 
Walsh (1995) and the conditions established in this research it is evident that TRN could 
greatly benefit from the development of complex strategic schema to enable “more 
sensemaking that is more varied and adaptive.” Providing more autonomy to leaders to 
allow them to decide the appropriate emphasis or degree of focus in the overall exploit 
and explore tradeoff is a minimum start (Raisch and Birkinshaw et al. 2009, Gibson and 
Birkinshaw 2004). However, this increased intention towards achieving a more 
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ambidextrous organization requires a longer term perspective that has direct implications 
on the degree of and form of strategic flexibility required by the firm (Lavie and Stettner 
et al. 2010, Goddard and Eccles 2013). The structural and contextual ambidexterity 
approaches need to be combined with soft wiring mechanisms that promote more focus 
on value-creating activities of differentiation, intrapreneurship, and innovation.  
 
6.2 The Strategic Foresight Component  
 
TRN’s Strategic foresight capability is related to its intent on two temporal dimensions. 
The first can be considered as related to the ability to sense and make sense of shorter 
term complex situations as they arise and the ability to take advantage of them. As this 
research has highlighted, TRN has not been able to make timely and speedy decisions. 
Also given the relative rollercoaster ride of strategic responses and poor financial 
performance outlined throughout this research, it is fair to say that TRN has not been able 
to exploit or effectively be strategically responsive. The second temporal dimension can 
be considered as sensing and anticipating longer-term trends and their strategic 
implications more effectively than its competitors. The importance of this capability is 
captured by repertory grid interviewee number two when he states, “somebody needs to 
win the war and not just the battle.” Strategic flexibility and effective execution require 
an organization to have regular and accurate communication in its hierarchy. The “Ivory 
Tower” phenomenon brought to light in this research is a central inhibitor to the level of 
realism and pragmatism in TRN’s strategic thinking and planning. As a result, some 
related factors need to be addressed to enhance and enable strategic foresight in TRN. 
First an overall culture of trust needs to be re-established. This trust includes security of 
position and safety from consequences of bearing bad or contrarian news and 
perspectives for those communicating upwards in the firm. It also involves downward 
trust in the quality and expertise of the leadership pipeline so that the messages received 
from below are acted upon and valued. An increased level of transparency and realism in 
downward information sharing mechanisms is another requirement to move from a 
perception of “propaganda” coming downward. This realism would also better inform 
and increase the value of responsive information flowing upward. Mom and van den 
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Bosch et al. (2007) research on information inflows indicate specific relationships 
supporting exploitation or exploration activities. The authors find that top-down 
knowledge inflows tend to be unambiguous, help in effectively and efficiently solving 
existing activities and increase depth in existing knowledge bases rather than breadth. 
While TRN can benefit in this directional communication to enhance alignment and trust, 
it is unlikely to assist in building cognitive complexity. Bottom-up knowledge inflows do 
increase variety in experience and can be a “major source of exploratory learning by 
adding new knowledge to a recipient’s existing knowledge base” (Mom and van den 
Bosch et al. 2007). The current state of bottom-up knowledge inflows in TRN is 
restricted as upward feedback has not been welcomed. Systems to encourage weak 
signals had been discontinued, and as evidenced in the data collection there was in 
several cases a perception that strategic thinking from direct reports was not sought after 
by line managers. Clearly this condition is a long way from the principles and cultural 
heritage of the legacy parent company. In addition to impacting engagement levels, it has 
also stunted the potential for rich and diverse sources of constructs. The final and even 
more promising findings of the authors are that horizontal inflows provide knowledge 
that is ambiguous, complex and tacit. This inflow helps managers “interpret ambiguous 
and complex issues” developing skills, not unlike paradoxical thinking (Mom and van 
den Bosch et al. 2007). These horizontal inflows also increase the breadth of knowledge 
bases and have “been found to enhance innovation and the creation of new knowledge”. 
Therefore, structures, processes, mechanisms or activities that promote and stimulate 
cross-fertilization of knowledge bases should support the potential for cognitive strategic 
flexibility. While this factor has not been intentionally restricted, it has also not been 
promoted or leveraged. Given the tendency to protect one’s own turf during a turnaround 
context, it is plausible that horizontal flows have not been flourishing in TRN.  Overall a 
great number of factors need to be adjusted to improve the practice and skills of strategic 
foresight including valuing it as a key competence not to be outsourced to consultants.  
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6.3 The Constraints Component 
 
The constraints component is strongly related to the perception of the degree of free will 
an individual or organization has in making strategic decisions. As Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2005) note, this perception is influenced by sense making as it is primary in informing 
and constraining “identity and action.” This perception can be about the assessment made 
regarding feasible resources, competitive landscape conditions or relevant factors in the 
wider macro environment. In TRN, a recurring and central constraining factor was the 
perception of financial health or “limited financial resources”. This research evidences 
that very real resource limits did exist. Yet, it also demonstrates that it resulted in the 
company reducing the effort for search and consideration of strategic options beyond a 
very narrow set of strategic schema. Reinforcing this narrow focus was the implied 
connotation that TRN “can’t afford to take risks” (Moscow interviewee 3). With the 
additional focus on operational efficiency during the turnaround, the implication was 
reinforced by the exploitation mindset. In the words of Tushman and Euchner (2015) 
“The exploit culture is a culture of not making any mistakes; it's a culture of discipline; 
it's a culture of process.” 
 
An additional factor constraining search and consideration of options was the divergence 
of the original two parent companies’ perspectives on risk. While Company R is no 
longer legally extant in TRN there are stakeholders remaining that may still represent a 
more conservative risk outlook.  
 
The short term point of view mentioned in the intent component section along with low 
financial slack created a perceived psychological insecurity around job safety and very 
real pressure for results. When cascaded throughout TRN it also influenced search and 
consideration of options by limiting the time horizon for results and the perception of 
what would be acceptable. In the words of Moscow Survey Respondent 9 it “tells people 
what they are supposed to do”. The implication is that the employees who embrace 
following process thrive while those who prefer autonomy and free thinking tend to leave. 
According to the Central Senior Executive interviewee “we have narrowed our executive 
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profile”. The impact of this on the former TRN culture and values of open dialogue, 
transparency, and autonomy, was significant. To make matters even more challenging the 
time for individuals to think strategically was also condensed or as this research suggests, 
only to be done if there was capacity for it after meeting other demands of the job. In an 
almost self-fulfilling cycle, the poor financial performance also created a very low human 
slack and depletion of the leadership and general employee pipeline (Mousa and 
Chowdhury 2014). Beyond the burden of doing the same with less, the impact was that 
many senior leaders needed to spend more time supporting inexperienced direct reports 
and less on thinking strategically or innovatively. As noted in the research of  Voss and 
Sirdeshmukh et al. (2008), there are divergent findings on the positive and negative 
effects of organizational slack and whether it promotes exploration or exploitation or not. 
The findings in this research complement and provide evidence of a negative 
relationship. TRN’s more recent financial enhancement through divestiture will allow it 
to make gradual increases of organizational slack. It also lifts the psychological limits of 
financial health. However, a culture change will be needed as well. Encouragement of 
calculated risk, investing earlier in entrepreneurial ideas, investing in selective high-
profile big bets and making “failing fast” and learning a no penalty principle are all easy 
prescriptions. Their successful if not challenging implementation will support 
consideration of new and innovative strategic options. 
 
6.4 The Orientation Component 
 
When considering the orientation component and the degree that TRN and its leaders 
focus internally or externally, we can see a variety of factors. One that is related to the 
constraints component and the perceived degree of control is whether the strategic frames 
in TRN were/are reactive or proactive in nature (Evans 1991). The data from this 
research supports the former orientation. This orientation is supported by statements such 
as the first repertory grid interviewee’s regarding the original lack of differentiating intent 
of being a follower or “doing what the big guy does”. The previously noted reactive state 
to Private Equity groups is another relatively high-profile example where TRN chose to 
take turnaround steps internally before they were done to them (forced on them). Perhaps 
an overriding metaphor that symbolizes the reactive strategic frame is the perception of 
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TRN strategy as aiming to be one of the “last bears standing.” As noted earlier this 
strategic frame could be interpreted to be in line with the “reserving the right to play” 
intentions outlined by Courtney and Kirkland et al. (1997). The results of this research 
did not find support for a conclusion that TRN was proactively pursuing this posture at a 
strategic or tactical level.   
 
Another factor of orientation is the inside-outside dimension. This dimension is also 
connected to other framework components especially to strategic foresight. Research has 
shown that access to external market information and responsiveness to that information 
is strongly correlated to business performance (Cano and Carrillat et al.  2004). 
Interestingly research by the Corporate Executive Board finds that macro events that are 
uncontrollable factors external to a company (regulatory actions, economic downturns, 
geopolitical events and currency fluctuations) account for a small percentage of “stall 
points” or corporate crises (Olson and Bever et al. 2008). What this study by Olson and 
Bever et al. (2008) highlights is that “the vast majority of stall factors result from a 
choice about strategy or organizational design. They are, in other words, controllable by 
management”. This finding indicates that management has much more discretion over its 
environment than may be perceived. It is also behind the sentiment of the following 
observation regarding the fate of companies being “that companies are rarely killed; they 
prefer to commit suicide” (Goddard and Eccles 2013). 
 
For TRN, this orientation has been measured via an externally managed survey called the 
Organizational Health Index (OHI). This instrument defines External Orientation as “the 
quality of engagement with customers, suppliers, partners, and other external 
stakeholders to drive value” (Keller and Price 2011). The resulting score for TRN in 2013 
was 63% which is in the 3rd quartile. This relatively low score is described as “Directs the 
energy of the organization inward”.  As cited in the review of literature Beer (1985) 
might categorize this as an “inside and now” focus on near-term improvements. This 
categorization would be consistent with the operational efficiency emphasis in TRN at 
the time of the survey. It may also be related to a more resource-based-view given the 
heavy investments needed in the telecommunications sector. The danger as Bogner and 
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Barr (2000) have noted is that a resource-based view’s “emphasis on the cumulative 
weight of past decisions” impacts thinking about the future by focusing on fixed assets, 
established channels of distribution” and other historically based assumptions. This type 
of strategic frame increases the probability of narrowing cognitive frameworks and 
increasing cognitive path dependency. The related strategic frames also come back to the 
balance of ambidexterity. Unfortunately, the industry dominant logic may have been 
influenced by the historic and significant restructuring of the current market share leader. 
During the 1990s, Company E had a strong focus on exploration. However during the 
high-tech bubble it experienced an industry first in the very visible lay-off of 60,000 
people. According to SBD Head interviewee 1 and SBD Head interviewee 2, this has 
made a lasting cautionary impression at the industry level. However, as the OHI indicates, 
without an appropriate external engagement TRN’s longer term sustainability is at risk. 
As indicated in the data from the repertory grid interviews and further confirming data 
collection in Project Three, decisions that were externally related tended to come rather 
late. The limited focus and attention to the external orientation was seen in this research 
in multiple ways beyond the OHI. For example, the fact that in the word cloud 
representation from Project Three “McKinsey Concepts” is larger than the “Customer” in 
influencing strategic thinking and decision making represents the weakness of the 
orientation. As noted in the constraints section, not having time and investment in 
effectively recognizing the external environment and wider eco-system (OTT) is a factor 
that limits the strategic options considered and their implications. Goddard (2014) makes 
an apt contrarian observation related to this inward cost focused mindset in his suggestion 
for revising Profit and Loss statements. He suggests a method of shifting frames by 
instead of devoting “a single line to revenues and a long list of lines to costs, imagine 
reversing this order of priority by breaking down revenues into multiple lines according 
to the source of sales and, conversely aggregating all costs into a single line.” While this 
is a playful idea, it accurately represents the TRN focus and danger of not appreciating 
sufficiently the sources of value creation. Shifting the balance of such frames is an 
underlying motivation and design principle of TRN’s new Leadership Framework, 
competencies and supporting mechanisms. 
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6.5 The Process Component 
  
The “how” of strategic decision making or process component in TRN has not been 
consistent over the time of this research. The context has had a large influence. For 
example, as noted in Project One, the level of participation from contributors farther 
down in the organization or from those who are getting signals on the front lines 
depended greatly on the stage of evolution and the sophistication of the company. The 
faltering of the translation of the strategy at the start of the merger integration resulted in 
a lack of clarity and alignment in the cascading of priorities. Over time, the factor of trust 
began to erode between management layers. This erosion created the “Ivory Tower” 
effect resulting in poorly informed decisions at the top followed by misguided directives 
being cascaded. Since these directives were based on “managed” information they 
increasingly came into conflict with front lines interests that were more in touch with 
reality on the ground. With a parallel decline in performance, the question of discipline 
and accountability became a central issue and campaign. As noted previously heavy 
governance over the process of decision making and increased top-down control was 
implemented. While this increased rigor in process it may have had selective exceptions. 
Repertory Grid Interviewee Four brought this to light when describing some cases as 
“decision by slideware”, especially when there was close alignment of the direction of the 
decision and the dominant logic of the industry. 
 
From the strategic flexibility perspective “planning flexibility” is a critical aspect of a 
firm’s ability to be flexible (Sanchez 1997). One element of this has processes that are 
open to new ideas, sources of information (internally and externally), and options 
generated from these sources (Sharfman and Dean 1997, Smith and Tushman 2005). The 
second element relates more to the rigidity of the process and the emphasis on the 
strategic planning philosophy. Will the firm choose to be more planned and deliberate or 
more emergent (Mintzberg 1990)? The deliberate approach tends to be more top-down 
with the benefit of consistency and efficiency. Emergent strategic planning tends to be 
more “informal, flexible and empowering” (Dibrell and Down et al. 2007). The 
implications are that deliberate strategic planning seeks less deviation to the extent that it 
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can cause cognitive rigidity whereas emergent planning has the potential to be more 
responsive to changing customer needs and environments (Dibrell and Down et al. 2007). 
In practice, these two perspectives work hand in hand (Mintzberg 1990). The key is to 
design the level of planning flexibility to the context requirement. From the process 
standpoint, mechanisms that enable the efficiencies of routines while building in strategic 
checkpoints or awareness to external triggers improve the balance between deliberate and 
emergent planning (Dibrell and Down et al. 2007). These methods allow for frequent 
review, revision and adaptation of decision making and thus more planning and decision-
making flexibility. The caveat is that emergent planning needs formal processes and 
practices to ensure that change occurs (Shimizu and Hitt 2004, Dibrell and Down et al. 
2007).  
 
The findings from this case study have indicated that TRN suffered in its decision-
making process due to divergent parent company’s outlook on risk and business models. 
This tension is now a minimal factor due to the repurchase of shares and sole ownership 
of the firm in 2013 to one parent company. There will, however, be a lingering impact 
from the heavy governance and loss of autonomy of decision-making during the 
turnaround. Extensive use of consultants has also lessened the opportunity for 
organizational and individual learning during that period. If, in addition, the “leadership 
profile has narrowed” with a loss of “free thinkers” then the journey to establish the 
potential for strategic flexibility will be longer and more challenging. The planned 
transformations arising from this research do include differentiation of planning and 
decision-making processes by context and units. Further, a return to a cascaded increased 
autonomy of decision-making via both process and expectations is underway. This action 
is consistent with the aspiration for enabling cognitive strategic flexibility. As Raisch and 
Birkinshaw et al. (2009) emphasizes, “Organizational contexts that provide managers 
with decision-making authority are likely to stimulate richer sense-making and cognitive 
processes at the personal level.” The adjustments will need to start from the top for 
various change management reasons. The need for interventions at the TRN Executive 
Board member level to shift strategic frames has been acknowledged and supported by 
the current TRN CEO. 
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6.6. The Emotion Component 
 
The emotion component relates to how strategic decisions affect both individuals and 
groups. Social Motivation theories include a range of emotionally motivated factors 
including aspirations of personal interest and social approval. The TRN research 
uncovered several of these including the personal interest of the senior leaders in the 
original merger decision, market domain conflict, potential payout interest from Private 
Equity, decisions related to goal motivation being done by “slideware” or narrowed 
cognitive search to justify past commitments (Kiesler and Sproull 1982). Shimizu and 
Hitt (2004) note this danger from their research where they found that the personal 
interest of managers can prolong commitment in the hope “of salvaging their careers.”  
The likely consequences of this type of behavior are summarized well in the words of 
TRN repertory grid interviewee number two in his lessons learned from this emotion 
when he observes that “I have learned that hope is not a very good business strategy.” 
Such personal interest can also impact and involve considerable ethical soul searching. 
As was noted by repertory grid interviewee number five´s observation that one’s 
decisiveness can be questioned in terms of whether it is motivated by protecting oneself 
or “moving forward to a place where you want to be?”  
 
Additional emotional factors uncovered from the case study were related to levels of 
engagement. Empowerment or control over decision making seemed to add to whether an 
individual’s response was mechanical or involved discretionary effort and passion in 
execution. Another engagement related factor was the subjective value placed on the 
intent of the strategic decision, the means for achieving it and the probability of its 
success. These factors tended to impact the emotional adjectives used by interviewees 
such as visionary or value destroying. The factors described here are not unique to TRN 
and tend to play out in ad hoc and individualized circumstances. These symptoms are 
partial motivation for this research’s recommendation of Corporate Values renewal in 
TRN during 2013. However, the most effective responses to these factors are to take on 
board systematic principles and processes prescribed in the literature for limiting decision 
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bias (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Snowden and Boone 2007, Kahneman and Lovallo et 
al. 2011, Lovallo and Sibony 2006, Roxburgh 2003, Sargut and McGrath 2011).   
  
These prescriptions will be embedded into TRN through programs, processes, training 
and coaching of management decision making and approval processes. However, more 
problematic emotional factors impacting decision making and the potential for strategic 
flexibility are related to systemic issues. Kanter (2003) provides a particularly accurate 
mirror of the emotional state of TRN in her analysis of firms in decline. Her description 
of the psychology and emotional state of companies is as follows:  “Decline causes 
managers to dislike and avoid one another, hide information and deny responsibility” 
(Kanter 2003).  The intense pressure, personal interest, and threat in TRN resulted in very 
similar emotions and behavior being evidenced in the case study. Kanter (2003) depicts a 
typical self-perpetuating cycle of decline as following phases of “ secrecy and denial,  
blame and scorn, avoidance and turf protection, passivity and helplessness.”  TRN’s 
version of this included “ivory tower” effects, lack of accountability, risk avoidance, self-
protection rather than collaboration, and management by fear tactics.  Kanter (2003) also 
describes the Invensys case where continuous restructuring created “a culture of fear and 
had reduced employee initiative.”  TRN faced similar levels of restructuring and fear that 
also resulted in significant voluntary turnover due to conflicting values and intolerance 
for the command and control leadership style. 
 
Recent research by Vuori and Huy (2015) at Nokia found that the fear emotion impacted 
information flows similarly to the ivory tower effects in TRN. The authors’ research 
reveals at least two levels of fear emotion “Top managers were afraid of external 
competitors and shareholders while middle managers were mainly afraid of internal 
groups, including superiors and peers” (Vuori and Huy 2015). The result was that top 
managers put intense pressure on middle managers but did not fully share the seriousness 
of external threats. These actions also led to “Middle managers’ internally focused fear 
reducing their tendency to share negative information with top managers, leading top 
managers to develop an overly optimistic perception of their organization’s technological 
capabilities and neglect long-term investments in developing innovation” (Vuori and Huy 
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2015). The description of these factors has a close correlation with images portrayed by 
repertory grid interviewees in TRN regarding discrepancies between the realities in the 
field and the overly optimistic world at “HQ”.  Further, the Nokia research highlights 
similar results as evidenced in the TRN research of a general hesitance of senior leaders 
and middle managers to engage in open strategic debate or communicate potential 
problems (Vuori and Huy 2015).  Given the overall poor responsiveness and outcome for 
the Nokia devices business, the close parallel of psychological and emotional factors in 
TRN is worrisome. Vuori and Huy’s (2015) study takes an attention-based view of the 
firm and is, therefore, highly relevant to a firm’s potential for strategic flexibility. The 
authors demonstrate how shared emotions can hinder the “integration of attention, 
resulting in temporal myopia”. If TRN is to avoid a similar destiny, it must transform 
itself. Kanter’s (2003) research proposes several actions that can help turnarounds on an 
emotional level. She emphasizes the importance of the “Leadership task of restoring 
people’s confidence in themselves and one another” (Kanter 2003). To counter the 
previous command and control styles of leadership, the new TRN Leadership framework 
emphasizes the supportive and challenging styles. Both of these styles are known to 
support engagement, foster innovation and increase decisiveness and risk-taking (Heifitz 
and Grashow et al. 2009). Kanter (2003) also recommends i) promoting dialogue, ii) 
engendering respect (a newly created TRN value), iii) collaboration across departments 
(which enhances innovation and the creation of new knowledge) and iv) inspiring 
initiative through empowerment. In addition to addressing all of these factors, plans for 
addressing the other five iSCOPE components have been proposed by the researcher. The 
next chapter will illustrate the journey of this framework’s findings, and insights into 
practice and theoretical contributions. 
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7.0 Ideas In Practice 
 
The inductive research process held within the Case Company resulted in a systematic 
analysis of identified problems and possible solutions derived from academic theory. The 
TRN intervention utilized and adapted the concepts described in earlier sections of this 
research with the intent of contributing to both management practice and theory. The 
description that follows focuses mainly on outcomes from the research’s findings 
however the implications go far beyond the scope and time horizon of this writing 
. 
 
7.1 The Journey Of Enabling Strategic Flexibility In TRN 
 
Based on the initial results and preliminary conclusions induced from Project One the 
researcher presented the high-level findings to the Head of TRN’s Center of Expertise 
(COE) during late November of 2011. This presentation resulted in the formation of a 
four-member COE sub-team for the purpose of exploring and investigating TRN’s 
Leadership, Culture and Values alignment. The team included TRN’s Head of COE, the 
Head of Organizational Development, the Head of Talent Management and Leadership 
Development and the Researcher (Head of Executive Development). The favorable 
reception of this research’s initial findings was aided by the heightened awareness of a 
need for change due to the recentness of a launch of a major restructuring carried out to 
achieve a financial turnaround. To help in the execution of that turnaround, a new set of 
principles was introduced and rolled out aggressively across the organization. The 
“Discipline, Accountability and Profit Mindset” (DAP) program was initiated in 
combination with harsh changes in management practices and an overall Command and 
Control leadership style. The additional negative impact of these actions on the potential 
for cognitive strategic flexibility has been clearly outlined in the research findings. 
However, the overall level of awareness and understanding of the implications of these 
actions were limited and unclear in TRN. Therefore, informal research and dialogue were 
carried out by the team including a formal presentation of the researcher’s high-level 
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findings from both Project One and Two in August 2012. The COE subteam's joint 
conclusion (supported by TRN’s Head of HR) was that a comprehensive culture 
transformation would be needed including new corporate values, a new Leadership 
Framework and a wide scope of management and process changes that were yet to be 
determined. As a secondary phase, the COE sub-team was enlarged by the formation of a 
larger eight-member TRN Culture Team formalized in November of 2012. The TRN 
Culture Team realized that to make an effective impact they would need to start with 
senior management and provide both internal and externally sourced evidence of the need 
for change. The resulting high-level actions of the Transformation Project are illustrated 
in the timeline in Figure 30. While not all of the transformation objectives are linked to 
this research it is important and relevant for at least five reasons:  
 
1) First, the output of this research was a major catalyst and shaper of the actions 
taken to design and launch the Project. 
 
2) Secondly, the findings from this research and insights from analysis of iSCOPE 
components recognize that focusing on only a small range of interventions to 
foster cognitive strategic flexibility at the level of TRN’s individual Strategic 
Leaders would reduce the possibility of success. The wider contextual factors 
would also need to be considered to enable change. 
 
3) Thirdly, the resulting Culture Transformation Project Office (CTPO) 
encompassed 67 projects. All projects were formerly aligned with and followed 
the principles the Leadership Framework and new Corporate Values arising from 
this research. 
 
4) Fourthly, the implementation of actions beyond the timeline of this writing 
includes incorporating organizational design principles based on contextual and 
structural ambidexterity into the new TRN structure to be realized in 2016. 
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5) Finally, to present the intervention proposal and actions of this research without 
providing the wider organizational initiative would be misleading to the 
methodology, inconsistent with the literature and would not fully inform the 
comprehensiveness of the impact of this research on TRN. 
 
The overall TRN transformation project high-level timeline is presented in Figure 30. 
 
 
 
Figure 30: TRN Transformation Project Timeline 
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7.2. Starting At The Top And Touching Everyone 
 
A central component of TRN’s ambition of improving its competitiveness had always 
been to build a strong leadership pipeline. As noted in Project One’s Exploratory Focus 
Group discussion a specific concern regarding TRN’s Leadership was the strategic 
frames of the most senior population (TRN’s Strategic Leaders). Given insights and 
implications from this research focusing on the creation of a new Leadership Framework 
with appropriate strategy related competencies and supporting mechanisms would be an 
essential initial catalyst to foster cognitive strategic flexibility (Intagliata and Ulrich et al. 
2000).  
 
As has been well-documented, effective change initiatives need to be systematic and take 
a holistic approach including more than just soft issues (Sirkin and Keenan et al. 2005).  
There is also wide recognition that buy-in at the top is one of the most effective starting 
points for role modeling and supporting change (Kotter 2007). While the TRN Executive 
Board (EB) was aware that a high cost had been associated with the turnaround there 
remained significant diversity in perspectives on the implications and on what was 
needed next (EB interviews December 2011-January 2012). Despite the recognition of 
the impact that the turnaround measures had made on the overall health of the company, 
there remained some hesitation amongst the EB members to make any adjustments. The 
focus on execution and command and control practices were seen to be one of the main 
drivers of the turnaround results. As evidenced in both Lant and Milliken et al.’s (1992) 
research and this case study, past success tends to reduce the search for new options. 
Underlying this caution was a lack of trust or belief in the employee’s ability to sustain 
the changes implemented. Concern that employees “would return to the old ways” was 
expressed on several occasions (EB OHI interviews May-June 2012). Expressed in 
ambidexterity terms this lack of trust is based on the assumption that employees cannot 
manage the paradoxical discipline of delivering on leanness while embracing benefits of 
other mindsets. This reluctance and uncertainty signaled to the COE Culture Team that an 
independent assessment and external process expertise would be needed to provide 
credibility to the Cultural transformation. 
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The result was the engagement of McKinsey Consultants who proposed the 
Organizational Health Index model (Keller and Price 2011) as an initial means of 
engaging TRN in cultural transformation. This model is backed by extensive research and 
provides a framework for assessing an organization’s health based on nine dimensions 
and 37 practices. Figure 31 shows the nine dimensions of organizational health from the 
model.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31 Nine Dimensions of Health from McKinsey OHI Model 
 
The power and appeal of using the McKinsey OHI Research as a catalyst for change was 
that it is linked to competitiveness and sustainability. Making this close link to corporate 
performance had the advantage of making the transformation a ‘business issue’ and not 
just a soft skills Human Resources initiative. Additionally, through its survey, the OHI 
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provided an external methodology for capturing internal ‘facts’ and data. The approach 
closely follows the logic of Chandler’s (1962) concept of structure follows strategy by 
impacting practices that create firms Archetype (Appendix 5). This approach aligned well 
with the COE Culture Team’s intent to change specific practices including the key 
practice of Leadership (note in Figure 31 that TRN is in the bottom quartile in this 
practice). This tool also provided external validation and support of many of this 
research’s findings. This external validation increased the stakeholder trust in using the 
iSCOPE insights to guide the initial thinking. The first steps taken by the COE Culture 
Team were as follows: 
 
1) Use of the values portion of the OHI survey with the EB and participants of 
the 2.5 day Senior Leaders Dialogue event as a current state snapshot to make 
the issues explicit. Use of the event as a first discussion platform to build 
momentum for change to new corporate values, leadership and to raise 
awareness of the issue of sustainability. This event was held in January 2013 
with the one-day portion focusing on values/leadership/culture designed and 
co-facilitated by the researcher and the Head of Organizational Development. 
 
2) Buy-in achieved at the top by running a dedicated OHI workshop with the EB 
to decide on a TRN Archetype (July 2013). As part of this process individual 
interviews were held with each EB member before the workshop. The result 
was that a modified version of the ‘Execution Edge’ archetype was chosen for 
TRN. 
 
3) Creation of a new Corporate Values and Leadership Framework to match and 
reinforce the new aspired to corporate culture and Archetype (July to October 
2013). Validation and finalization of the TRN Corporate Values were 
achieved in an EB workshop designed and facilitated by the researcher in 
October 2013. 
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4) Creation of a Cultural Renewal Project Office to launch a comprehensive 
cultural change initiative (November 2013). The initiative includes EB 
sponsors for all five overarching work streams driving the ten practices and 67 
projects. The work streams were empowered to propose and plan changes in 
behaviors, practices and management systems consistent with the new aspired 
to culture. 
 
5) The first phase of Cultural Renewal launch at the November 2014 two-day 
Top 250 Summit. This event included the sharing of the 1) refreshed strategy 
2) chosen archetype, new corporate values, chosen practices and 3) the new 
TRN Leadership Framework. 
 
The Transformation Project plan includes a comprehensive set of events, activities, and 
actions over a three-year horizon. Two primary parts of this initiative relate directly to the 
practical contributions of this research. First, the Leadership Framework will have a 
direct impact on the expectations for strategic leaders’ behavior and their evaluation. The 
design of this framework along with its corresponding competencies will impact the 
strategic flexibility capability of the company by formalizing standards that aim to 
enhance strategic thinking and insight. Secondly, the five CTPO clusters aim to realign 
the systems and management practices to create a culture that is more conducive to 
finding the balance between exploitation and exploration (March 1991). 
 
As noted above, these combined wider but integrated actions in TRN are on-going at the 
time of this writing and have budgets for a three-year planning horizon. Nevertheless, we 
now consider in more detail the focused actions regarding fostering cognitive strategic 
flexibility at the individual level through the Leadership Framework. 
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7.2.1 Research Impact On Fostering Cognitive Strategic Flexibility In 
TRN 
 
Consistent with the contextual insights gathered in this research, four work streams were 
created to drive the adoption of the Leadership Framework:  
 
1) Communication and Symbolic Actions (to signal and reinforce the change) 
2) Building and Enabling (the Framework and its competencies through 
training/education)  
3) People Processes (embed framework and principles in all people processes) 
4) Management Systems and Processes (modify, replace and eliminate) 
 
This overall approach to the four work streams is represented in Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32: Approach To Embedding The Leadership Framework In TRN 
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The initiative to transform TRN’s strategic cognitive flexibility was (and is) politically 
sensitive. As with most change initiatives, there has been the need to recognize the 
challenges of the past and current state while focusing on the positive aspirations. In short 
the researcher emphasized this symbolically by successfully embedding slogans in the 
CEO’s and other corporate communications such as “What got us here, won’t get us 
there.” The positioning of the need for change in this manner avoided the potential for 
blame and finger pointing while at the same time not drawing direct links to lack of 
competency; especially in the area of strategic thinking (further metaphors were used to 
create a positive foundation for accepting the change).     
. 
7.2.2 Creating The New TRN Leadership Framework 
 
The researcher and a senior TRN colleague were made responsible for the creation of the 
new Leadership Framework. The creation process involved was as follows: 
 
1) Based on mutual expertise in the area of Leadership and reference to relevant 
(Corporate Leadership Council and academic sources)  literature, consideration of 
the essential aspects of “what good leaders do” was undertaken to create a first 
draft proposal. 
 
2) A review and analysis of internal views on Leadership and culture was conducted. 
This included all the data collected via the OHI results which were based on a 
survey of 10,000 employees, focus groups with high potentials and selective 
employees. Additionally individual interviews with 16 senior leaders were 
conducted directly by the researcher and the co-creator of the framework. The 
main purpose of this data was to listen to both the perceived current state and 
what the overall employee population aspires to in the area of leadership. 
 
3) Given that buy-in from the top would be an essential success factor in the 
implementation of the Framework the next step involved individual EB 
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interviews. A one hour interview with each of the 14 EB members was held to 
explore their ideas and preferences for the TRN Leadership Framework (See 
Appendix 6). 
 
4) A deeper sharing and review of the iSCOPE Framework was conducted. 
Comparisons and alignments were made to ensure full capture of the implications 
of the research.  
 
5) Analysis and consideration of gaps, strategic fit, and continuity were undertaken. 
An assessment of the alignment of the Leadership Framework with the draft new 
TRN Values was checked. Several reiterations and editing sessions resulted in the 
final creation of four Leadership Standards and supporting statements. The 
Framework was then approved October 17th, 2013 by the EB. The new 
Leadership Framework can be seen in Figure 33 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 33:  New TRN Leadership Framework At The Standards Level 
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7.3 The iSCOPE Link To The Leadership Framework  
 
A few things can be seen from the new TRN Leadership Framework at the “standards 
level.” The Framework mirrors three fundamental business processes of engaging 
resources, executing effectively and efficiently and renewal. The “We know our business 
and perform” standard emphasizes sensing, sense making, and foresight as a starting 
point. It also reinforces the need to exploit and deliver today. The “We lead with clarity 
and integrity” standard emphasizes providing and communicating a direction in a 
compelling way. It also touches on ethical standards that enhance organizational trust. 
The “We develop ourselves and others” standard addresses the need for a strong 
leadership pipeline and a learning culture capable of growth and adaptation. The fourth 
standard “We shape the future” supports a proactive mindset and both incremental and 
breakthrough innovation. Importantly it explicitly supports challenging the status quo. 
The final piece of the framework not shown in this visual is the supportive and 
challenging leadership styles. These two styles permeate all four standards and are 
underlying leadership principles of the framework. As noted in the iSCOPE diagnostic 
section these two styles support engagement, innovation, decisiveness and risk-taking 
(Heifetz and Grashow et al. 2009). To help educate and reinforce these dimensions the 
researcher has co-created a leadership assessment tool that indicates levels of use of the 
four styles of Command, Control, Supportive, and Challenging. This tool recognizes that 
all styles have their benefits and application but emphasizes the fit of use (and provides 
behavioral practices) in creating enabling contexts (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1994, Mom and 
van de Bosch et al. 2009). To further operationalize the Leadership Framework each of 
the four “Standards” have a set of behavioral competencies associated with them to 
further guide what is expected of TRN Leaders. Consistent with leadership pipeline 
theory, the competencies have been segmented for priority based on the level of the 
leader within the organization (Charan and Drotter et al. 2001). The emphasis on the 
strategic thinking dimension will be heavier the more senior the leader is. This is 
consistent with the Leadership Pipeline Model and the need to enable the potential for 
strategic flexibility amongst TRN’s Strategic Leaders as a starting point (Charan and 
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Drotter et al. 2001). Appendix 4 shows the full distribution of competencies across the 
Leadership Levels. 
 
A selective list of most relevant Leadership Competencies to enable TRN’s Strategic 
Leaders potential for Cognitive Strategic Flexibility are listed below: 
 
Strategic Agility 
Sees ahead clearly; can anticipate future consequences and trends accurately; has broad 
knowledge and perspective; is future oriented; can articulately paint credible pictures and 
visions of possibilities and likelihoods; can create competitive and breakthrough 
strategies and plans 
 
Perspective 
Looks toward the broadest possible view of an issue/challenge; has broad-ranging 
personal and business interests and pursuits; can easily pose future scenarios; can think 
globally; can discuss multiple aspects and impacts of issues and project them into the 
future. 
 
Dealing with Ambiguity 
Can effectively cope with change; can shift gears comfortably; can decide and act 
without having the total picture; is not upset when things are up in the air; does not have 
to finish things before moving on; can comfortably handle risk and uncertainty. 
 
Innovation Management 
Is good at bringing the creative ideas of others to market; has good judgment about which 
creative ideas and suggestions will work; has a sense about managing the creative process 
of others; can facilitate effective brainstorming; can project how potential ideas may play 
out in the marketplace. 
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Managing Vision and Purpose 
Communicates a compelling and inspired vision or sense of core purpose; talks beyond 
today; talks about possibilities; is optimistic; creates mileposts and symbols to rally 
support behind the vision; makes the vision sharable by everyone; can inspire and 
motivate entire units or organizations. 
 
Decision Quality 
Makes good decisions regardless of how much time it takes based upon a mixture of 
analysis, wisdom, experience, and judgment; most of his/ her solutions and suggestions 
turn out to be correct and accurate when judged over time; sought out by others for 
advice and solutions. 
. 
Successful implementation of the full list of Leadership Competencies and principles of 
the four Leadership Standards will take time. The multiple mechanisms for embedding 
the Framework throughout the organization as touched on earlier include and are not 
limited to the following: 1) Leader’s Performance Evaluations/bonuses for the “How” 
portion of achievements based on the Framework 2) Training programs at all levels of the 
organization have been redesigned in alignment with the Framework and Competencies 
3) The “Distinctive Leadership Index” Survey questionnaire launch. These questions 
provide evaluation by direct reports on the leadership competencies and standards and 
will be used for individualized development plans and the new “one-in-ninety line 
manager dialogues” 4) customization of the 360% feedback assessments based on the 
new competencies, feedback coaches trained on the new 360% for development 5) 
Framework and competencies used as criteria for new positions, succession planning and 
hiring through Behavioral Based Interview tools designed from the framework and 
competencies.  
 
In addition to these more permanent mechanisms, there has been formal communications 
and education program as part of the overall Cultural Renewal launch. During 2015, the 
leadership framework “module” has been included as one-third of the time of full day 
events at 32 global locations (3500 line manager participants). As of September 2015, the 
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redesigned corporate training programs have hosted 2867 participants for face to face 
sessions. At the more senior leader population level, five hundred and fourteen 360% 
assessments with feedback coaching sessions have been conducted. The final and equally 
critical component of enabling the new Leadership Framework is the alignment and 
embedding of the concepts in the development and execution of the 10 CTPO work 
streams and 66 other projects. These projects have been prioritized and are rolling out in 
order of business impact and logic of contextual alignment. 
. 
While the success of the intervention being undertaken at TRN is still uncertain, there are 
at least several dimensions that are transferable to other organizations. First the overall 
findings regarding the inhibitors and enablers to strategic thinking illustrated in this study 
provide an empirical benchmark of lessons learned. Secondly, this research has shown 
that using the repertory grid interview technique is a viable methodology for assessing 
and defining competency models. Thirdly, the iSCOPE framework provides a pragmatic 
framework that can be used as diagnostic tool for considering similar interventions in 
firm’s facing strategic flexibility and ambidexterity dilemmas or other culture and 
organizational change initiatives.   
 
7.4 Overview Of Contributions To Theory And Practice 
 
This research has made contributions to several aspects of research practice and 
organizational understanding: 
 
1) The new iSCOPE Framework provides practical utility for practicing managers. It 
also offers new conceptual links between a dispersed range of academic theories 
and integrates them in a pragmatic way. 
2) The research takes first steps towards creating a theoretical synthesis between the 
strategic flexibility and ambidexterity streams of research. By exploring the 
potential of conceptual and practical benefits not yet considered it helps move 
forward both fields and inform future research. 
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3) The use of the Repertory Grid Interview Technique builds on and complements 
previous studies in the area of strategic thinking and decision making. It also 
presents unique insights to the inhibitors and enablers of strategic thinking 
especially as related to cognitive strategic flexibility. 
4) The application of the theoretical concepts underlying strategic flexibility to 
practice offers a greater understanding of their pragmatic repercussions. The use 
of the Repertory Gird Interview Technique demonstrated its viability as a 
methodology for developing impactful Talent Management principles and 
competency model designs.  
 
This research has used a general inductive approach in both the development of the Case 
Study data collection and its analysis (Thomas 2006). Strauss (1987) refers to this as the 
researcher beginning with “an area of study and allowing the theory to emerge from the 
data”. The area of study in this Case has been strategic flexibility at the individual and 
organizational levels. As this research focus necessitates the study of enabling the 
cognitive dimensions of strategic flexibility it falls primarily under the “Individual and 
Organizational minds” research stream (Schwenk 1992). However, given the additional 
objective of application of the theoretical concepts to management practice the scope of 
this research includes further disciplines. A central and complementary area is Strategic 
Leadership since it is the vehicle from which all strategy is formulated and executed. The 
related fields of Talent Management and Change Management were also integral 
elements with the latter being more relevant to the execution of the TRN intervention.  
 
The general inductive approach employed for this research holds the expectation that the 
analysis will result in “the development of categories from the raw data into a model or 
framework” (Miles and Huberman 1994). The expectation of the creation of a framework 
is that it will be developed “through interpretations made from the raw data by an 
evaluator or researcher” (Thomas 2006). This research’s interpretation of the raw data 
has resulted in the inductive development of the iSCOPE Framework. The Framework’s 
components are based on two dimensions. Firstly, the content of the repertory grid 
interviews and supporting data collection provided the initial empirical basis. Secondly, 
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the integration of relevant academic literature and concepts for each of the Framework’s 
components provided increased conceptual depth. This new Framework has “practical 
utility” given its pragmatic application to the problems of practicing managers (Corley 
and Gioia 2011). The Framework’s use as a diagnostic tool for considering organizational 
interventions or as a change management vehicle has been demonstrated in the TRN case 
study. This process illustrated how it can be a useful lens for identifying and categorizing 
complex performance and behavioral factors at the individual and organizational levels. 
Further, the components of the framework are valuable for analyzing the 
interrelationships and dependencies between the factors or symptoms. As in the TRN 
example, the iSCOPE component analysis can lead to the design of intervention solutions 
that are concrete, mutually reinforcing and systemic. The Framework also provides new 
conceptual links and connections between a dispersed range of academic theories by 
integrating them in a pragmatic way. By identifying and demonstrating new ties between 
literature-based theories and applying them empirically, increased understanding of the 
practical implications of these connections has been achieved. For example, in the TRN 
case the linkage of strategic flexibility enablers and inhibitors across theories related to 
strategic foresight, cognitive biases, trust, leadership pipeline strength, information flows, 
integrated and differentiated thinking, slack, individual and organizational fear, and 
others outlined in the research, advances knowledge of their interrelatedness.  
 
The research has also argued that there are benefits to exploring the connections and 
applications of the streams of ambidexterity and strategic flexibility. Thomas (2006) 
states that “the primary purpose of the inductive approach is to allow research findings to 
emerge from the frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data, without 
the restraints imposed by structured methodologies.” During the iterative process of data 
collection, data analysis, reflection, and review of the literature the researcher became 
increasingly aware of the conceptual connections not yet explored between the strategic 
flexibility and ambidexterity streams. This awareness was heightened by the need to have 
practical applications from the concepts. From a solution perspective, the most recent 
work in ambidexterity showed promising connections both at the individual and 
organizational levels. Despite this realization, the researcher could not find previous 
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research explicitly connecting these two streams. While there is a logical connection 
between organizational adaptation and strategic flexibility the overlap has not been fully 
explored or leveraged. The closest emerging connecting factor appears to be in the area 
of the “dynamic capabilities” concept that is increasingly referenced in the ambidexterity 
stream. This evolving connection is due to two conceptual developments. Firstly, Teece’s 
recent significant shift and recognition that “Leadership matters” and that manager-
entrepreneurs strategic foresight “might be the most prominent feature of the firm’s 
dynamic capabilities” (Teece 2014). Secondly, researchers such as Birkinshaw’s (2015) 
trying to understand how ambidexterity is achieved in practice and breaking down 
components of dynamic capabilities as a means for exploring the variations in how firms 
use different flexibility tactics. The researcher anticipates that these two developments 
will eventually lead to greater connections between ambidexterity and strategic flexibility. 
While dynamic capabilities are not positioned as a strategy or a strategic principle they 
clearly describe the state of being flexible (Teece 2014). Therefore, this ‘flexible’ 
capability is at the core of exploration. There has not yet been a connection made 
between the potential similarities of the cognitive requirement at the individual level. 
Namely the paradoxical thinking demands of ambidexterity and cognitive strategic 
flexibility. Further, the more recent ambidexterity research investigating the mechanisms 
that enable the tension between exploit and explore likely have overlap with facilitating 
cognitive strategic flexibility as evidenced in the iSCOPE analysis of TRN. Additionally, 
the use of strategic flexibility concepts developed by Sanchez (1997) of coordination and 
resource flexibility supported by practical examples outlined by Aaker and Mascarenhas 
(1984) could have immense benefit to firm’s seeking ambidexterity. The connections 
between structural and contextual (or “behavioral”) ambidexterity to enabling strategic 
flexibility for firms in mixed clock speed industries such as TRN could be extremely 
practical (Birkinshaw 2015). While the findings from this research support the idea that 
structural ambidexterity is not feasible during turnaround situations. It can be a useful 
guiding concept in practice to resolve tensions between the exploit explore pressure of 
firms emerging from distressed contexts that need to regain an appropriate balance. This 
research has taken first steps towards creating a theoretical synthesis between these two 
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connected streams. By doing so, it helps to move forward both fields and inform future 
research by identifying factors and the benefit of their further study.  
 
This research has also complemented previous research using the repertory grid interview 
technique in the area of strategic thinking and decision making. The use of this method 
with a focus on constructs related to strategic decision making builds on previous studies. 
However, it provides unique insights to the inhibitors and enablers of strategic thinking 
especially as related to cognitive strategic flexibility. New potential connections amongst 
cognitive theory such as cognitive complexity/focus, strategic foresight/insight, and 
market variation factors were also considered. The findings of this research support the 
notion that clock speed factors are extant not only in either slow or fast clock speed 
industries but industries experiencing mixed clock speeds. At the firm level, these 
findings have repercussions on the cognitive demands of the executive leaders. When 
considered in combination with market variation demands as outlined in TRN, there is 
evidence that greater cognitive complexity and strategic insight are needed for senior 
managers working in these contexts. Therefore, there is a need to implement 
systematically mechanisms for enabling the potential for cognitive strategic flexibility 
beyond the level of the individual. This research has also provided greater understanding 
and the pragmatic repercussions of these concepts to practice in talent management 
systems regarding the placement of senior executives. From a methodological perspective, 
the study has shown that using the repertory grid interview technique is a viable and 
useful means of assessing the needs and defining critical elements of competency models. 
The use of the iSCOPE Framework for supporting the design of Leadership Frameworks, 
demonstrating the central role they play in the strategic thinking of individuals and the 
organization as a whole, the supporting methodologies of the larger TRN intervention 
change initiative derived from the Framework, all provide useful examples to 
practitioners in their pursuit of effective management practice. 
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7.5 Research Limits And Future Research 
 
This research was conducted within one Case Company and as such it has limits due to 
the particular characteristics of the company. TRN is a large multinational corporation 
that competes in a mature and hostile market context. Further, it is in an industry that has 
multiple clock speed dimensions. It would be valuable for future research to use similar 
methodologies in different contexts for comparative purposes. For example, a case study 
of a smaller organization might have a similar diversity in market dynamics but a 
different heritage and perhaps reveal new insights regarding how the ISCOPE 
components drive the strategic thinking of the company. Alternatively, selecting one 
country or focusing on uniquely different sites within a company could uncover further 
macro and micro organizational enablers and inhibitors to cognitive strategic flexibility. 
An additional limitation of this research is that the conclusion of the TRN intervention is 
still in process without a full understanding of the implications and outcomes. A repeat of 
the current research in four or five year’s time would be extremely informative regarding 
the lessons learned and empirical implications of the research. A complementary research 
initiative that could build on this case study might be using the repertory grid interview 
method with a wider purposeful sampling in TRN or another multinational corporation 
with comparable scale. While gaining the goodwill to undertake repertory grid interviews 
on a wider scale at senior leadership levels can be prohibitive, it would have great 
potential for a more granular study of the enablers and inhibitors of cognitive strategic 
flexibility by specified target groups. Segmenting and analyzing data from the grid 
interviews by market type, business unit or new-to-industry executives would potentially 
allow for increased understanding of what dynamics are primary or unique to the sub 
context in impacting their strategic thinking. Tracking the movement of the executives in 
a longitudinal study for the purpose of exploring changes in mindset and learning would 
also provide useful knowledge that could impact talent management theory and 
leadership development practices.     
 
In the specific example of TRN, there will be business units with clear separation based 
not only on product dimension but also on their opposing positions on the ambidexterity 
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spectrum. The use of the Repertory Grid Interview Technique in two of these structurally 
separated units would increase knowledge of how the different focus on exploitation and 
exploration impact management practices and strategic thinking within one company. 
This researcher has the role within TRN to continue and expand the execution of a subset 
of interventions proposed in this case study. Of particular interest is the impact of specific 
leadership practices on strategic thinking. While concrete actions and supporting systems 
are already in process within TRN, a research agenda that would support and measure the 
impact of the practices would contribute to practice theory. Combined with the structural 
ambidexterity of TRN’s business units, much could be learned about enablers and 
inhibitors of cognitive strategic flexibility and behavioral ambidexterity (Birkinshaw 
2015). It may also be that a deeper dive into the impact of the dynamics of each of the 
ISCOPE components would further inform practice. Further, the implications for 
strategic flexibility and ambidexterity would have immense potential. Finally, additional 
research using similar methodologies in other industries with mixed clock speed 
dimensions would also offer comparative value and possible applications of lessons 
learned for use in practice and the development of theory. 
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